Is China’s New London “Super Embassy” a Risk to National Security?

The planned 20,000-square-meter embassy complex will also include 225 residences, a “cultural exchange” building, and facilities to accommodate hundreds of Chinese embassy staff—making it the largest diplomatic mission in Europe. This size could provide ample cover for intelligence personnel and facilities. With an external area of 614,000 square feet, China could also design parts of the building to optimize for intelligence collection, such as multistory buildings optimized for line-of-sight signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection. In previously submitted architectural plans, China proposed constructing a seven-story Embassy House featuring a rooftop structure of unclear purpose. It could house additional floors, including sensitive communications and collection equipment. Part of the proposed Embassy House faces directly northwest, which may provide unobstructed views of 30 St Mary Axe (The Gherkin) and other key buildings in London’s financial district. This tactic has precedent: In 2022, Beijing sought to construct a 70-foot white pagoda in Washington, D.C.’s National Arboretum—a project ultimately blocked after the FBI determined it could be used to spy on Congress. If the United Kingdom approves this embassy plan, China will likely proceed with constructing its seven-story Embassy House—this time on sovereign Chinese diplomatic territory—leaving British authorities with little recourse to stop it. Beijing has vehemently denied all allegations of espionage at the new site, stating that “anti-China elements are always keen on slandering and attacking China.”

Q2: Why is the UK government concerned about allowing ample room to protest?

A2: The UK government is concerned that the new embassy complex, once completed, will regularly attract a large number of protesters. In early 2025, two large demonstrations—each drawing over 4,000 participants—took place amid growing fears that the facility could be used to surveil, intimidate, and even illegally detain Chinese dissidents living in London. These concerns are particularly acute among the city’s Hong Kong diaspora, which numbers around 285,000 people—many of whom fled following Beijing’s 2019 crackdown on pro-democracy movements. These fears are not unfounded. Since November 2022, members of Parliament have accused China of operating illegal “police stations” in London and Glasgow to monitor and intimidate dissidents—claims Beijing strongly denies. While the alleged station in London was reportedly just a small office, protesters fear that China’s new “super embassy” could significantly expand the presence of Chinese agents in the city and serve as a new hub for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s repression of Chinese nationals living in London.

Local authorities, in turn, have mostly expressed concern that the proposed site is too small to safely accommodate the anticipated influx of large-scale protests. In 2022, the Tower Hamlets Council rejected China’s planning application, citing the risk that large protests could endanger local residents. Later in 2024, London Metropolitan Police’s counterterrorism unit echoed these concerns, warning that the site’s layout would funnel protesters and could disrupt surrounding roads—an assessment that played a key role in the Council’s decision to again reject the application in December 2024. However, in January 2025, Scotland Yard abruptly dropped its objections after reviewing a China-funded study that claimed up to 4,500 people could safely protest at the site and surrounding streets. However, the proposed site has since attracted two large-scale protests in February and March 2025, with the latter drawing over 6,000 participants—well beyond the report’s safety capacity. Despite this, neither the Metropolitan Police nor the Council has formally reissued their objections, likely because the decision has since shifted to the UK government.

Q3: Why is China pushing for its approval now?

A3: China is now renewing its push for its embassy’s approval, likely driven in part by the recent change in the UK government. When China’s previous planning permit was rejected in 2022 by the Tower Hamlets Council, China chose not to appeal, anticipating that the then-Conservative Sunak government would not support it (Sino-British relations were at a seven-year low point). However, following Labour’s July 5, 2024, victory, China moved quickly to revive the project—resubmitting a largely identical planning proposal just two weeks after the election. Diplomatic pressure ramped up in November 2024, when Chinese President Xi Jinping personally phoned Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer to press for the embassy’s approval. In response, Starmer instructed Deputy Prime Minister Angela Rayner to officially “call in” the application—wresting final decision-making authority from the local Tower Hamlets Council to the UK government and significantly increasing the likelihood of approval.

A quid pro quo may be at play between Beijing and London. The United Kingdom’s own embassy in Beijing is in urgent need of repairs, but China has frozen the requisite building permits until the United Kingdom greenlights its new embassy in London. Broader geopolitical shifts may also be influencing the situation. While the United Kingdom has traditionally aligned closely with U.S. policy on China, the second Trump administration’s chilly posture toward European allies and growing fears of a U.S. retreat from Europe and NATO could prompt British leaders to reassess their stance and seek deeper engagement with Beijing.

