Rebuilding to Reconquer: Can Russia’s Defense Firms Deliver?

In the post-2022 period, Russia has expanded domestic arms production to replace battlefield losses and meet future demand, with defense enterprises at the center of this effort. This report offers the first in-depth examination of five Russian defense firms that cover a broad cross-section of Russia’s defense sector: four major, well-established defense enterprises—Uralvagonzavod, Almaz-Antey, KRET, and Kalashnikov—and a new defense player, Ushkuynik. Together, these firms play central roles in the design, production, scaling, and supply of key systems—tanks and other armored vehicles (Uralvagonzavod), air defense systems (Almaz-Antey), electronic warfare (KRET), artillery and precision weapons (Kalashnikov), and drones (Ushkuynik). The report analyzes the internal and external factors shaping their production dynamics—including historical background and organizational structure, scale of production both before and after the full-scale invasion, revenue and procurement patterns (where possible), labor constraints, and evolving networks of foreign suppliers—and assesses what these trends imply for Russia’s ability to meet current wartime and future reconstitution goals. 

Taken together, the cases of Uralvagonzavod, Almaz-Antey, KRET, Kalashnikov, and Ushkuynik suggest a defense industry in which wartime pressures have accelerated trends toward greater consolidation around major state-backed conglomerates; expanded production and a specialized workforce; and an export portfolio shifting toward newer, combat-tested equipment, especially unmanned systems. As a result, despite battlefield strain, consistent labor shortages, corruption, persistent dependence on imported components, and sanctions-induced elevated costs to acquire them, Russia is likely to sustain a high production tempo in selected categories of weapons systems while gradually rebuilding its strategic reserves. This creates new challenges for NATO. While Russia is intensely focused on the war in Ukraine, should the war end or fighting subside, Russia would shift its focus to reconstituting its military forces. The central dilemma for Western defense planners is the asymmetry of production: Russia’s defense industrial base is likely to remain on a wartime footing even if the fighting in Ukraine stops, whereas Western defense industries are unlikely to mobilize comparably until a major conflict is already underway.

This publication was funded in 2025 by the Russia Strategic Initiative, U.S. European Command. The views expressed in this publication do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of War or the U.S. government.