Lebanon and Israel Talks: Empowering Diplomacy Over Open-Ended Conflict

Israel and Lebanon hold their third round of talks today under U.S. auspices in Washington, D.C. The first two rounds were preparatory rounds to agree on the parameters for starting full-scale talks; this third round will be transitioning to the substantive portions of the agreement.

The direct diplomatic track between Lebanon and Israel is the first in many decades and represents a genuine opportunity to build lasting security across the Lebanon-Israel border and lead toward a permanent cessation of hostilities and the potential for peace between the two countries. The United States is playing an important role in mediating and pushing the process forward. The parties are approaching the talks with positive intent, but also with slightly different agendas.

Lebanon’s Objectives: Ceasefire, Sovereignty, and Secure Borders

For Lebanon, the goal is to secure an urgently needed full ceasefire, stop the demolition of homes and villages under Israeli occupation, and strengthen the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to enable it to resume its duties in Southern Lebanon and coordinate toward a full Israeli withdrawal. Lebanon also seeks to extend its authority throughout the rest of the country, reclaim the state’s monopoly on the use of force, and disarm Hezbollah. Beirut also wants the final demarcation of the land border between the two countries, a reaffirmation of the maritime border agreement, and an exchange of prisoners.

Lebanon’s president, prime minister, and government are eager to make rapid progress along this path, but they face a number of constraints. After 25 years of the Assad regime and Iranian dominance, and 7 years into a deep economic and financial crisis, the state is in a dilapidated condition and requires large-scale external support as well as more reform to increase its capacities.

Politically, Beirut’s leaders need buy-in from the speaker of the Parliament of Lebanon, Amal leader Nabih Berri, and are moving along the tracks of disarming Hezbollah and negotiating with Israel, both of which are opposed by Hezbollah, and which are still facing strong opposition within the Shiite community.

In addition, Beirut has to take into account the Arab position, represented by Saudi Arabia, which favors the talks but is also concerned about what it perceives as Israeli ambitions to become the new hegemon in the region.

The Lebanese position is to aim for all the steps that need to be taken to enable a fully secure border for both sides, and a permanent cessation of hostilities, as well as the full restoration of Lebanese state sovereignty, including the disarmament of Hezbollah; after that, Lebanon would move on to the next step of exploring peace with Israel.

Israel’s Objectives: Security, Permanent Peace, and Political Considerations

From the Israeli side, one can detect a fair amount of reluctance. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu did not initially respond to Lebanese calls for direct talks and a ceasefire. It took direct pressure from President Donald Trump to bring about Israeli acceptance, as well as two ceasefires, which have been honored much more in the breach than in compliance. But Israel has taken up the diplomatic channel and has sent empowered negotiators to the table.

Israeli demands are simple and clear: the full disarmament of Hezbollah and a fully secure border. The challenge is that the Lebanese state is not yet in a position to achieve that goal in the near term and requires substantial support and time to get there. But Netanyahu’s timetable is more urgent and short-term. He needs to show results in the here and now as he is facing a tight reelection campaign that will determine his political future in the next few months.

The war against Hezbollah enjoys majority support in Israel, along with a similar opposition to accepting a ceasefire. So Netanyahu wants to go into the elections showing that he is taking decisive action against Hezbollah; at the same time, he can make political capital out of also claiming that he is working toward peace with another Arab country.

Hence, Israel is entering the talks with mixed interests. It is likely to resist a full ceasefire and insist on going ahead with the talks while its military operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon continue. That will be difficult for the Lebanese side to agree to.

The United States: Essential Mediator, Strategic Sponsor, and Calculated Actor

For the United States, one of the key dynamics is that President Trump is very interested in the end state of being able to declare another peace treaty under his auspices in the Middle East. While the road to getting there might be challenging and long, both sides need to be aware that, for President Trump, that is his main motivating factor for staying involved.

On a short-term horizon, it is no secret that Trump is focused on the more urgent and important goal of trying to conclude a deal with Iran that would enable him to declare some form of victory and move on. If he reaches an end of hostilities there, he might want to pivot to an end-of-war and peace narrative and may lean on Israel to agree to a full ceasefire in Lebanon as well.

