A Pacific Leaders Meeting with Too Few Leaders

From August 30 to September 3, leaders from across the Pacific Islands region gathered for the 55th Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Meeting (PIFLM). The summit comes on the heels of a dynamic year, with China launching its first ever submarine-launched ballistic missile into the Pacific, Australia finalizing mutual defense treaties with Fiji and Papua New Guinea, and a drastic leadership change in the Solomon Islands. While the focus of this year’s summit, hosted under the theme “Building Economies: Life. Action. Unity.,” was primarily on strengthening Pacific regionalism and cooperation to meet regional challenges, the geopolitical tensions surrounding last year’s summit have continued.

This Critical Questions examine this year’s PIFLM, including why this regional meeting is continuing to attract global attention, this convening’s main outcomes and what the United States as a dialogue partner brought to the table, which leaders were absent and why, and how China continued its pressure campaign against Taiwan’s Pacific engagement.

Q1: What is the PIFLM, and why has it received so much outside attention?

A1: The Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) is the main Pacific regional body and includes 18 member countries and territories, including Australia and New Zealand. The PIFLM is the annual gathering of PIF leaders to discuss challenges and opportunities for cooperation. In addition to forum members, the PIF’s 21 dialogue partners and development partner Taiwan have traditionally been invited to join as well.

This regional gathering has received increasing attention in recent years as China has ramped up efforts to establish influence and presence across the Pacific—a region that Australia, the United States, and other like-minded countries consider critical to their national security. For countries that have a strategic interest in the region but are not PIF members—such as the United States, Japan, and China—the PIFLM provides a key opportunity to meet with the region’s senior leaders and shape regional dynamics and posture.

China’s interest in the Pacific is threefold: (1) as a source for resources such as fish and lumber, (2) as a strategic asset for complicating U.S. and allied military planning in the case of a contingency, and (3) as a key component of a broader diplomatic effort to reduce Taiwan’s voice on the global stage, and in particular reduce Taiwan’s diplomatic support abroad. Over the past decade, China has secured the switch of diplomatic recognition of three Pacific islands—Kiribati and the Solomon Islands, both in 2019, and Naoero in late 2024. As of this year, three Pacific nations maintain official diplomatic ties with Taipei: the Marshall Islands, Palau, and Tuvalu.

Both the 2024 and 2025 PIFLMs were marked by controversies around Taiwan that raised concern in the United States and other like-minded nations. In 2024, when the meeting was hosted by Tonga, the conference’s final communiqué was rewritten to remove any mention of Taiwan following strong objections from China’s special envoy to the Pacific, Qian Bo. In 2025, the meeting was hosted by the Solomon Islands under then-Prime Minister Jeremiah Manele, whose government was closely aligned with China. Dialogue partners, including the United States and China, as well as development partner Taiwan, were excluded from attending. Although Manele asserted that this decision was due to the PIF’s ongoing review of regional partnerships, others saw clear Chinese influence in the outcome.

Q2: What were the outcomes of this year’s PIFLM?

A2: This year’s forum produced numerous statements of progress on key regional issues, but few actual implementable decisions. The regional issues were largely overshadowed by the geopolitics surrounding the event, including the unfortunate absence of 6 of the 18 leaders.

One of the more closely watched aspects of this year’s PIFLM was the forum’s reaction to China’s submarine-launched ballistic missile test on July 6. While several Pacific leaders forcefully condemned the test immediately afterward, including Palauan President Surrangel Whipps Jr. and Tuvaluan Prime Minister Feleti Teo, the region’s foreign ministers failed to release a joint statement outright condemning China at their regional ministerial earlier this summer—reportedly due to objections from Naoero and Kiribati. While Pacific leaders did in fact release a statement at this year’s PIFLM criticizing the lack of advance notice, the statement did not explicitly call out China. In the statement, leaders “registered concern on the recent intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test which overflew a number of Members without adequate notice. Leaders called on all States undertaking ICBM testing to ensure transparency and reassurance including through the provision of advance notification of at least 24 hours in accordance with international practice.” Naoero and Kiribati again prevented a truly unified statement, with Naoero dissociating and Kiribati absent from the leaders’ retreat.

