Photo: The Carter Center
Former U.S. president Jimmy Carter lived almost 44 years after serving his single term as President of the United States (1977–1981), and after his presidency, he remained actively engaged in humanitarian and public affairs for another four decades. In 2002, some 21 years after he left the Oval Office, Carter received the Nobel Peace Prize “for his decades of untiring effort to find peaceful solutions to international conflicts, to advance democracy and human rights, and to promote economic and social development.”
One of the many issues that received Carter’s attention in his post-presidency and which was mentioned in the Nobel Prize citation was his efforts involving North Korea. During Carter’s term as president, North Korea did not figure prominently. The end of the Cold War, the growing U.S. relationship with China, and North Korea’s effort to develop nuclear weapons led to the growing importance of North Korea. As a former U.S. president and an engaged elder statesman, Carter played a very public role with regard to North Korea on three particular occasions.
In the summer of 1994, North Korea announced its withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, threatened to expel international inspectors sent by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to observe its nuclear activities, and at the same time began removing spent fuel rods from the North Korean nuclear reactor at Yongbyon. These were all clear indications of North Korean intentions to develop nuclear weapons capability. These actions were preceded and followed by months of intense negotiations between senior North Korean and United States officials, as well as with representatives of the IAEA.
In the midst of these very sensitive discussions, Jimmy Carter made a trip to North Korea and placed himself in the middle of the conversation. Carter’s trip was not one he was asked to undertake on behalf of the U.S. government. The former president informed then-president Bill Clinton’s Vice President Al Gore that he had confirmed with North Korean leaders that an earlier invitation extended to Carter to visit Pyongyang still stood, and Carter told Gore that he intended to go to Pyongyang. Several senior foreign policy officials of the Clinton administration feared that Carter might seek to negotiate an agreement that was inconsistent with the course the Clinton administration was pursuing. After lengthy internal discussions, President Clinton overruled opponents of a Carter visit. Clinton hoped that a Carter visit might offer Kim Il-Sung an opportunity to back down from his intransigent stand and save face. All Clinton officials made clear that Carter would be going to North Korea as a private citizen, not an official representative of the U.S. government. Carter was specifically told that he was not empowered to negotiate any agreements on behalf of the United States.
Carter crossed the demilitarized zone into North Korea on June 15, and he met with Kim Il-Sung the following day. In his discussions with North Korean officials, Carter went well beyond what the Clinton administration authorized him to seek in his discussions. Carter, however, believed that U.S. sanctions were a serious mistake, and he made specific proposals to North Korean officials that he thought would end the standoff. Not surprisingly, Kim and Carter reached a tentative agreement: the United States would support Kim’s efforts to obtain light-water reactors to help resolve North Korea’s energy needs, and the two countries would restart negotiations to improve relations. In return, North Korea would allow IAEA inspectors to remain at the Yongbyon nuclear facility to monitor reprocessing of fuel rods. That provision was a serious concern since U.S. policy, international agreements, and the South Korean government were totally opposed to North Korea reprocessing fuel rods, even if IAEA inspectors were present when it was done.
After his discussions with North Korean negotiators, Carter told senior Department of State and White House officials in Washington what he had agreed to in the negotiations, and he also informed them that he was making a statement on CNN announcing the agreement he had just negotiated. Carter later admitted that he made the statement on CNN because he knew it would make it more difficult for the Clinton Administration to back away from the terms he had negotiated. Mike Chinoy was the CNN reporter who was in North Korea at the time of Carter’s visit. (See Chinoy’s article: “Remembering Carter’s 1994 Pyongyang Peace Mission.”)
The provisions Carter negotiated with the North Koreans became the basis for the 1994 Agreed Framework and remained the foundation of United States and North Korean dealings on nuclear issues during most of the remainder of the Clinton Administration (1993–2001). Carter’s discussions with Kim Il-Sung may have averted a conflict with North Korea in the late 1990s. North Korea, of course, continued its development of nuclear weapons in violation of the agreement, and Pyongyang tested its first nuclear weapon on October 9, 2006. The subsequent testing and further development of nuclear weapons by Pyongyang meant that any future conflict with North Korea would be even more fraught.
The Carter Center, the nongovernment and nonprofit organization established by Jimmy Carter after his Presidential tenure, touted his North Korean efforts in a summary report on the negotiations: “Carter Trip Paves the Way for U.S.-North Korean Pact.” The report, which is still posted on the Carter Center’s website, quotes positive press on his activities in Pyongyang all dated in 1994. More recent reports and analyses, however, are far more critical. The History News Network’s report on Carter’s role in 1994 is aptly titled “The Part of Jimmy Carter’s Legacy Everyone Wants to Forget.”
