Wargaming Nuclear Deterrence and Its Failures in a U.S.–China Conflict over Taiwan

This study examines nuclear dynamics in a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, a war that the authors hope will never occur. What creates the greatest pressure for nuclear weapons use in such a conflict? What happens if nuclear weapons are used? To answer these questions, the CSIS-MIT team modified its existing U.S.-China wargame to include nuclear weapons and ran it 15 times. 

The greatest pressure for nuclear use came when China teams reached a crisis: their invasion was in danger of a defeat that might threaten Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule. To dissuade China from gambling for resurrection—using nuclear weapons to salvage a failing conventional campaign—U.S. diplomacy was much more important than nuclear brinksmanship. Favorable outcomes were possible, but total victory was unachievable. The United States must therefore be prepared to successfully prosecute a high-end conventional war while at the same time providing face saving off-ramps to the adversary. To do otherwise risks a nuclear holocaust, as indeed occurred in three game iterations.

The research for this project was funded by a grant from the U.S. Department of Defense. The MIT Wargaming Lab supported the completion of this report and is grateful for generous family foundation support.