Closing the Local Knowledge Gap in U.S. Competition with China

The United States and China are locked in a battle for influence around the world. China has leveraged its size, economic growth, and ability to scale centralized policies to extend its influence globally. Crucially, its engagement extends beyond formal government-to-government agreements; China engages with local-level actors and adapts to local customs and cultures to extend its reach beyond national capitals. At the same time, the Chinese regime is becoming more authoritarian and repressive, raising concerns that it may export these practices abroad. The United States, however, has yet to develop a comprehensive strategy for pushing back against Chinese influence at the edge of strategic competition. Long-standing aid programs and partnership initiatives have had success in places, but China has discovered weak spots in the worn ribbons of U.S. influence.

For the United States to roll back the web of Chinese influence, it must not only provide an alternative partnership; it must outcompete China in a fundamental skillset: local knowledge. Understanding the human landscape in detail—the populations of those areas, their needs and goals, and their views on the U.S. government—is critical to developing meaningful connections and presence that both benefit local populations and push back against Chinese influence.

To tackle these challenges, CSIS hosted a discussion series called “25 Gamechangers for 2025,” bringing together 25 leading thinkers on national security, including operators, industry leaders, and policymakers in Washington. This group crafted new strategies for engagement, particularly focused on how to gain knowledge of local population needs, feed it to decisionmakers in Washington, share it across the interagency, and adapt policy.

The group found that industry is one important piece of filling the local knowledge gap, and at the moment, it is underused. The private sector already excels at integrating diverse data sources to build detailed pictures of local populations and their behavior. These capabilities can help the U.S. government better understand local priorities, track changes in sentiment, and tailor outreach or development initiatives to local needs. Drawing on this kind of data-driven insight would enable the United States to reestablish deep, informed engagement at the local level, better support local needs, and compete more effectively with China’s localized influence.

China’s Spreading Influence

China has been building its strategy of local-level engagement for decades. Through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and public diplomacy efforts, China has engaged in hyper-local outreach, shifting economic and political loyalties. This has boosted China’s economy and secured its influence abroad, but it has also challenged global norms and institutions.

Launched in 2013, the BRI, also known as the New Silk Road, is a massive infrastructure development plan designed to improve connectivity and facilitate trade between China and other countries in Asia. The BRI’s focus has since expanded globally, with more than 149 countries officially joining as of February 2025, including 53 countries in Africa, 21 in Latin America and the Caribbean, six in Central Asia, and 17 in Europe. BRI projects include roads, railways, and port infrastructure. In Kenya, for instance, China financed the construction of a high-speed railway connecting Nairobi with Kenya’s largest port, Mombasa. Kenya also received 17.5 billion shillings ($172.5 million) to build a data center in Konza, a tech city about an hour from Nairobi. Similarly, the Dominican Republic received a $600 million loan from China to expand its electricity grid and agreed “in principle to PRC construction of a major new port facility.” BRI investments are believed to total over $1 trillion globally.

While these investments are typically negotiated at the government-to-government level, they have lasting impacts on communities far outside national capitals. For example, the China Railway Rolling Stock Corp’s Rolling Stock Center—a BRI project in Batu Gajah, Malaysia, a small town of 137,000 located 125 miles (200 kilometers) from Kuala Lumpur—illustrates how local communities can develop favorable views of China through engagement with BRI projects. The majority of the town’s residents (63 percent) viewed the project’s economic impact as “somewhat positive” or “very positive,” and 75 percent believed it would benefit the local economy in the future. Local government officials also praised the project’s job opportunities and broader economic benefits. Further, 69 percent of respondents indicated that they thought the project would have a positive social impact. Overall, 51 percent of residents listed China’s investments in Malaysia as “quite good” or “very good,” whereas only 13 percent believed they were “quite bad” or “very bad.” This localized engagement both advances China’s economic interests and can translate into broader political influence by strengthening Beijing’s reputation and positioning it as a constructive partner that is actively engaged in uplifting livelihoods.

China also engages directly with local stakeholders and organizations such as regional officials, municipal governments, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). These partnerships are diverse and extend far beyond trade and investment deals. For instance, in September 2024, the mayor of South Africa’s eThekwini Municipality (Durban) met with a Chinese delegation from Ningde, a city in Fujian Province. The two cities signed the Friendly Exchange City Relationship Agreement, committing to collaborate on “trade, investment in green energy, tourism, education, and environmental sustainability.” This partnership is particularly significant given that Durban is home to Africa’s largest and busiest container port, the Port of Durban.