One problem in U.S.-North Korean relations from 2008 to 2019 was the detention of U.S. citizens who entered North Korea, some who legally entered as tourists, and others who illegally crossed to evangelize or simply for the adventure. North Korean government’s punishment of foreigners for illegal entry or engaging in prohibited activities was particularly harsh. One such American who entered North Korea was Aijalon Mahli Gomes, an American teacher who had been teaching at a Christian school in Seoul. He entered North Korea illegally from China in January 2010. He was promptly arrested, and four months later was found guilty in a trial of entering the country illegally. He was sentenced to eight years in prison for hard labor and fined the sum of $700,000.
While Gomes was incarcerated in Pyongyang, a South Korean naval vessel was sunk. The UN Security Council determined that the South Korean ship had been sunk by a North Korean submarine. The North Korean government publicly denied any involvement in the sinking of the South Korean vessel and publicly threatened that if further action were taken by the United Nations or other countries, “wartime law” would be applied to Gomes. That would mean stiffer penalties, which could result in life imprisonment or a death sentence for the U.S. citizen. A few weeks after his sentencing and imprisonment, Gomes attempted suicide. Shortly afterward, in early August 2010, a U.S. Department of State official and two medical doctors traveled to Pyongyang seeking Gomes’ release on humanitarian grounds. They were permitted to see Gomes, but their request for his release was denied.
At about that time, former president Jimmy Carter was enlisted by U.S. religious leaders and Gomes’ family to go to Pyongyang to seek Gomes’ release. Carter did not travel at the request of the U.S. government, but he went as a private citizen. He was permitted to enter the country, but he did not meet with senior North Korean officials on this occasion. He successfully secured the U.S. citizen’s release. Because of the U.S. government’s experience with Carter’s independent actions when he visited North Korea in 1994, the Department of State publicly and pointedly emphasized that Carter was going to North Korea solely for private humanitarian reasons. He was traveling as a private citizen, and his visit and action were not on behalf of the U.S. government. The North Korean government permitted Carter to take Gomes with him when he left the country after his very brief visit.
This international nongovernmental organization of prominent public figures and former senior government leaders, including several Nobel Laureates, was founded in 2007 by Nelson Mandela, the anti-apartheid political prisoner and later president of South Africa. The current chair of the Elders is former Irish president Mary Robinson. Other members and former members include Kofi Annan and Ban Ki-Moon, both former UN secretaries general, Archbishop Desmond Tutu of South Africa, former Norwegian prime minister Gro Harlem Brundtland, former Liberian president Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, and a number of others at various times. As a former U.S. president, Carter was particularly prominent, and he is the only U.S. president who has been involved with The Elders.
Jimmy Carter’s post-presidential activities prominently included a leading role in “The Elders.”
In April 2011, Jimmy Carter led a delegation of four Elders on a peace mission to North Korea with the objective of defusing tensions on the Korean peninsula and determining the need and possibility of providing humanitarian food assistance to North Korea. Carter was joined by former Finnish president Martii Ahtisaari, former Norwegian prime minister Gro Brundtland, and former Irish president Mary Robinson. Their principal concerns were the reported serious food shortages in North Korea and nuclear risks with no progress on disarmament on the Korean Peninsula. The delegation met North Korean officials and they visited farming areas near Pyongyang.
Although the four members of the Carter-led Elders delegation were all former heads of state or heads of government, they were all “former” leaders. They were not empowered by any government to negotiate. The report released after the Elders’ visit emphasized the importance of improving relations between North and South Korea, the necessity of international aid in dealing with serious food shortages in North Korea, and the need to recognize basic rights to food, health, and education. Members of the delegation were given a cordial welcome, and during the visit, they met with Foreign Minister Pak Ui-chun and the Head of State Kim Yong-nam. However, they were not given an audience with Kim Jong-il, the most important official of the country. This was a significant down-grading from Carter’s first visit to North Korea in 1994, when Jimmy and Rosalynn Carter were hosted by Kim Jong-il’s father Kim Il-sung.
In contrast to Carter’s first visit to North Korea in 1994, the official report on the Elders’ visit stated: “The Elders emphasized that they did not seek to interfere in official negotiations and were not carrying official messages from any government.”
