The Archipelago and the Umbrella: Harmonizing French and NATO Nuclear Deterrence

When President Macron took the podium at the Île Longue submarine base last March, he introduced an important evolution in French nuclear doctrine with the unveiling of dissuasion avancée (forward deterrence). This concept is a direct response to Russia’s protracted war in Ukraine, NATO’s preparation for high-intensity conflict, and transatlantic restructuring via “burden-shifting.” Macron framed forward deterrence as complementary to NATO. It certainly can be, but this will require some work.

There is a long-standing question about how to reconcile France’s fiercely guarded sovereign nuclear deterrent with NATO’s collective architecture, built upon U.S. extended nuclear deterrence. Macron’s proposal provides opportunities to harmonize French and NATO efforts, while preserving French independence. However, if uncoordinated, it risks creating friction points, muddying alliance signaling, and stoking political anxieties among European allies who still view the U.S. nuclear umbrella as existential.

To prevent this initiative from reducing allied cohesion, it should be implemented carefully. This article discusses what France proposes, evaluates potential interfaces with NATO, and offers a pragmatic roadmap to align efforts. This can ensure forward deterrence strengthens, rather than splits, the architecture of European deterrence.

Different, But Compatible, Nuclear Doctrines and Practices

In the nuclear domain, Macron’s address identified practical issues—doctrine, signaling, and exercises—that must be measured against NATO’s own framework to see where they align or clash. Despite lingering misconceptions, French and NATO nuclear deterrence are compatible in practice.

Doctrines, not Dogma

A myth persists that French nuclear doctrine is incompatible with NATO’s, which is built upon U.S. and UK nuclear policy, because of the strict separation between the nuclear and conventional domains in French thinking. Thus, any notion of integrated deterrence, or a continuum of conventional and nuclear options, is anathema to Paris. France relies on a unique, nonrenewable warning shot (ultime avertissement) to signal that France’s vital interests are engaged and to restore deterrence.

In Macron’s address, he rejected “flexible nuclear response” and noted France long ago discarded any concepts of “tactical use of nuclear weapons.” Yet in 1991, NATO modified flexible response to “reflect a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons,” eliminated nuclear artillery and short-range missiles, and changed its posture to rely solely on dual-capable aircraft. Using nuclear weapons on a mass battlefield scale to blunt a conventional advance is a Cold War trope. In modern allied strategy, any nuclear employment would be fundamentally strategic, under “extremely remote” circumstances.

A NATO or French nuclear mission employing nuclear-armed aircraft would have tactical and operational factors, but both would intend to have a similar strategic effect: altering an adversary’s decision calculus. This doctrinal coherence will facilitate France’s bilateral dialogue with its allies, who agree with the strategic purpose of nuclear weapons.

A deeper divergence persists, however, in how France and NATO conceptualize conflict under a nuclear shadow. NATO prepares for intense conventional combat in a contested environment, including the possibility of Russian nuclear use, or threat of use. France, by contrast, would never incorporate any warfighting dimension to its nuclear strategy. This can create a divergence from allies’ interest in discussing potential scenarios involving conflict against a nuclear-armed adversary, which could create strategic and operational dilemmas.

In such scenarios, NATO would be managing escalation across conventional and nuclear domains, carefully deterring nuclear aggression. A French warning shot could occur amid an ongoing conventional war. In a real-world situation, maintaining robust communication among allies would be paramount to ensure maximum coherence between distinct responses, while preserving independent decisionmaking.

Nuclear Practices

The most novel element of Macron’s address was his vision of an “archipelago of forces”—deploying elements of France’s Strategic Air Forces to allied territory to create strategic depth. This temporary dispersal model is intentionally distinct from the permanency of NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements, in which European host nations provide bases for dual-capable aircraft or storage sites for U.S. nuclear weapons. Paris has deliberately drawn a clear line between its posture and NATO’s while simultaneously introducing a new modality of nuclear dispersal to strengthen nuclear signaling.

While peacetime deployments of nonnuclear-armed Rafale fighter jets to Sweden or Poland present low risks, deployments for crisis signaling should be calibrated thoughtfully. In a crisis, a nuclear signal must be received and interpreted accurately by Moscow to induce de-escalation.

There is a risk that the signal will lack credibility if dispersal is seen as a bluff, rather than an effective way to employ French nuclear air forces from alternative locations. It could also inadvertently invite an opportunistic attack to test the validity of France’s commitment. Participating nations will be vulnerable to Russian targeting, as are NATO’s air bases. The archipelago will complicate Russian targeting if a variety of austere locations are used, but the trade-off is a potential loss in effectiveness, including less logistical support and protection. A range of basing options should be considered to balance operational flexibility and survivability, addressing force protection, communications, and logistics.

