Don’t Blink: The Delicate State of U.S.-China Communication Channels

In the wake of high-profile trade talks in Geneva, the state of U.S.-China communication channels is in focus again.

Over the course of Donald Trump’s first term as U.S. president, most of the more than 90 communication channels between the U.S. and Chinese governments went dormant. While some communication lines resumed during the Biden administration, Nancy Pelosi’s Taiwan visit and the 2023 surveillance balloon incident set back numerous bilateral channels. 

In Trump’s second term, U.S.-China leader-to-leader, economic and trade, and military-to-military communication channels are being tested again. Effective communication in these arenas can help guide bilateral relations, ease trade tensions, and prevent military conflicts, but many key communication channels face significant uncertainty.

Leader-to-Leader Channels

Leader-to-leader communications set the course for U.S.-China relations and directly influence lower-level communication channels. 

The momentum for leader-to-leader communication has fluctuated in the early days of the second Trump administration. Trump and Xi spoke in November 2024 and January 2025, and speculation swirled in early 2025 around a potential Trump-Xi meeting. However, while Trump insists on personal diplomacy, Xi will not risk the uncertainty of an unscripted, high-stakes meeting. The prospect of a Trump-Xi summit diminished after the April tariff escalations and ensuing multi-week standoff as both leaders attempted to avoid 'blinking first' and initiating even lower-level trade talks. 

During the Biden presidency, meetings between the two countries’ top officials became key to facilitating leader-to-leader meetings and stabilizing U.S.-China relations, particularly the high-level backchannel between U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi. Sullivan and Wang participated in heated U.S.-China exchanges in Alaska in 2021, but their private talks in Vienna and Malta helped re-engage the two sides after the tumult of the surveillance balloon incident and paved the way for the November 2023 Biden-Xi summit in San Francisco, which facilitated the resumption of military-to-military communications and other bilateral channels. 

It is unclear whether a similar backchannel will emerge between current U.S. and Chinese officials. Secretary of State and acting National Security Advisor Marco Rubio is a vocal critic of the Chinese government and was sanctioned by Beijing in 2020 for his outspoken criticism of the Chinese government’s actions in Hong Kong, among other human rights issues. Wang and Rubio spoke in January, but when Wang visited New York for United Nations meetings in February, no Trump officials met with him.

Economic and Trade Channels

Economic and trade channels will also have significant influence on the trajectory of the U.S.-China trade war and the broader relationship. 

The May trade talks in Geneva between U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer and a Chinese delegation led by Vice Premier He Lifeng resulted in 115% reductions of both countries’ tariffs for 90 days and the suspension or cancelation of other non-tariff measures implemented since April 2. The two sides also agreed to establish a mechanism for future dialogue among Bessent, Greer, and He. 

Despite this breakthrough, the protracted, painstaking buildup to the Geneva talks reflects the fragility of U.S.-China trade communications. In mid-April, Trump said “the ball was in China’s court” to make a trade deal. Beijing, however, projected defiance, vowed to “fight till the end” in the trade war, and repeatedly emphasized they would not enter dialogue on unequal footing. China framed the decision to ultimately agree to talks as meeting “global expectations” after repeated U.S. requests for dialogue. Tariff reductions will undoubtedly ease trade tensions, but optics and differing communication preferences may impede further progress.

Military-to-military Channels

Regular military-to-military communication between the United States and China can help reduce the risk of miscalculation, misunderstanding, and unnecessary crises.

U.S.-China military-to-military communication often follows the contours of broader bilateral developments. China suspended high-level military-to-military communications with the United States after Nancy Pelosi’s Taiwan visit in 2022, and such communications stalled until the Biden-Xi San Francisco summit enabled a virtual meeting between the two countries’ top generals in December 2023. A flurry of exchanges quickly followed, including the resumption of working-level military talks and high-profile meetings in Beijing and Hawaii. 

During Trump’s second term, U.S.-China military-to-military contact has been limited. April working group talks in Shanghai were the first such contact since Trump took office, but there have been no public signs of senior-level talks.

Major shakeups on both sides have also complicated high-level military ties. Xi’s purges of multiple Central Military Commission members are unprecedented in the post-Mao era, and Trump also fired several high-ranking military officials and is removing working-level staff across the U.S. government.

Beyond recent events, the United States and China have long lacked crisis management channels. As crisis management expert Michael Swaine points out, many possible crisis management mechanisms have been proposed and agreed upon at the track II level, but few have been implemented. Chinese scholar Zhang Tuosheng argues that the lack of crisis management frameworks impedes prevention, management, and control of crises and increases the risk of military conflict.

Looming Uncertainty

Many aspects of U.S.-China communication during Trump's second term remain uncertain. Neither Trump himself nor his top officials have articulated a grand strategy towards China, and the administration still has unfilled positions. Moreover, relationships between U.S. and Chinese counterparts at all levels will require time to develop.

However, Trump and Xi’s views on backchannels and working-level communication are at odds. Trump wants to deal with Xi directly, but Xi prefers to follow protocols and for matters to be hashed out between their envoys before leader-to-leader meetings. This dissonance could contribute to mutually reinforcing communication barriers.

Conversely, breakthroughs in one communication channel can bolster dialogue in other areas: backchannels such as the Wang-Sullivan channel can facilitate leader-to-leader meetings; trade talks can cool the trade war; leader-to-leader talks can enhance military-to-military exchanges; effective military-to-military crisis management can ease pressure on leaders. 

If the two countries can navigate trade tensions and avoid major incidents that hinder bilateral communication, there may be space to rebuild trust, but U.S.-China communication channels face a challenging and uncertain future.