To build such relationships, China has sought to understand and operate within local customs and norms. In Pakistan, for instance, China’s China-Pakistan Management Initiative brings senior managers from large Chinese firms to earn an executive master’s in business administration (MBA) at Lahore University of Management Sciences. In this program, Chinese professionals build local networks while gaining a deeper understanding of Pakistani culture and traditions, local languages, and Islamic values, as well as Pakistani business norms. Similarly, China cultivated influence in West Africa by enrolling expatriate Chinese workers in local language classes, emphasizing local management styles and local practices. Further, Chinese influencers based in the region have promoted Chinese culture in local languages via social media platforms like Facebook, TikTok, YouTube, and Instagram, further expanding Beijing’s visibility at the grassroots level.

Case Study I: Cambodia

These dynamics come together in Cambodia. Since joining the BRI in December 2013, China has become the country’s largest investor and trading partner. Through the BRI, China has financed infrastructure projects across Cambodia—including energy plants, airports, bridges, and major road networks—that have boosted connectivity and strengthened both the local and national economy. A flagship example is the $2 billion, 187-kilometer Phnom Penh-Sihanoukville Expressway, which cuts across 31 townships and 110 villages to link the capital with Cambodia’s only international deep-sea port. The project raised property values, created thousands of jobs, and reduced the travel time between the capital city and the city of Sihanoukville from six hours to two, thereby lowering transport and trade costs and encouraging regional tourism.

In addition, China and Cambodia have deepened educational cooperation. Cambodia hosts four Confucius Institutes, which provide Chinese language and culture programs to Cambodians in Phnom Penh and Battambang, Cambodia’s third largest city. Beyond the Confucius Institutes, more than 4,500 Cambodian students have studied technology and science in China, with at least 800 receiving financial aid from Beijing.

Furthermore, China is involved in Cambodia’s media environment. China Radio International (CRI), a Chinese state-owned broadcaster, produces Khmer-language content tailored to Cambodian audiences and reports on local events. In addition, China-based entities invest directly in local digital media platforms such as TNAOT News and ASEAN TOP NEWS, and China maintains content-sharing agreements with Cambodian media outlets, leading to the broad reprinting of China-produced content.

Though the BRI has created thousands of jobs and stimulated the local economy, unregulated investments have also had detrimental impacts, shaping local perceptions of China. Private Chinese investors have been known to “attach the BRI label to their investment, hoping that this will give their operations greater legitimacy and endorsement by governments,” blurring the distinction between state-backed projects and informal or illicit ventures. A striking example of this is the Sihanoukville Special Economic Zone (SEZ), a flagship BRI project located 12 kilometers from the port city of Sihanoukville. As of 2025, the SEZ has reportedly created more than 35,000 jobs, “transforming the city from a sleepy beach town into an urban hub of skyscrapers, hotels, condominiums, and casinos.”

But the SEZ remains highly controversial: Critics highlight limited employment opportunities for Cambodians, rising cost of living that is displacing local residents, and mounting environmental damage. These economic complaints are further weighed down by the situation in the nearby port city of Sihanoukville. While not part of the BRI itself, the city’s growth was triggered by BRI projects like the SEZ and the Phnom Penh-Sihanoukville Expressway. These anchors sparked massive private Chinese investment in real estate, including casinos and hotels, transforming the city. However, a combination of Cambodia’s 2019 gambling ban and the Covid-19 pandemic caused this private investment to falter, leaving thousands of buildings unfinished. Most critically, this vacuum catalyzed the city’s pivot into a hub for transnational organized crime, particularly human trafficking and industrial-scale scam centers, many of which are owned or operated by Chinese-speaking criminal groups. This has deepened negative associations between Chinese investment and criminal activity. A 2024 survey, for example, found that 75 percent of Cambodians identified crime and security problems as the main drivers of their unfavorable perceptions of growing Chinese engagement. Still, approximately three-quarters of Cambodians had only positive or more positive than negative views of Chinese influence in Cambodia.

Case Study II: Tajikistan

Like Cambodia, Chinese investment and presence in Tajikistan have shaped local perceptions. As part of the BRI, China has financed important infrastructure projects such as thermal power plants, power grids, and the Dushanbe-Chankak Highway, as well as the construction of new Tajik government parliamentary buildings. China also invested in Tajikistan’s 5G, cloud computing, and fiber optic cables as part of the Digital Silk Road. Further, Tajikistan’s State Communications Service received $50 million to establish the “Unified Electronic Communications Switching Center,” which the government claimed would ensure “national and information security.” The system, made with equipment purchased from ZTE, however, gives Dushanbe the ability to surveil online activity and “suspend mobile and wireless connectivity entirely during crises for the regime, a step taken by the government in the Pamir region on numerous occasions,” raising concerns about censorship, freedom of expression, and human rights.