In mid-1977, just a few months after Carter assumed the Presidency, I joined the White House National Security Staff as a White House fellow with responsibility for the then-communist countries of Central Europe. I was with Carter in New York City in September 1977 for the high-level meeting of the UN General Assembly, which involves many heads of state and heads of government of UN member countries during the opening sessions of the General Assembly.
While Carter was at the United Nations for his speech to the General Assembly, he met privately with a number of prominent world leaders who were also in New York at that time, one of which was the Polish foreign minister. I attended that meeting as the official U.S. notetaker. I entered the room just before the president and the foreign minister came in followed by a mob of journalists and photographers pushing and elbowing for the two or three minutes they were permitted in the room to snap photos and shout questions to the two leaders. I was smashed against the wall by the pulsating media throng. As the press were herded out, Carter looked suspiciously at me because I was not leaving. His lead Secret Service agent whispered in his ear that I was the National Security staffer who was taking notes of the meeting.
During the time I was on the White House National Security Staff, I attended Carter’s meetings with visiting political delegations from Central Europe and participated in internal discussions involving Carter on U.S. foreign policy questions involving that region. In December 1977, I traveled to Warsaw with Carter on his visit to Poland for meetings with Polish communist government officials, and I was in Carter’s meetings in Washington with visiting Romanian president Nicolae Ceausescu.
Three and a half decades after my time at the Carter White House and long after Carter returned to Plains, Georgia, I again talked at length with the former president, this time at the Hartsfield-Jackson Airport in Atlanta. Carter was leaving to head the Elders delegation to North Korea in April 2011. Carter requested a Department of State briefing on humanitarian assistance to North Korea and issues involving U.S. citizens held in North Korea. I was then the U.S. special envoy for North Korean human rights at the Department of State, and these issues of concern were within my portfolio. The reason I was sent was because I dealt with humanitarian and human rights issues. Department of State officials clearly wanted to make clear that no one involved in nuclear issues would speak with Carter before his visit to North Korea.
On this last of his visits to North Korea in April 2011, Carter made a request and noted in his report on the Elders visit that one of the objectives of the visit was to “attempt to obtain the release of Eddie Jun (Yong-su), who is a prisoner in NK. He is known as a Christian missionary who has traded tractors and similar equipment for several years between SK and NK.” Carter made the request to North Korean officials that he be permitted to visit Eddie Jun, and he asked that Jun be permitted to leave North Korea with the Carter and the Elders’ delegation. North Korean officials denied that request.
In May 2011, four weeks after Carter’s last visit to Pyongyang, as U.S. special envoy for North Korean human rights, I led a delegation of six U.S. government officials to Pyongyang. We held discussions with the North Korean Foreign Minister and other officials on the humanitarian food needs of North Korea and discussed how U.S. officials could monitor the distribution of U.S. humanitarian food aid as required by U.S. law. I also requested to meet with the incarcerated U.S. citizen Eddie Jun who at that time was at a Pyongyang hospital being treated for health problems. I requested that we be permitted to bring Jun with us when our delegation returned to the United States. On the day we left Pyongyang, Eddie Jun sat next to me on the Air Koryo flight from Pyongyang to Beijing.
North Korea was only one of the many international issues that President Jimmy Carter dealt with both as president and as a private citizen after his presidency, but it was clearly one of the most complicated and sensitive that received his attention. Carter spoke of this commitment to human rights in his inaugural address on January 20, 1977: “Because we are free we can never be indifferent to the fate of freedom elsewhere. Our moral sense dictates a clearcut preference for those societies which share with us an abiding respect for individual human rights.”
The issue of human rights was a cornerstone of Carter’s foreign policy, and during his presidency, institutional changes that are still in place were made to enhance the role of human rights in U.S. foreign policy. Carter’s predecessor President Gerald Ford created the post of “Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs.” But under Carter, human rights were further highlighted with the establishment of the Department of State’s Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. The bureau was headed by an assistant secretary of state, and additional offices were created to deal with asylum as well as refugee and migration issues. Annual country reports on human rights were expanded to consider human rights issues in all foreign countries. These institutional changes gave greater focus and priority to human rights and humanitarian issues, and that has remained true today. Carter’s appointment of human rights advocate Patricia Derian as the first assistant secretary of state for human rights was an important step in confirming human rights as a key issue in U.S. diplomacy.
Ambassador Robert R. King is a senior adviser in the Office of the Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. Previously, Ambassador King served as special envoy for North Korean human rights issues at the U.S. Department of State from November 2009 to January 2017.
