Forecasts and Recommendations about the Second Trump Administration Policies toward the Two Polar Regions

By electing Donald Trump as president and giving the Republican Party control in both the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate, U.S. voters have given the future Trump administration a rare opportunity to advance the president’s policies and vision for the United States. Among many other foreign policy topics, Trump’s return to the White House will have a significant effect on U.S. policies in the two very different polar regions: the Arctic and the Antarctic. To project where policy on the polar regions may go, one can look to his first administration, the 2024 Republican Party presidential platform, Project 2025, and Trump’s presidential campaign, but those remain just signals until senior officials are selected and the new administration determines its priorities. What follows are some forecasts about the next Trump administration’s polar policies and recommendations about how to achieve the goals that got him elected.

U.S. Policies on Polar Regions

By virtue of Alaska, approximately 15 percent of the Arctic is U.S. territory, which makes the Arctic both a domestic and foreign policy topic with competing interests to balance. In 2022, after a multi-year, inclusive interagency process, the United States released its National Strategy for the Arctic Region, which replaced the previous version issued in 2013. The goal of the new strategy is “an Arctic region that is peaceful, stable, prosperous, and cooperative.” It lists four pillars to achieve this goal—security, climate change and environmental protection, sustainable economic development, and international cooperation and governance.

Arctic Forecast and Recommendation: If well-established practices continue, the second Trump administration will consider what portions of this just-completed Arctic strategy it will emphasize while not investing time and effort to revise it. For example, the next Trump administration could advance both the Arctic strategy and Trump’s frequent calls to cut the federal bureaucracy by ensuring that Alaskans and Alaskan Natives are heavily involved in federal government decisions about the Arctic, particularly those that affect the U.S. portion of the Arctic. Doing so would also advance U.S. interests in the international arena since Alaskan Natives have an independent voice as Permanent Participants in the Arctic Council in addition to being domestic constituents. Given its position on climate change, the Trump administration will likely be willing to accept greater environmental costs to achieve sustainable economic development than what the drafters of the Arctic strategy envisioned.

No country, including the United States, owns territory in Antarctica, which will continue to keep that continent and surrounding Southern Ocean distant from immediate U.S. domestic interests. In the absence of recognized sovereignty, countries have managed the region, which covers approximately 10 percent of the globe, since 1961 by consensus based on the Antarctic Treaty as a natural reserve devoted to peace and science. In 2024, after a multi-year, inclusive interagency process, the United States released its Policy on the Antarctic Region, which replaced the previous version issued in 1994. The goal of the strategy is for the United States to “continue to lead cooperative international efforts through the Antarctic Treaty System to maintain the Antarctic Region for peaceful purposes, protect its relatively pristine environment and ecosystems, and conduct scientific research.”

Antarctic Forecast and Recommendation: The next Trump administration is unlikely to revise the Antarctic Policy since it has even less direct domestic implications than the Arctic Policy. While the Trump administration will have a different approach than the drafters of the Antarctic Policy towards climate change, it should continue to apply the vast majority of the policy that continues to rely on collective action to cost-effectively and pragmatically manage this large but remote portion of the globe.

U.S. National Security Polar Interests

The first Trump administration strongly opposed increased People’s Republic of China (PRC) activities in the Arctic, with Secretary of State Mike Pompeo effectively rejecting in 2019 the PRC’s claim as a “near-Arctic state” and supporting the Arctic Council as a bulwark against the PRC. It also closely monitored Russia reopening Soviet-era military bases in its Arctic territory and criticized Russia for attempting to make the new Northern Sea Route a domestic, not international, water route. At the same time, it criticized its Arctic allies on NATO spending and alienated many of them over climate change, which is the cause for increased geopolitical competition in the Arctic.

Arctic Forecast and Recommendation: Advancing the Arctic Strategy, Project 2025, and the Republican Party Platform calls to strengthen alliances, the second Trump administration will likely continue to work within the Arctic Council as a bulwark against PRC incursions into the region and to advance pan-Arctic topics that advance U.S. and regional interests. The accession of fellow Arctic Council Members Finland and Sweden to NATO could assist the United States in pushing NATO to increase its Arctic operational capabilities, although NATO members may be less enthusiastic in supporting U.S. priorities related to the U.S. homeland if they believe the new U.S. positions in NATO on climate change and Russia do not support protecting their own national security.

The first Trump administration protected U.S. national security from great power competition by undertaking a surprise arms control inspection of stations in Antarctica, including a Chinese station. There are increasing concerns that suspected Chinese dual-use capabilities in Antarctica could threaten U.S. national security. Unlike the first Trump administration, the United States will need to counter efforts by China and Russia to destabilize the region’s fishing agreement, CCAMLR. China, largely for potential commercial activity, and Russia, likely seeking to make mischief, have combined to engage in bad-faith negotiations that overturned decades-old fishing regulations in the region and undermined key international provisions. Russia has also used fishing measures to place the United States in the middle of the longstanding Argentina-UK dispute over sovereignty in the South Atlantic.

Antarctic Forecast and Recommendation: The second Trump administration will use the strong, existing monitoring tools established by the Antarctic Treaty to shine a light on Chinese actions and capabilities in the Antarctic. It is also likely to encourage like-minded allies to use those same Treaty tools for the same purpose. It should also oppose Chinese and Russian efforts to use regional agreements, such as those that manage Antarctica, to undermine U.S. interests in the region and globally. The effect of these low-cost efforts will be to keep Antarctica peaceful and from consuming more financial resources and to advance the Republican Platform’s promises to counter China and strengthen alliances.