Furthermore, with Russia focused on Ukraine, China is taking on a larger security role in Tajikistan and Central Asia as a whole. Tajikistan plays a crucial role in China’s regional security because it borders China’s autonomous Xinjiang region and serves as a security buffer zone between China and Afghanistan. Notably, the withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan in 2021 and subsequent Taliban takeover “heightened threat perceptions for both China and Tajikistan, further driving cooperation and coordination.” In November of that year, Tajikistan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs asked China to pay for a new base near the border with Afghanistan. In 2022, the two countries agreed to increase security cooperation, including by conducting joint counterterrorism exercises at least once every other year. China’s security forces have also “been deployed to suppress internal dissent,” particularly in Tajikistan’s Pamir region, where the response has been violent and repressive.

These investments have shaped regional perspectives while U.S. and allied efforts are falling short. On average, 63 percent of Tajiks express positive opinions of China, but only 35 percent have positive views of the United States. Similarly, in 2020, the Wilson Center found that 8 percent of Tajiks listed the United States as “unfriendly and threatening,” whereas only 2 percent said the same of China.

U.S. Efforts Falling Short by Comparison

While China has tried to polish its image in potential partner nations globally, the United States has not. But U.S. shortcomings in comprehensive engagement are not new. During the war in Afghanistan, the United States was unsuccessful in part because of a lack of understanding of the country. Few U.S. officials were familiar with Afghanistan’s culture, spoke Pashto or Dari, understood the complexities of Afghan tribal and ethnic groups, or were educated about Islamic beliefs and practices, harming U.S. credibility in the country. Further, rural areas, where three-quarters of Afghanistan’s population lives, were “untouched by many of the development projects funded by the United States.”

U.S. and allied efforts are once again falling short, as the United States has not provided an adequate alternative to China’s BRI investments or to Beijing’s local-level engagement. In the digital realm, for example, many developing countries are unable to afford U.S. or other allied technology. The relative affordability of Huawei tech, along with the extensive free training programs the company offers, strengthens China’s image and fosters alignment with China’s digital strategy. In Mexico, Huawei phones are so widespread that the probability that a phone call goes through a Huawei device is over 80 percent. Furthermore, Huawei donates devices to schools around the world—for example, an entire information and communications technology (ICT) lab for a Tanzanian school and 300 tablets to a university in Jamaica—ensuring that many students are educated using Huawei systems. This exposure has long-term implications as students become accustomed to those systems, making switching to Western systems both more costly and logistically difficult.

Recent cutbacks in U.S. foreign aid programs almost certainly will further hamper U.S. foreign influence efforts. Some observers worry that China will move in to fill these gaps. For instance, only one week after the United States cancelled aid projects in Cambodia focused on child literacy and nutrition, China’s aid agency announced funding for similar programs. Whether or not China ultimately fills these vacuums, Beijing is likely to gain an upper hand in on-the-ground engagement and local perception in the areas where the United States is actively pulling back.

With the total reimagination of U.S. presence abroad, Washington should put at the forefront of the rebuilding initiative plans for pushing back against China. Understanding the needs of local populations should be the foundation of this new strategy, and industry expertise should be the building blocks. Policymakers need new tools for collecting granular, local data, both with in-person engagement and using AI-enabled systems to draw insight from vast data resources. They need new technologies for analyzing and understanding that data quickly enough to make a difference. Finally, in order to fully coordinate these efforts across the national security establishment, the National Security Council needs to rapidly receive this analysis and be able to execute effective policy through rapid information sharing—another area where AI-enabled decision tools could help.

CSIS’s group of “25 Gamechangers for 2025” will set a new course for U.S. strategy, ready to deploy at a macro level and at a hyper–local level. New energy and new ideas, paired with technological solutions that can make the U.S. agile and effective, will help the United States push back against China.

CSIS thanks Vannevar Labs for their generous support of this effort.

Emily Harding is director of the Intelligence, National Security, and Technology Program and vice president of the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Julia Dickson is an associate fellow for the Intelligence, National Security, and Technology Program at CSIS.