The biggest risk is in uncoordinated nuclear signaling, which could undermine escalation management. Determining whether a bilateral decision by France would be communicated to other allies, or to NATO as a whole, is important, as well as how this will align with NATO’s collective efforts, including decisions about its nuclear forces. While there is potential to strengthen deterrence if Russia sees a complicated picture, there is also risk of fragmented allied signaling.

Regarding exercises, Paris has invited European allies to participate in the French nuclear air exercise Poker. The United Kingdom sent observers in December 2025, and German aircraft will participate in September in a conventional role. Incorporating allied air forces will demonstrate collective strategic solidarity and build political goodwill.

NATO allies already provide conventional support to nuclear operations and understand the vital role it has for deterrence. In 2025, over 70 aircraft from 14 nations participated in the Steadfast Noon nuclear exercise, and some nations contributed air bases or airspace. France’s allies, including those that provide NATO with dual-capable aircraft, understand nuclear air operations and may have ideas on how to add complexity to Poker. French allies will gain insight into employment of France’s air-launched, nuclear-armed cruise missile, called the ASMPA-R—a unique capability in Europe.

Exercise participation should not be performative, though. Paris has stated that a real-world mission will be executed by France alone. France’s allies may begin to question if participation is worthwhile. The advantage of Steadfast Noon is in demonstrating collective mission readiness, not just political support. Participation in French exercises should, to the extent possible and compatible with French independence, reflect European cohesion and find a way to give meaningful roles to European participants.

Achieving Coherence Between Conventional and Nuclear Domains

The conventional elements of forward deterrence are a step toward refining French thinking about escalation management below the nuclear threshold, in a form of rapprochement with NATO’s approach. The question is how French and NATO demand signals for conventional capabilities can be mutually supportive.

Understanding Épaulement

The French concept of épaulement—most often translated as “mutual support”—describes how conventional and nuclear forces interact. New operational realities are forcing transition from a rigid stance to a more flexible approach. Under épaulement, conventional forces must be robust enough to handle high-intensity conflict below the nuclear threshold, preventing an adversary from circumventing deterrence from below.

On this point, French and U.S. policies converge. The United States has spent decades encouraging Europe to field more conventional forces to reduce reliance on U.S. support—and the U.S. nuclear trigger. The current debate over burden shifting is a modern echo of 1960s arguments that birthed the conventional requirements for flexible response. The difference now is that high-end capabilities are sought as the backstop for conventional forces, versus tactical nuclear weapons.

NATO’s efforts to integrate nonnuclear strategic capabilities into its plans can align with France’s ambition to spearhead European initiatives. If France and other European nations improve the conventional leg of their forward deterrence, it could actually become a central contribution to the so-called European pillar of NATO.

Avoiding Duplicative Architecture

The Île-Longue speech identifies early warning, missile defense, and deep precision strike as key tools for escalation management. These capabilities are also vital for conventional defense, which can ensure the nuclear threshold remains high. And they can also support nuclear forces by protecting air bases or degrading anti-access environments.

The conventional capabilities that may emerge from forward deterrence initiatives will likely be integrated into NATO’s planning. While critics often fear a hidden intent to construct a “French-led Europe,” it is worth recalling that France is fully reintegrated into NATO’s military command structure and participates in the processes that determine alliance capability needs. NATO’s defense planning process produces an aggregate demand signal designed to support its defensive plans. Each ally receives explicit capability targets to ensure its investments benefit the collective defense architecture. Fortunately, the capabilities Macron highlighted align with NATO’s priorities. Paris has no intention—nor the capacity—to ensure this conventional build up on its own, hence it envisions a division of labor among Europeans.

The primary challenge for European allies, including France, will be to build defense industrial capacity while maintaining the United States’ political buy-in. This will require convincing U.S. policymakers that European defense industrial expansion yields strategic benefits—reinforcing NATO’s overall posture while allowing gradual burden shifting—which outweigh potentially less market share for the U.S. defense industry.

Consultations “à La Française”

Political decisionmaking is vital for deterrence credibility, as much as effective military forces. France’s offer of dialogue with allies is welcome for its inclusivity. Yet allies must clearly evaluate what Paris is offering versus what NATO already provides.

France has only established institutional nuclear dialogues with the United Kingdom and Germany so far. A flexible web of bilateral forums may be useful for peacetime topics, such as exercise participation, but will likely need to be streamlined for crisis situations.