U.S. Polar Logistics and Operational Capacity

Recognizing that Russia had a significant advantage over the United States and its allies in the quantity of icebreakers and that China is rapidly building its own icebreaker fleet, the first Trump administration issued a presidential memorandum in 2020 to spur U.S. icebreaker (polar security cutter) construction. After learning the United States did not have the domestic capacity to build the vessels, the Biden administration established in 2024 the ICE Pact to improve U.S. domestic industrial capacity and to build the polar security cutters promised in Trump’s memo. Neither the first Trump nor the current administration addressed the other significant polar logistical platform, the LC-130H. These skied cargo airplanes, operated by the New York Air National Guard’s 109th Airlift Wing, give the United States unique and valuable polar operational capacity. However, the planes are old, and Congress has taken only limited action to fund the modern version of these planes, the LC-130J, which is built in Georgia

Arctic Forecast and Recommendation: Resuming what he started and consistent with Project 2025 and the Republican Party pledge to revive the U.S. industrial base, become a manufacturing superpower, and modernize the U.S. military, the next Trump administration will prioritize creating a U.S. Coast Guard icebreaker fleet, along with the domestic industrial capacity to build and service it, and should do so through the ICE Pact. It should urgently prioritize obtaining Congressional funding for the LC-130J to rapidly improve U.S. polar logistics while the icebreakers are being built. It should also ensure proper training of the crews of this essential polar equipment.

In addition to recognizing the need to rebuild the dilapidated polar logistics network, the first Trump administration recognized that operational presence in the polar region increases geopolitical influence and promotes its national security and acted accordingly. Notably, in order to increase the United States’ presence in the Arctic, it opened a U.S. consulate in 2020 in Nuuk, Greenland. With much less fanfare, the first Trump administration in 2019 approved the modernization of McMurdo station in Antarctica, which is by far the largest station in Antarctica and has significant geopolitical importance in the Ross Sea and as the logistical hub for the U.S. station at the South Pole.

Antarctic Forecast and Recommendation: The next Trump administration should build on U.S. polar operational presence by increasing its diplomatic and military presence in the Arctic, such as through additional, more expensive efforts such as the notional Iron Dome Missile Defense System raised in the Republican platform or a proposed deep draft port in Nome. It should complete the McMurdo station modernization in Antarctica as the most economically efficient way to advance U.S. interests in the region.

Polar Resource Management

The second Trump administration has promised to remove the United States from the 2015 Paris Agreement and will likely restrict U.S. government officials from even mentioning “climate change” or signing documents that include those words. These two policies led the United States in the first Trump administration to isolate itself on previously non-controversial issues, such as when the United States blocked the Arctic Council from signing a collective statement in 2019 after failing to convince the other participants to remove language pertaining to climate change. It is unclear at this time the geopolitical price the next Trump administration will be willing to pay related to its climate change policy. Freed from concerns about carbon emissions, the Republican Party Platform promised to make the United States the dominant energy producer in the world, which will no doubt include taking extensive action in Alaska. The first Trump administration supported, for example, opening the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to mining despite opposition from Alaskan Natives and environmental groups. 

Arctic Forecast and Recommendation: The second Trump Administration will oppose climate change policy globally and increase domestic oil exploration and exploitation to advance its national economic interests. It should weigh the political cost of opposing “climate change” words and actions in all forums and at all times, as well as how it engages with Alaskans and Alaskan Natives on increasing Alaskan energy production.

The first Trump administration entered into an agreement in 2017 with Arctic Council members to enhance regional scientific cooperation and concluded negotiations in 2018 with nine other countries, including the PRC and Russia, to prevent unregulated fishing in the emerging Arctic Ocean high seas. Having obtained consensus in 2016 for the Ross Sea marine protected area (MPA), the United States did not play a leading role in promoting additional MPAs in Antarctica during the first Trump administration. The first Trump administration released an Executive Order in 2020 to strengthen efforts to combat illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, among other actions. Along with combating IUU fishing, addressing marine resource protection in Antarctica will be an important topic during the second Trump administration since China, for potential commercial reasons, and Russia, in its role as a global spoiler, has blocked the establishment of marine protected areas in Antarctica for the past several years. This is despite the support of the fishing industry and countries closest to Antarctica for establishing those MPAs.

Antarctic Forecast and Recommendation: The second Trump administration should continue work started during its first administration to combat IUU fishing by collaborating with countries active in both polar regions to protect marine resources, including conducting the scientific research that underpins those protections. The second Trump administration should not join the Chinese-Russia coalition that blocks additional MPAs in Antarctica.

The second Trump administration will have a significant effect on the Arctic and Antarctica with policies that are directly geared toward the region or those that are designed for other purposes but indirectly impact the polar regions. Specific to the region, increasing U.S. operational and logistical capacity provides the clearest opportunity for the next administration to advance issues it campaigned on, including strengthening the U.S. industrial manufacturing capacity and protecting U.S. national security in the two polar regions. For broader policies, though, the incoming administration will need to consider how to balance its policies on some global topics, such as its relationship with Russia and NATO, its position on climate change, and its protection of fishing stocks, in order to achieve its priorities around the world and in the two polar regions. The extent to which the second Trump administration takes a nuanced view of how to message and advance conflicting global and regional policies will influence its level of success in achieving the goals that got it elected.

William Muntean is a senior associate (non-resident) with the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.