The United States has a pivotal role to play in these talks because it is the lead supporter of Lebanon and the LAF, and the only one with leverage over Israel. The process of bringing security to the Lebanon-Israel border and making steady progress in disarming Hezbollah relies on upscaling support to Lebanon and the LAF—including security sector reform.

The United States is faced with managing the different timetables in this process. Stopping the current hostilities, which are affecting communities on both sides of the border, is an urgent priority measured in weeks and months. Building up the Lebanese state and army, after many years of the Assad regime and Iranian influence, and fully disarming Hezbollah, are also urgent goals, but will require many months or a few years to fully accomplish.

The Missing Parties: Hezbollah and Iran

The other players in these talks, of course, are the absent players—Hezbollah and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The IRGC intentionally brought about this war by pressing Hezbollah to launch rockets at Israel on March 2. Its goal was to reopen the Lebanese front and pin down at least some of Israel’s military and political energies in a proxy war in Lebanon, as part of its effort to ease the pressure on Iran itself and inflict costs on its enemies. From its perspective, Israel has obliged.

For the IRGC, the current situation is its preferred sweet spot: an open front between Lebanon and Israel, with an extended Israeli occupation that drains Israeli resources and attention and gives Hezbollah a new lease on life as the resistance to Israeli occupation. While Iran might welcome a ceasefire in Lebanon, if it secures one in the Gulf—and uses that time to try to rebuild Hezbollah—it would draw comparable benefit from open-ended war in Lebanon, keeping Israel busy and pinned down, no matter the cost to Lebanon or to the Shiite community.

It is not clear if the Lebanese leadership of Hezbollah has much agency in current decisionmaking relating to their own party, as their actions have certainly helped Iran, but have only brought ruin and devastation on their own community.

The IRGC and Hezbollah do not want the Lebanese-Israeli talks to make any real progress, neither toward empowering the LAF, extending state authority to the south and other parts of the country, nor reaching a secure border agreement and permanent cessation of hostilities. Of course, they oppose the disarmament of Hezbollah, and they would also obviously oppose any peace treaty between the two countries. But since early 2025, while they are still able to determine dynamics on the battlefield, they have lost their ability to determine Lebanese state policy.

The Lessons of the November 2024 Cessation of Hostilities Agreement

It would behoove those assembled in Washington to assess the previous experience of the cessation of hostilities agreement that was arrived at by both sides, with U.S. mediation, back in November 2024. While not perfectly or fully implemented, that agreement enabled a historic and major LAF deployment to the entire area south of the Litani River. The agreement was the first in many decades, began a significant reduction of Hezbollah weaponry and capacities in the surrounding area, and signaled the ending of Hezbollah attacks on Israel—at least until the launching of the U.S.-Israel war on Iran in late February.

Of course, that was just the first phase of implementation, and required more steps, support, and time to reach its full potential. But the November 2024 agreement demonstrated that diplomacy could credibly and sustainably alter realities on the ground.

Unfortunately, Israel pocketed the steps that the Lebanese state undertook without complying with its side of the agreement. Israel pledged to withdraw from the five positions it occupied in Southern Lebanon and to reduce the pace of attacks on targets in Lebanon, without following through.

For Israel, its lack of compliance was dictated by what it considered its security priorities. But the effect in Lebanon undermined not only the credibility of diplomacy but also the Lebanese state and army.

Through the 2024 Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement, the Lebanese state asked citizens—especially those near the southern border of Lebanon—to trust state institutions and the national army rather than Hezbollah, and to trust that the state’s actions and international diplomacy would return security and prosperity to the region. Israel’s actions telegraphed to the same community that the Lebanese state’s actions would not bring about security nor prosperity, and that Lebanon’s international diplomacy would have no leverage or impact on their lives or on Israeli actions. Hezbollah welcomed the counter-message, which reinforced its narrative that only armed resistance backed by Iran—not the state—could improve conditions at the southern border.