Allies entering these dialogues must learn the “grammar” of French deterrence, but they should also ask hard questions about nuclear signaling and operations, even if Paris prefers to dodge. Since 1966, allies have used the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) to develop agreement on NATO’s nuclear policies, plans, and posture. They are accustomed to having a voice on nuclear matters and making consensus decisions.

NATO has well-developed procedures for nuclear decisionmaking that are integrated with its military command structure to ensure political control over nuclear forces. During a crisis or conflict, the supreme allied commander Europe can provide a holistic, multi-domain view of the theater that no European capital can match. And the leaders of all three allied nuclear powers retain absolute control over their nuclear forces, regardless of the type or format of allied consultations.

Closer dialogue will not abrogate French sovereignty, but Paris must anticipate that its allies will expect real substance, not just rhetorical briefings, if they are expected to accept the risks of closer political and military cooperation. They will understand the limits of consultations, in that decisions ultimately will be made by the French president alone, as this will echo the decades of experience working with the United States and the United Kingdom. The question, therefore, lies more in the articulation of the multiplicity of bilateral European nuclear dialogues, among themselves, and with NATO’s existing framework.

Proposal for a Franco-NATO Nuclear Roadmap

Mapping the Archipelago

The conditions for temporary dispersal of French nuclear aircraft must be negotiated ahead of a crisis. Ad hoc diplomacy during an active nuclear standoff would invite panic and mixed messaging. France should use its bilateral dialogues to discuss details and gain agreement with willing host nations, tailored to mission needs and national restraints. Agreements should address the prerequisites for dissuasion avancée: basing, access, and overflight; secure communications; force protection, including air and missile defense; and pre-negotiated crisis protocols.

Crucially, because an ally would be bilaterally supporting a sovereign French deployment, dispersal should be seen as decoupled from collective NATO action. However, there remains a need to calibrate nuclear signals or risk unwanted escalation. Lines of communication could be established between France’s Strategic Air Forces and NATO commands to enable information sharing and operational deconfliction.

Playing Poker at High Noon

Exercise coordination could yield powerful synergies. Overlapping the timing or airspace of French and NATO nuclear air exercises could send a potent and unified deterrent signal to Russia. Exercise coordination would amplify political cohesion across the alliance while underscoring separate nuclear decisionmaking centers. Ultimately, incorporating deep precision strike and missile defense capabilities can add complexity to exercises and refine concepts for conventional support to nuclear operations. Conventional and nuclear exercises should inform each other to ensure coherence, operational coordination, and resource allocation.

Deterrence credibility will be enhanced when Moscow sees more nations participating in exercises with NATO and its three nuclear powers. While France should always prepare for independent action, utilizing advanced allied capabilities in a French nuclear air operation should be discussed.

Harmonizing Conventional Demand Signals

On the conventional ledger, Paris should leverage its position within NATO to ensure the capabilities required for épaulement are aligned with the NATO defense planning process. Harmonizing these efforts will ensure allied investments support both collective defense and nuclear deterrence. This will be especially important in the near term as the alliance continues to restructure itself.

Expanding European defense industry production to meet French and NATO demand will also strengthen allied preparedness for conflict. A Europe that is conventionally stronger should induce caution in Russia and deter potential aggression. This will naturally sustain a high nuclear threshold across the alliance, making a conventional collapse less likely and nuclear deterrence more credible.

Finding the Right Consultation Mechanism

In a crisis or conflict, political consultations will be necessary, as time and circumstances permit. While France is likely to maintain its long-standing abstention from the NPG, it should find a way to ensure coherence between its bilateral dialogues and NATO consultative bodies. This could be achieved by regularly briefing the North Atlantic Council on French nuclear consultations while remaining outside of NATO nuclear decisionmaking. Doing so will strengthen political unity and promote coherence in allied nuclear decisions before a crisis hits. Rather than a redundant multilateral alternative, the strength of the French approach lies in its bilateral formats, which preserve the strategic advantage of “separate centers of decision-making” that complicate an adversary’s calculus of how multiple independent powers might react.

Ultimately, dissuasion avancée should not be viewed as an anxious hedge against a fracturing NATO alliance, but as a complementary reinforcement of NATO’s overall posture. By replacing ambiguous rhetoric with strengthened bilateral ties and practical measures, France can ensure that its fiercely guarded independence directly bolsters collective European defense. In an era defined by a protracted war in Europe and evolving transatlantic needs, Paris can prove that a French archipelago can coexist alongside the U.S. umbrella.

Astrid Chevreuil is a former visiting fellow in the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. and a French career diplomat. Jim Stokes is a senior fellow in the Future of Security Programme at GLOBSEC and the former director of nuclear policy on the NATO International Staff.

The views expressed are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the opinions of any other organization.