The Alluring Potential of an Integrated Venezuelan Gas Industry

Photo: Ronaldo SCHEMIDT / AFP via Getty Images

Photo: Ronaldo SCHEMIDT / AFP via Getty Images

The Trump administration’s removal of autocrat Nicolás Maduro from power could deliver an energy diversification benefit that has received little attention. While Venezuela is well known for having the largest oil resources (303 billion barrels), its vast and long-stranded natural gas resources (roughly 192 trillion cubic feet) could become a source of global energy supply in their own right.

Venezuela’s gas resources have long been a stranded asset, trapped by ideology and mismanagement. If political stability holds in Caracas, gas may prove to be the fastest and most pragmatic pathway to reintegration, delivering wealth to the Venezuelan people, the Western Hemisphere, and its allies. The U.S.-led Western Hemisphere would gain a more resilient energy architecture, less exposed to adversaries and bad actors.

Background: Venezuela’s Gas Potential

Venezuela produces and consumes only about 3.1 billion cubic feet per day (bcf/d), roughly the same scale as the United Kingdom’s output in 2024, but with proven reserves roughly 40 times larger than the United Kingdom’s, according to the Energy Institute. Venezuela’s gas output is mostly “associated gas,” produced as a by-product of crude oil drilling. While monetizing additional associated gas will likely occur over time as infrastructure and capital become available, nonassociated “dry gas” fields could see faster development, particularly those located near the infrastructure-rich Trinidad and Tobago.

Trinidad is the key to Venezuela’s capacity as a gas supplier to the world because of its geographic proximity (bordering Venezuela) and Trinidad’s already-established liquefied natural gas (LNG) export facility, known as Atlantic LNG. While Trinidad’s native gas resources are in structural decline, neighboring Venezuela has plenty of gas resources to contribute to a dynamic partnership.

There are three main natural gas fields shared between Trinidad and Venezuela: Loran-Manatee, Dragon-Hibiscus, and Manakin-Cocuina. Shell reached a final investment decision in 2024 on the Trinidad portion of the Loran-Manatee field.

  • The Manatee gas field, located in Trinidadian waters, holds an estimated 2.7 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of gas, while the adjacent Loran field on the Venezuelan side holds roughly 7.3 Tcf. The Trinidad portion of the Loran-Manatee is expected to come online by late 2027, helping to supply Trinidad’s Atlantic LNG facility with around 600 million cubic feet per day. This would supply roughly 45 percent of the feed gas needed to sustain Atlantic LNG’s 2025 output. Venezuela and Trinidad previously agreed on a government-to-government framework in which each country would develop its respective share of the Loran-Manatee field. With the political environment transformed, full unitization of the field could now be reconsidered, further enhancing efficiency and recovery.
  • Venezuela’s Dragon gas field, estimated at roughly 4.2 trillion cubic feet, is a large, proven, shallow-water field, about 100–125 meters deep, with minimal geological risk. Venezuela and Trinidad had negotiated a development partnership before Maduro suspended the project in October 2025. Importantly, Shell and Trinidad’s National Gas Company still hold a 30-year license for the Dragon field, though development remains contingent on further easing of U.S. sanctions.
  • The Hibiscus platform that Shell is developing in Trinidadian waters sits only about 10 miles from Dragon. Connecting the two would be technically straightforward, requiring relatively limited new infrastructure. From an engineering standpoint, synergies could be developed quickly, allowing gas production as early as 2029, subject to licensing and regulatory approvals.
  • The Manakin-Cocuina gas field, estimated at around 1 trillion cubic feet and developed by BP, could also benefit from renewed cooperation between Venezuela and Trinidad. Sustained U.S. government support will be critical to its development and monetization.
Leslie Palti-Guzman

Leslie Palti-Guzman

Senior Associate (Non-Resident), Energy Security and Climate Change Program

Programs & Projects

Outlook for Venezuelan Gas Growth

If above-ground requirements—including fiscal, legal, and licensing—move smoothly, incremental gas volumes could follow a two-phase process. In the near term, development of the offshore dry gas fields shared by Venezuela and Trinidad could add meaningful volumes of approximately 1.8 bcf/d within four years, leveraging operational infrastructure and commercial channels on the Trinidadian side. Over a five-to-seven-year timeframe, larger volumes of approximately 3 bcf/d could materialize, without counting associated gas monetization, which would likely proceed as well. There are three reasons Venezuelan gas could move more quickly than many expect:

  1. The foundation for cross-border gas cooperation with Trinidad has already been laid. For years, governments and companies have attempted to create synergies between the neighbors, only to see progress derailed by political instability emanating from Caracas and the resulting sanctions regimes. As that constraint is gradually lifted, cooperation on technical and commercial matters will become increasingly plausible.
  2. With full cooperation and licensing, these shared fields could materially increase the available gas supply for exports via Trinidad. A greater gas supply would give a lifeline to Trinidad’s Atlantic LNG liquefaction project. Trinidad currently produces about 2.4 bcf/d of gas and exports roughly 1.2 bcf/d (9 million tons per annum) of LNG, well below its nameplate capacity due to feed gas shortages. By developing the shared gas fields, Atlantic LNG could rebound to full capacity of 12 million tons per annum (MTPA) by or before 2030. The mothballed idled liquefaction train one could even be restarted if still technically possible, which would bring a combined extra 6 MTPA of LNG from Trinidad (compared to 2025 volumes) to the global market by the end of the decade, coinciding with the European Union’s cessation of Russian gas imports (still planned for the end of 2027).
  3. Europe is one of the natural markets for this future LNG growth. LNG has become the backbone of European energy security, but policymakers increasingly worry about concentration risk. U.S. LNG dominates Europe’s import portfolio, making up over half of EU LNG imports in 2025. Gas from Venezuela, exported via Trinidad, would offer Europe a complementary Atlantic Basin supply. Shipping routes are short, costs are competitive, and there are no major chokepoints.
     

In global terms, an incremental 6 MTPA is not transformative in a well-supplied market, but it provides low-cost supply diversification. If all this LNG were to land in Europe, it would represent roughly 6 percent of the European Union’s 2025 LNG demand. In a world where Europe remains committed to diversification away from Russia and increasingly sensitive to concentration risk, that is a meaningful addition. In a glut scenario, additional Trinidad volumes could displace a few U.S. spot cargoes at the margin or exert downward pressure on Atlantic Basin prices.

The operators of these shared fields on the Trinidad side, Shell and BP, two European companies, are actively engaged with U.S. authorities regarding licensing, conveying to the Trump administration the commercial logic of monetizing these cross-border fields using existing infrastructure. Meanwhile, U.S. oil companies are likely to be more involved in monetizing the associated gas as oil production increases and infrastructure improves.

Benefits of the Integrated Venezuelan Gas Industry

Commercialization of Venezuelan gas would provide Europe with a new source of supply as it seeks further diversification from both Russia and the United States, and as LNG from Qatar has recently experienced major disruption. It would also provide a steady source of supply for neighboring Trinidad, seen as a natural partner to export Venezuelan gas, as its own organic resources have been depleted.

For Washington, Venezuelan gas routed through Trinidad would reinforce Western Hemisphere energy integration, support a key Caribbean partner, and help stabilize global gas markets, keeping cost-competitive Russian gas at bay.

Leslie Palti-Guzman is a senior associate (non-resident) with the Energy Security and Climate Change Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., and founder and president of Energy Vista.

Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

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