The Strategic Principle: A Strong Lebanese State Is the Only Durable Solution

Lebanon has suffered from a collapse of sovereignty and unstable borders since at least the late 1960s, when Arab pressure forced Lebanon to cede control of part of the south to the Palestine Liberation Organization. Later, the Assad regime and Iranian pressure facilitated Hezbollah’s grip on the country. The Lebanese people, represented by their state, are urgently focused on trying to reclaim their country’s sovereignty, establish safe and secure borders, and disarm all nonstate actors.

Israel has been trying to secure its northern border through unilateral military action for more than half a century, as well, and still has no lasting result to show for it.

The short version is that bringing security to Lebanon—and Israel—requires the re-emergence of a strong state in Lebanon. It is unclear that Israel recognizes this strategic reality. Much of Israeli policy reflexively resists the emergence of a strong state along its border. But a strong state is the only guarantor of the elimination and permanent absence of armed nonstate actors. A weak state enables armed nonstate actors and perpetuates the decades-old security chaos along the border.

While Israel’s actions against Hezbollah have certainly weakened the group and enabled a historic turnaround in Lebanon and Syria, the manner in which many of these actions are carried out—and Israel’s disregard for agreements reached with the Lebanese state—also serves to undermine that same state. In other words, Israel’s actions are generally weakening Hezbollah and the Lebanese state at the same time. This creates a recipe for long-term state failure and chaos, in which nonstate actors like Hezbollah thrive, and not a recipe for long-term security or stability.

For the United States, and for countries in the region and internationally, the simple reality that a strong Lebanese state is the long-term answer to this decades-long security problem should also be front and center. Over the past year and a half, the United States and other allies of Lebanon have welcomed the rise of a new president, prime minister, and government in Lebanon that rejects IRGC and Hezbollah power and is intent on building a strong and stable Lebanon and having stable and secure relations with its neighbors.

And while the United States and others have provided significant support to the state and the LAF over the past months, the overall level of support and engagement should be ramped up to a higher level. The Lebanese state needs to arrive at a level of state and domestic military capacity comparable to, say, that of Jordan. Of course, many reforms should be implemented on the Lebanese side, both in the military as well as in the public administration and economic/banking sector, but these actions rely on a higher level of engagement from the United States and the regional and international community to seize this historic opportunity.

The Days Ahead

It is hard to say exactly how the two days of talks in Washington will fare. Certainly, there are differing agendas and timetables as we have outlined above. And certainly, there will be repercussions from other arenas of discussion, whether along the U.S.-Iran track in Islamabad, or in the U.S.-China talks in Beijing that might affect Islamabad, and in turn, the United States.

A positive outcome from the talks would include the following:

• Implementation of a genuine ceasefire and an end to the destruction of homes and villages.
• Concrete commitments by the LAF to expand deployment and strengthen control in Southern Lebanon and throughout the country.
• Substantial new U.S. and international assistance to Lebanon and the LAF.
• A sequenced roadmap covering Israeli withdrawal, border demarcation, detainees, sovereign state expansion, Hezbollah disarmament, and a permanent cessation of hostilities.
• A shared declaration of principles outlining the desired end state.

Lebanon would affirm that the Lebanese state alone should exercise authority over decisions of war and peace; that all weapons will come under exclusive state control; and that Lebanon seeks secure and stable relations with all neighboring states, including Israel.

Israel would affirm that it has no territorial ambitions in Lebanon; that it supports the emergence of a strong and sovereign Lebanese state; and that it will withdraw fully from Lebanese territory as security arrangements and Hezbollah disarmament are implemented.

The United States would commit to guaranteeing and monitoring the diplomatic process; mobilizing military and economic assistance for both parties; coordinating international support; and exercising its influence to ensure reciprocal implementation by all sides.

A Historic Opportunity

The current talks may falter or fail; the gaps between the parties remain substantial, and regional developments—particularly U.S.-Iran diplomacy—will influence the prospect of peace. Yet the strategic logic is compelling. Lebanon urgently needs sovereignty and stability. Israel urgently needs a secure northern border. The United States seeks a diplomatic achievement and a more stable regional order. These interests converge around a single objective: the reconstruction of a strong Lebanese state. If the parties recognize this reality and align their policies accordingly, the current negotiations could set the stage for a historic transformation.

Paul Salem is a senior associate (non-resident) at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.