A Far-Right Breakthrough? Germany’s AfD on the Brink of State-Level Governance

In September, Saxony-Anhalt, one of Germany’s 16 states, might witness a first for the country since World War II: A far-right party could win the absolute majority of seats in a state parliament, appoint the minister-president, and assume governance of the state. The consequences could be far-reaching. In recent polls, the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) ranks at 41 percent, followed by the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) at 24 percent, and others at 14 percent and below. Similar levels of support are seen across Eastern Germany: Saxony is on par, while Thuringia (40 percent), Brandenburg (37 percent), and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (36 percent), where state elections will be held just two weeks later, are following closely.

While Eastern Germany leads in the polls for support to the AfD, the trend is nationwide. Following a decade-long ascent, the AfD has recently taken the lead as the most popular party at the national level, with more than one in four voters supporting the far-right party in national polls. After a three-way coalition—led by former Chancellor Olaf Scholz of the Social Democratic Party (SPD)—collapsed in late 2024, the current CDU-SPD coalition is taking much longer than announced to deliver promised reforms and sits at just 17 percent approval. With support for the center parties eroding all around, Saxony-Anhalt’s elections are a litmus test not only for the state, but also for Germany as a whole.

Q1: Who is the AfD?

A1: Originally a market-liberal, Eurosceptic party that emerged in the aftermath of the euro crisis, the AfD quickly drifted rightward and capitalized on anti-immigration rhetoric during the influx of refugees to Germany in the mid-2010s. It has continued to warn against the supposed “Islamification” of Germany and the perceived threats of migration and crime. The party has accused traditional parties of failing to address these dynamics.

The AfD displays the nativist and authoritarian tendencies of far-right extremist parties. As of late 2023, Saxony-Anhalt’s state chapter of the AfD is classified as “confirmed far-right extremist” by the State Office for the Protection of the Constitution. The AfD challenged an identical ruling for the national party last year, and the case is still pending in courts. Openly distinguishing between “biological Germans” and “passport Germans,” the AfD’s far-right nativism is by no means concealed.

Though just one of many far-right parties that have emerged across Europe in the 2010s, the rise of the AfD is followed with particular concern in Europe. This is because it is comparatively more extreme than other far-right European parties since it is gaining ground in the most powerful country in the European Union, and the very country that unleashed National Socialism onto Europe less than a century ago.

Q2: Who votes for the AfD and why?

A2: As with other far-right parties, the question is whether the AfD’s electorate is drawn to the party because, or despite of, its extremist ideology. 60.5 percent of AfD voters expressed xenophobic attitudes, and roughly a third of AfD voters hold a right-wing extremist worldview—a group the AfD has been successful in mobilizing. At the same time, more than two in five AfD voters think that the party does not sufficiently distance itself from right-wing extremist positions. In another sign of protest voting, 85 percent of AfD voters believe the AfD is the only party that allows them to express their dissatisfaction with current politics.

The AfD’s electorate is heterogeneous in its views and motivations, but it shares some common sociodemographic traits: economic grievances, a high share of blue-collar workers, greatest popularity among voters 25–44 years old, and a larger share of men than women. It is also notable that the strongest recent gains have been among voters 18–25 years old, where the party tripled its results compared to the 2021 national election.

The AfD’s campaigning also stands out from other parties: Saxony-Anhalt’s minister-president candidate Ulrich Siegmund has over 707,000 followers on TikTok in a state of 2.12 million people. His polished appearance and professional tone lend respectability, and radical demands blend with footage of a community-oriented politician responding to audience questions. In the East German states, where many struggle to identify with the political class in Berlin, the AfD’s physical presence in the streets and omnipresence in the media helps to push the common populist “us versus them” narrative: The AfD is here for you, the other parties are not.

Q3: What might an AfD victory in Saxony-Anhalt mean for Germany?

A3: Despite its success, the AfD has never been in government at either the state or national level, owing to a “firewall” among the other parties. Except for the populist, pro-Russian Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht, every significant party has ruled out forming a coalition with the AfD at either level—including the CDU and its sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU), which have lost many voters to it. The only real chance at governing for the AfD is therefore through an absolute majority. In the case of Saxony-Anhalt, this now seems within reach this September: The German multiparty system could swing the result in the AfD’s favor in case several smaller parties miss the 5 percent vote threshold to enter parliament, which could turn even a low- to mid-40s vote share into an absolute majority of seats.