Q4: What is the UK government’s calculation?

A4: The ruling Labour government—and Prime Minister Starmer in particular—appears open to reviving China’s embassy plans. Since becoming prime minister, Starmer has signaled a willingness to reengage with Beijing and has adopted a noticeably more conciliatory stance than his recent Conservative predecessors. He was the first British prime minister in over five years to meet with President Xi and has publicly called for “consistent, durable” ties with China. Economic factors are likely a key driver of this shift—as the United Kingdom seeks to revive its slowing economy, attracting Chinese foreign investment has become a priority. At the same time, uncertainty surrounding Britain’s trade relationship with the United States under a second Trump administration may be prompting UK leaders to deepen economic ties with China. Notably, Starmer’s decision to “call in” China’s application preceded the UK finance minister’s January visit to Beijing, during which she secured GBP 600 million (USD 756 million) in Chinese investment commitments. Further, Foreign Secretary David Lammy and Home Secretary Yvette Cooper have also expressed support for the embassy plan and sent a favorable joint letter to the Planning Inspectorate, which recently concluded its independent inquiry and has issued a formal, non-public recommendation to Rayner on June 12. Rayner is expected to make a final decision by September 9, 2025.

However, opposition to the embassy project exists within Parliament, though it largely falls along partisan lines. Conservative Shadow Justice Secretary Robert Jenrick condemned the project, calling the building a “spy headquarters,” while former Conservative leader Sir Iain Duncan Smith warned that the embassy could jeopardize intelligence sharing with the United States (see more in Question 5). However, these objections are unlikely to significantly influence the current government or sway Rayner’s final decision.

Q5: What would this mean for the U.S.-UK partnership, intelligence sharing, and the Five Eyes alliance?

A5: Should the United Kingdom move forward with approving China’s new embassy, it could have significant implications for U.S.-UK intelligence sharing and the broader Five Eyes alliance. On June 7, a senior Trump administration official voiced concern, stating that the United States is “deeply concerned about providing China with potential access to the sensitive communications of one of our closest allies.” The Times also reported that President Trump previously urged Starmer to reject the proposal during trade talks in May. Should the project be approved, the Trump administration may have more reservations about sharing intelligence with the United Kingdom, fearing that China could gain access to highly secret U.S. sources and methods. In response, the United Kingdom may scale back its own intelligence sharing with the United States. Given that the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) and Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) are among the world’s most advanced intelligence agencies—with extensive global intelligence collection networks, particularly in the Middle East and Africa—any reduction in intelligence sharing would have serious consequences for both countries’ national security and the broader U.S.-UK alliance. Moreover, this shift could reverberate across the Five Eyes alliance, potentially prompting Canada, Australia, and New Zealand to also scale back their own intelligence sharing. As the second-most powerful member of the alliance, a reduced UK role would significantly weaken Five Eyes’ overall effectiveness and capabilities.

Security concerns surrounding the proposed Chinese embassy have also drawn criticism from Congress. On February 19, 2025, the U.S. House Select Committee on the CCP issued a statement on X criticizing the proposed embassy, warning that it poses “significant security concerns: from interference and surveillance to risks for sensitive infrastructure like London’s financial services.” In a separate letter, CCP Committee Chairman John Moolenaar (MI-2) and Congressional-Executive Commission on China Co-Chairman Chris Smith (NJ-4) directly urged the UK government to reject the embassy plans. However, other Five Eyes members—Canada, Australia, and New Zealand—have not yet formally commented on the new embassy. Westminster has sought to reassure its allies, stating that any potential security risks associated with the embassy “will be taken care of assiduously in the planning process.” However, such assurances may carry limited weight, as implementing safeguards at this stage would still require Chinese cooperation—something that remains unlikely (see more in Question 6).

Q6: What can the United Kingdom and the United States do about this? What are the downsides to those policies?

