Own Goals

Thanks to the World Cup, millions more Americans now know what an “own goal” is. It occurs when someone on the defending team puts the ball into their own goal, thus scoring for the other side. This is never intentional. Players who deliberately score against their team would not last long. It usually results when there is a scramble in front of the goal and the ball is inadvertently deflected into the goal off the foot or head of a defender. Outside the sports metaphor, it is called an unforced error. Own goals also occur in politics and government, and this column will focus on three of Trump’s that are trade related.

The most obvious is the Iran war. Trump started it, said it would only last a few weeks, and now, six months later, it is still here. It did not start as a trade argument, but it became one when Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz, upending the global trading system and stranding hundreds of cargo ships in the Persian Gulf. So far, the war has cost billions of dollars and the lives of thousands of people in multiple countries, severely depleted the U.S. supply of weapons, which will have implications in Europe and Asia, sent the price of oil soaring, disrupted global commerce, and handed Iran a leverage tool it had not previously considered using. One lesson here is a reminder that smaller countries have leverage too, and big countries don’t always prevail. One would think the United States would have learned that lesson already in Vietnam and Afghanistan. The irony is that if the war ever concludes with an agreement, it will probably look very much like the one Trump pulled out of in his first term.

Speaking of smaller countries’ leverage, the second example of an own goal is the other “war”—the trade war with Canada. Trump started this one early in his second term with tariffs on steel and aluminum, two important products that cross the border in both directions. He followed that with additional “Liberation Day” tariffs, although products compliant with the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) were excluded. Canada was one of only two nations that retaliated (the other was China), which led recently to Trump’s announcement of 50 percent tariffs on Canadian imports, this time without a USMCA exception. When the talks that followed collapsed, those tariffs were imposed, and Canada retaliated with tariffs effective September 8. Trump then announced further tariffs effective January 1, 2027, allowing time for more negotiations. The U.S. assumption is that Canada’s economy is dependent on the United States and that ultimately its government will meet U.S. demands. So far, Canadian public opinion is strongly behind its government’s resistance, and there is already discussion of leverage points, which include oil (which is refined in the U.S. Midwest and keeps gasoline prices lower than they otherwise would be), potash (an important element in farm fertilizers), an array of critical minerals, and electricity. Canada is the top customer for U.S. exports in 26 states and in the top three for 45 states. Cutting off commerce, which would be the effect of prohibitive tariffs, cuts both ways: In a trade war, there are no winners. If there is a settlement—and one is likely at some point—it will take things back to the way they were, meaning the entire episode will have accomplished little.

The third own goal is the administration’s China policy. This one is a bit different, since China poses a genuine security and economic threat, and any president would be impelled to take action. It is also not a case of big versus small, but it does teach the same lesson as the other two examples, that leverage is a two-way street, and that U.S. actions have inspired the other party to hit back. Trump’s 2025 tariffs on China led to a series of escalating tit-for-tat moves that ended—probably temporarily—only after the two leaders met. Similarly, expanded U.S. controls on high-tech exports to China led to China’s imposition of parallel controls on critical minerals that the United States, including its high-tech sector, needs for future development. The consequence has been acceleration of China’s efforts to independently develop its own high-tech sector and complications for U.S. efforts to do the same, mostly due to the on-and-off nature of the tariffs and controls and the uncertainty that creates.

All three of these examples illustrate the importance of essential elements of good governance: thinking carefully before acting, identifying possible negative outcomes and collateral damage, and taking care to forestall them. Governments that do not rigorously do that end up with own goals, resulting in both the direct damage they cause as well as failing to achieve their initial objectives. Paralysis by analysis can also be a problem when a crisis requires bold action, but the examples cited are unforced errors—own goals caused not by a mistake during a crisis but by a failure of good governance.

William A. Reinsch is a senior adviser (non-resident) and Scholl Chair emeritus with the Economics Program and Scholl Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. He can be reached at [email protected].