Kim’s Second Byungjin: 21 Years After the Six-Party Talks Agreement

It has been 21 years since the six parties with the deepest interest in the peace and security of the Korean Peninsula concluded the September 19 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks in 2005. In exchange for North Korea’s commitment to denuclearization, the other five parties agreed to provide security assurances, diplomatic recognition, and energy and economic assistance in an incremental, action-for-action manner. The agreement was less than perfect, glaringly so in its silence on North Korea’s uranium enrichment program, but disablement actions such as the destruction of the iconic cooling tower at Yongbyon’s graphite-moderated reactor gave hope that a viable path to denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula existed. The agreement and the subsequent documents outlining first- and second-phase actions also allowed Pyongyang to probe what benefits it would receive for moving down that path.

Momentum was lost, unfortunately, in 2008, as it became increasingly evident that there could be no authentic and credible talks without North Korea’s uranium enrichment program, which Pyongyang omitted from the declaration it submitted to the Six-Party Talks in June 2008. Its determination not to address the highly enriched uranium (HEU) program showed in its refusal to grant the verification measures necessary to understand and eventually dismantle it. Privately, on the sidelines of the talks, North Korean diplomats told U.S. officials that denuclearization would no longer be a legitimate diplomatic topic for negotiation. Efforts by the Obama administration to nudge Pyongyang back to the Six-Party Talks while advancing U.S.-North Korea relations were rebuffed, and from 2012 onward North Korea has consistently refused meaningful dialogue on its nuclear program.

Nevertheless, the September 19 Joint Statement retains enduring value for three main reasons:

1. It provides a fundamental framework for an incremental, step-by-step approach to denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
2. It provides a framework for compensating North Korea’s denuclearization steps with security assurances, economic and energy aid and assistance, and normalization of relations among all the member states
3. It demonstrates, as did the Leap Day Understanding of 2012 and the progress made and then lost in U.S.-North Korea summitry in 2018–2019, that North Korea’s entire uranium enrichment program must be on the table. There can be no authentic and credible discussion of denuclearization, arms control, or even peace so long as North Korea robustly and unabatedly expands its inventory of weapons-usable nuclear material through undeclared uranium enrichment.

Implications for Today

In the broadest sense, North Korea’s walking away from the Six-Party Talks and from its commitments under the Joint Statement in late 2008 was a clear proclamation of its lack of interest in denuclearization and, by extension, in any conciliatory, non-confrontational relationship with the United States. The “action statements” of February and October 2007 laid out agreed denuclearization steps by North Korea, the economic and energy assistance North Korea would receive, and expedited paths toward normalization of U.S.-North Korea and Japan-North Korea relations. They demonstrated both the practicality and the proportionality of denuclearization-driven diplomacy. These reciprocal, step-by-step actions were built to address real North Korean needs, build confidence, and show Pyongyang an alternative path to peace and prosperity through denuclearization. Normalized relations, reduced tensions, economic aid and assistance, and even security guarantees were not enough to keep Pyongyang interested in the process. That is most likely to remain the case going forward, whether the goal is complete denuclearization, a mere halt to the program, or something in between.

That is in part why arguing for a “peace first” approach is met with skepticism today. A peace-first approach might reduce tensions and create an environment in which incremental reductions in the North Korean nuclear threat become possible, but it has been tried repeatedly. Implementation of the September 19 Joint Statement rested on a step-by-step approach that front-loaded numerous benefits for North Korea. In walking away from the Six-Party Talks beginning in 2008, Pyongyang rejected that approach. It has since passed up opportunities to make serious progress toward normalization with the United States under three different presidents (Obama, Trump, and Biden), each of whom front loaded benefits North Korea would enjoy while recognizing that the heavy lifting of complete and verifiable denuclearization would take time. Pyongyang has simply been uninterested in exploring what a better relationship with the United States, or with South Korea for that matter, might yield in security, economic, and diplomatic benefits.

Kim’s Second Byungjin

What is Kim Jong-un seeking at this time? Since late 2017, when the November launch of the Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile was messaged as having “completed the state’s nuclear force,” North Korean rhetoric and behavior have pointed toward a diplomacy that locks in international acceptance of North Korea as a “responsible nuclear power” and moves beyond sanctions and pressure. Just as Pyongyang confidently proclaimed in 2013 that it would pursue “byungjin” (simultaneous development of both nuclear and economic development), it could now be said to be pursuing a “second byungjin” that advances its nuclear program while also seeking to normalize relations with countries willing to tolerate (if not necessarily accept) North Korea as a nuclear power. Pyongyang believes it can have both, which complicates any peace-first approach that purports to slow the growth of the North Korean threat.

North Korea remains committed to securing nuclear and conventional forces that clearly establish its dominance over South Korea. That shows both in its openly aggressive rhetoric aimed at Seoul over the past few years and in its development of capabilities messaged as a first-strike option against South Korea with tactical nuclear weapons. In the context of the repeated authoritative North Korean statements warning of continued qualitative and quantitative growth of its nuclear force as well as Pyongyang’s actions, there is little room for optimism that Kim would consider ways to reduce or limit the size of his arsenal, create mechanisms for crisis management or trust building, or seek rapprochement with South Korea.

Can Kim and Trump Meet Halfway?