A6: The United Kingdom has several options at its disposal regarding the embassy, each with its own set of benefits, drawbacks, and risks:

• Reject China’s planning permit outright: One option for the UK government is to reverse its decision to “call in” the application and return authority to the Tower Hamlets Council, which would almost certainly reject the proposal. (The Council unanimously voted to deny Beijing’s permit as recently as December 2024.) By deferring to the municipal Council, rather than issuing a direct rejection from Westminster, this approach may be seen as less confrontational and less diplomatically damaging. Alternatively, the UK government could explicitly reject Beijing’s proposal on national security grounds, a move which has precedent in Ireland. In March 2022, Ireland denied Russia’s request to build underground complexes at its Dublin embassy, due to concerns that it could be used by the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) or Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) (Moscow issued sharp denials, calling the accusation “ludicrous.”) However, either path would inevitably result in rising tensions with China and hinder Starmer’s efforts to reengage with Beijing—potentially leaving Britain even more isolated amid growing uncertainty in its trade relationship with the United States. In terms of immediate consequences, China would likely withdraw its GBP 600 million investment commitment and freeze future foreign investment, delivering a blow to a British economy already struggling with stagnation and rising government debt. Additionally, the United Kingdom’s own application to rebuild its crumbling embassy in Beijing could remain frozen. 
  
  However, the United States could help mitigate some of the potential fallout through a combination of assurances and pressure. As a “carrot,” the Trump administration could ease UK concerns by reaffirming that the U.S.-UK “special relationship” remains strong and unrelated to recent U.S. verbal attacks on Europe and NATO. It could further reduce recent tariffs on UK imports (such as pharmaceuticals) or propose increased U.S. investment in the country to help offset the economic impact of rejecting China. On the “stick” side, the administration could threaten to issue a last-minute block to the United Kingdom’s bid to lease the Chagos Islands from Mauritius, which is home to a strategically important joint U.S.-UK naval base that draws significant U.S. investment. Additionally, it could signal that approving China’s embassy would result in a reduction in U.S. intelligence sharing. 
   
• Conditionally approve China’s planning permit: Another option would be for the United Kingdom to reject China’s current planning permit but indicate that it will approve a revised proposal—provided China removes plans for the large basement, multiple underground rooms, and a tunnel. The United Kingdom could also impose additional restrictions, such as limiting the height of buildings, as part of any approval agreement. However, Beijing is unlikely to accept these changes. Previous alteration suggestions have failed: When Labour cabinet ministers Cooper and Lammy previously urged for the inclusion of a “hard perimeter” to prevent unregulated public access to the site’s Cistercian ruins—citing concerns that emergency responses would not be able to access the compound quickly if a member of the public were to fall ill—Beijing dismissed the suggestion, stating it had “no desire or intention to change the scheme in the way in which it has been suggested.” 
  
  However, the UK government and the Greater London Authority should still conduct a comprehensive review of the fiber-optic cables and sensitive communication lines beneath the site—and relocate them or add a comprehensive suite of anti-tap sensors. The city could also try to shut down or relocate the three large data centers and BT exchange near the site. While the exact cost is difficult to estimate, relocating underground cables in such a densely populated area is among the most expensive types of cable infrastructure work. With over 4 million kilometers of data lines running beneath central London, the total expense could quickly escalate. Moreover, it remains uncertain whether Beijing would accept these conditions, and these measures may ultimately prove both ineffective and prohibitively expensive. Anti-tap sensors might be cheaper, but they hardly guarantee protection. 
   
• Link conditional approval of China’s embassy to UK embassy renovation in Beijing: At the very least, the United Kingdom could conditionally approve China’s planning permit (incorporating the aforementioned cable relocation precautions) while simultaneously applying pressure on Beijing to approve the United Kingdom’s own stalled embassy renovation project in central Beijing. Because the United Kingdom already intends to fully demolish and rebuild its aging embassy in Beijing, it could take this opportunity to submit a new building proposal that includes multistory towers, an expanded underground parking lot, other underground facilities, and a tunnel. The UK embassy in Beijing is one of Britain’s largest diplomatic missions and is strategically located in Beijing’s Central Business District and within striking distance of the Daily-Tech Chaolai Data Center and the Beijing World Financial Center, both of which could prove useful for MI6. The United Kingdom could make approval of its new embassy plans a prerequisite for approving China’s request in London. Moreover, any justifications Beijing uses to reject the United Kingdom’s proposal could be mirrored in denying China’s.

Aosheng Pusztaszeri is a research assistant with the Intelligence, National Security, and Technology Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.