Having the AfD accede to governance on a state level would in itself create a shock to the ideological spectrum. For the first time, the party would be able to put some of its agenda into practice. Its platform for Saxony-Anhalt is centered around immigration restriction, the promotion of family, education, domestic security, and cultural identity.

On immigration, many of AfD’s suggested policies, such as using regular prisons for deportation detention, are irreconcilable with the federal constitution and EU treaties. However, select measures that pertain to institutions whose powers are located at the state level, such as the police or sketches of a “deportation police,” might still be implementable with real effects on individuals’ lives in the region. Others, such as the permanent separate schooling of refugee children without the intent of integration, clearly violate European law. Yet if met by sluggish or reticent supervising authorities, such models could be branded “temporary” and simply sputter on without much challenge.

With education being organized at the state level in Germany, this is where one could expect the most immediate, drastic changes: A ban of pride flags in schools to be replaced with the German national flag, the reversal of inclusion policies for children with disabilities, the elimination of anti-racism initiatives, the revival of exchange programs with Russia, and the revision of the history curriculum to focus on “the origins and success story” of the German nation under Bismarck and less on the large-scale crimes of the twentieth century.

The AfD could also have influence over the civil service and the administration. Only a small fraction of civil servants in state governments are political appointees, with most being appointed for life. The AfD might try to amend the definition of political appointees in state civil service law—echoing the Trump administration’s “Schedule F”—but it may not need to go that far: With a large part of the baby boomer generation nearing retirement, hiring criteria could be subtly tailored to favor ideologically aligned candidates. Beyond staffing measures, there is also a risk of current state and local officials practicing preemptive obedience to avoid conflict. An incident in the state capital Magdeburg in May 2026 shows what that could look like on a local level: In what turned into a national scandal, the city library backed out of hosting an anti-right-wing activist author after the AfD raised objections through the city council. In this case, the reading was eventually reinstated after a nationwide outcry.

With an absolute majority in Saxony-Anhalt, the AfD would also, for the first time, be represented in the Bundesrat, the legislative body representing the German states. The Bundesrat can veto or at least object to any laws suggested by the Bundestag, Germany’s federal parliament. The AfD would gain real blocking power only once it governs in several states, but with one state it would at least gain visibility—able to offer proposals for the Bundesrat to consider and vote on, it could push state demands, such as on asylum, into the national debate.

More fundamentally, a state-level victory in Saxony-Anhalt could have ripple effects across the country, building momentum for high AfD turnout in the Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Berlin elections later in 2026. Six more state elections will take place before the regularly scheduled national election in 2029. Governing on a state level could further normalize the party to potential voters and signal that governing in the Bundestag is now within reach. It could accelerate the rightward shift of the Overton window in national politics, which has already begun. Before its collapse, Scholz’s coalition between the SPD, Green Party, and Free Democratic Party adopted a markedly harsher tone on immigration with legislation such as the 2024 Repatriation Improvement Act. In early 2025, the CDU/CSU went further and passed a national parliamentary resolution on asylum and migration together with AfD votes. Hundreds of thousands took to the streets in protest, afraid that this might be the beginning of the end of the firewall.

If AfD voter share rises across states, options for coalition building without the AfD on a national level are increasingly dire: Popular support for both the CDU and SPD has declined further since the 2025 election and, following current trends, a governing coalition would require three partners and might not even command a clean majority. If a democratic coalition forms in 2029 but then stalls over ideological differences, the following elections could lead to an AfD-majority government or a collapse of the firewall. It remains to be seen whether the CDU/CSU will show itself more flexible under mounting pressure: The party also has a ban on forming a coalition with the left-wing Die Linke, which further ties its hands should the AfD continue to rise.