Kim Jong-un most likely believes there is value in diplomacy with the United States that falls short of a formal proclamation by Washington that denuclearization is no longer a goal. When the time is right, Pyongyang can easily drop or suspend its requirement that the United States cease insisting on denuclearization. Washington has comparable flexibility: The State Department can continue to assert that denuclearization is the goal, the president can avoid language that would antagonize Kim, and the two leaders can meet in the spirit of advancing peace in a dangerous region. Pyongyang has at times stated that it needs no one’s “recognition” of an established reality. The benefits of securing a meeting with President Trump could be seen as more valuable than dogmatic adherence to its goal of locking in some nuclear power title.

The president could take an approach that troubles both his supporters and his detractors, perhaps a sign he is on the right track. Advocates of a “realistic” acknowledgment of North Korea as a “nuclear power” and of abandoning the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization (CVID) formulation greatly overestimate the value to Pyongyang of such a statement, particularly measured against the harm it would do to the United States’ North Korea policy and to U.S. cooperation with allies such as South Korea. Equally wrong is the worry that all hope for denuclearization vanishes with any meeting between the two leaders in which denuclearization takes a back seat to relationship building and broad-brush discussion of the need for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.

Given the cards he has been dealt, dealt not by his predecessors but by Pyongyang, there is value in President Trump’s current approach to North Korea, both in his pursuit of summit-level dialogue with Kim Jong-un and in the cautious pace he has set in the face of Pyongyang’s absolute rejection of U.S. overtures. There seems to be more intentionality and pragmatism in play than critics of the president’s outreach acknowledge. That said, defenders of his approach outside the administration have not made a compelling case that the potential gain from a Trump-Kim summit would be worth the risk. The temptation to point fingers at the efforts of previous administrations for failing to resolve the North Korea nuclear issue sooner must be resisted. Lessons from past summits, including from Singapore and Hanoi, should be discussed in a more objective and non-political manner. A more sophisticated discussion may be worth considering related to reinvigorating pressure on North Korea from China and Russia, since both have greater interests with the United States that might incentivize a cooperative approach, in spite of setbacks in such efforts over the past decade.

Pyongyang Said It Plainly in 2009

As the Six-Party Talks collapsed in the final months of 2008, the North Korean Foreign Ministry stated on January 17, 2009, days before President Obama’s inauguration:

"This is a revelation of the true colors of the U.S. as a big power which regards the normalization of the relations as a gift to the DPRK and a distortion of the essence of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula. The U.S. is miscalculating if it considers the normalization of the DPRK-U.S. relations as a reward for the DPRK's nuclear abandonment. It is the reality on the Korean Peninsula that we can live without normalizing the relations with the U.S. but not without nuclear deterrent. We have lived for decades without normalizing the relations with the U.S. and live on still with dignity."

Two key points are worth considering. First, nothing has changed in regard to North Korea’s posture toward the United States. Second, from the U.S. perspective, the inextricable ties between North Korea’s nuclear capability and instability on the Korean Peninsula make it impossible to find a path to U.S.-North Korea détente or inter-Korean reconciliation independent of the nuclear issue. Rhetoric emphasizing CVID is not an affront to Pyongyang or a maximalist and unnecessary obstacle complicating efforts to engage, reduce tension and threat, and achieve peace. The logic behind the United States’ insistence that authentic and credible progress on denuclearization be achieved for peace to be promoted is unchanged. The problem is that the two sides’ fundamental goals are antithetical and irreconcilable: Pyongyang intends to build a nuclear arsenal capable of decisively dominating and subjugating South Korea, and the United States pursues denuclearization, peace, and prosperity for the whole Korean Peninsula.

The Good News: Deterrence Is Working

Recent rhetoric from Pyongyang, Moscow, and Beijing shares a common theme: growing concern about and anger toward the U.S. military presence and U.S. actions in the region, closer U.S.-South Korea coordination on nuclear issues within the Nuclear Consultative Group, the remilitarization of Japan, and trilateral U.S.-Japan-South Korea cooperation. That is encouraging. Concern in these three capitals contradicts premature proclamations of the United States’ demise in East Asia. It reflects frustration and fear that efforts by China, Russia, and North Korea to dominate their respective spheres are not working, particularly North Korea’s costly efforts to intimidate and subjugate South Korea. The strengthening of U.S.-Japan-South Korea cooperation, driven in large part by the surge in North Korea’s nuclear and missile threat over the past few years, has negative implications for China’s security and intentions vis-à-vis Taiwan. Russia has long been concerned about how North Korea’s actions sustain a Northeast Asian demand signal for U.S. military presence.

All that said, it is difficult to deny that, through no fault of their own, neither President Obama nor President Biden was an attractive dialogue partner for Kim. President Trump is uniquely positioned to engage Kim with sufficient credibility, even if such talks yield limited fruit. His cards are not the greatest, but he seems to know it. Whatever the outcome, the United States would do well to remind both China and Russia that North Korean behavior damages their national interests and will continue to do so until the three parties can cooperate once again, as during the Six-Party Talks, to lead North Korea down a different path than the one it has been on.

Sydney Seiler is a non-resident senior adviser with the Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. The views expressed in this submission are the author’s and do not imply endorsement by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the U.S. Intelligence Community, or any other U.S. government agency.