There is a stream of observers that is less pessimistic about the outcomes of far-right parties such as the AfD ascending to state or national governance, suggesting that this would lead to a “disenchantment” of their voter base: No longer a protest party, a failure to deliver substantial policy deflates the populist agenda. However, examples of this theory in practice apply mostly to scenarios where the far-right party entered a governing coalition as a junior partner, such as with Austria’s Austrian People’s Party-Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) coalition collapsing over FPÖ-internal quarrels after just two and a half years in 2002 and the FPÖ losing nearly two-thirds of its support in the ensuing snap election. Given the firewall and the AfD’s current comparative size, the AfD is unlikely to find itself in a comparable position. Poland’s Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS) leading the United Right coalition between 2015 and 2023—where junior partners ran on PiS’s own electoral list rather than as independent parties—might be a more adequate proxy. With the United Right maintaining its voter share between its first and second term in office alongside a radicalization of its agenda—and losing power in 2023 only after eight years, while remaining Poland’s largest party—the example bodes ill for the disenchantment hypothesis.

Q4: What would an AfD victory mean for the rest of Europe?

A4: An AfD win in a singular German state would not be immediately felt across Europe, but the symbolic shock would. Parts of Germany would be governed by a party openly sympathetic toward Russia and euphemistic about Germany’s darkest years.

The AfD has no significant allies among Europe’s most prominent far-right parties. France’s Rassemblement National (RN) and Italy’s Lega expelled it from their European Parliament group over individual members’ refusal to distance themselves from the Nazi apparatus. It was forced to found the Europe of Sovereign Nations (ESN) Group, supplying more than half of the faction’s 27 seats. Partners include Bulgaria’s ultranationalist, pro-Russian, and anti-NATO Revival party and Slovakia’s equally pro-Russian neo-Nazi affiliates Republic Movement. Poland’s New Hope, with two seats, is the only Russia-skeptic member. The smallest and most far-right of the European Parliament’s right-wing factions, ESN wants to reverse EU integration, “preserve” culture and identity, reverse the EU Green Deal, and suspend the UN’s Migration Pact. The AfD’s 2024 platform for the EU elections lists a German exit from the European Union only as a “last resort” and, as with other far-right parties, its tone on the matter has mellowed in the post-Brexit period.

With the AfD and RN at odds over both faction and policy—among them economics and market liberalism—a strong far-right axis seems out of reach. The positioning toward Russia divides those parties further: The AfD’s sympathies are shared by Austria’s FPÖ, Italy’s Lega, and Romania’s Allegiance for the Union of Romanians, while Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy, Poland’s PiS and New Hope, and the Nordic parties stand against. After Donald Trump’s return to the White House, one could have assumed that the Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement could act as a common denominator for the European far-right and subversively shape its future. The AfD enjoyed Vice President J.D. Vance’s and Elon Musk’s explicit endorsements in the run-up to the 2025 national elections and even sent delegates to Washington. Yet President Trump’s claims on Greenland and the war with Iran have cooled the relationship drastically. While MAGA might still supply ideological inspiration—and official U.S. policy is to support conservative movements in Europe—the United States under Trump can hardly be considered a true political ally, including for the AfD.

The most likely impact from the strengthening of far-right parties in Europe, in this case led by the AfD’s rise, would be paralysis: Disagreements over matters such as defense and an unwillingness to surrender vetoes in the European Council would block reform, gradually hollowing out the European Union’s ability to tackle today’s big challenges. This could further increase reliance on the United States, especially in matters of defense. Meanwhile, Russia would benefit from a fragmented Europe—particularly if the far-right erodes European support to Ukraine—and could expand its ties beyond currently sympathetic countries like Slovakia. Should the AfD win in Saxony-Anhalt, Russia might gain a foot in the door in Germany.

Should the AfD take the majority in Saxony-Anhalt this September, the most direct consequences would fall on the groups of people in the state that it agitates against, including refugees and asylum seekers, Muslims, and queer people. Educational and administrative measures could entrench the ideological impact. While a state victory would likely spur the party’s success and give it a closer shot at acquiring power at the national level, it might also spur the remaining parties and undecided voters to band together as a counterweight. Furthermore, a further strengthening of the AfD would likely weaken the European Union, and therefore Europe’s geopolitical significance as a whole. An AfD victory will not immediately change the balance of power in Germany or Europe, but it sets the stage for more polarization and instability.

Donatienne Ruy is a former fellow in the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. Emma Buelte is a former intern in the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at CSIS.