The leaders also made progress on a years-long review that aims to both update internal regional architecture and codify the PIF’s relationships with external development partners. At this PIFLM, the leaders agreed to place dialogue and development partners into two tiers. Although not officially named in the final communique, other news sources have reported that China, the United States, Japan, France, India, Indonesia, Germany, the United Kingdom, the European Union, Canada, Singapore, South Korea, and the United Arab Emirates are in tier one. These countries are labeled as “strategic partners” and will be allowed to attend the PIFLM. Countries placed in tier two are considered “sector partners” and will only be allowed to attend the region’s foreign ministers meeting.

In recent years, the Pacific, long a transit hub for drugs, has seen a major uptick in the number of drug trafficking incidents, largely related to methamphetamine and cocaine destined for Australia and New Zealand. In response to this growing threat, the leaders agreed in principle on the Waqa Moana concept, a program aimed at curbing transnational organized crime and illicit drug trade across the Pacific. Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese announced $600 million toward the Moana Waqa concept at the forum, with most of these funds geared toward aerial surveillance to monitor drug vessels and assist Fiji’s police force.

With climate change continuing to be an existential threat for much of the region, the forum leaders also endorsed the “BELAU Declaration for Urgent and Inclusive Climate Action to keep 1.5°C Within Reach,” which remains in line with the Paris Agreement. The BELAU declaration calls on the international community to take immediate action in the following areas: keeping the Paris Agreement’s 1.5 °C goal in reach, centering the ocean-climate nexus, working toward 100 percent renewable energy, and improving climate finance and implementation.

Other areas of focus at this year’s summit included regionalism, gender, climate change, peace and security, economic development, and technology and connectivity, among others.

Q3: What did the United States bring to the table?

A3: As a PIF dialogue partner, the United States sent a delegation led by Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau, who announced more than $150 million in support for the region across a wide array of sectors. To address the region’s energy security needs, the United States is providing $60 million toward a regional energy security initiative and will conduct a feasibility study on Tonga’s fuel supply infrastructure. The U.S. Trade Development Agency approved funding to modernize the ports of Majuro and Ebeye in the Marshall Islands and will provide technical assistance on the nation’s mobile network. It will also support a feasibility study to upgrade Tonga’s data center infrastructure.

On security cooperation, the United States will provide $17 million to combat illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in the region and will cohost with Palau the inaugural U.S.-Pacific Islands Conference of Police Ministers. The United States will deepen scientific and technical cooperation with the region, supporting seabed mapping, exploration, and characterization to help Pacific countries make better-informed decisions in this sector. In the digital technology space, the United States will expand support across the region, helping governments adopt cloud-based technologies and advancing telecom regulation and digital transformation programs. The Peace Corps and the governments of the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Palau signed a letter of intent to establish a North Pacific Peace Corps Program.

The United States also announced initiatives in collaboration with other partners, including upgrading Omoka Port on Penrhyn Atoll in the Cook Islands in partnership with New Zealand; supporting the development of a new hospital in Palau with Australia, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and Taiwan; and conducting a drinking water sampling project with Taiwan in Palau.

Q4: Why were so many Pacific leaders absent from the meeting?

A4: In a time when regional unity is strongly needed, one-third of the forum’s leaders were absent—the leaders from Kiribati, Samoa, New Caledonia, Vanuatu, Fiji, and the Solomon Islands all missed some if not all of the week’s discussions for various reasons.

Just a few hours after arriving in Palau, Solomon Islands Prime Minister Matthew Wale was forced to return to Honiara to face a motion of no confidence. Solomon Islands Home Affairs Minister Manasseh Maelanga filed the motion, accusing Wale of “repeatedly making decisions on matters of national importance without proper consultation with, or the approval of, Cabinet, thereby undermining the principles of collective Cabinet responsibility, representative democracy, and good governance.” Although this motion was withdrawn the day before it was set for debate, it prevented Wale from attending the main portion of the PIFLM and promoting his idea for a regional security agreement. Instead, his proposal for a “Blue Pacific Ocean of Peace Regional Security Treaty” was “noted” but not decided on. Given that Wale is the most pro-Western leader his country has had in recent years after successive pro-China governments, some viewed the timing of this motion as suspect. New Zealand Foreign Minister Winston Peters suggested “outside forces” were involved, also stating that it would be “defying gravity and logic” to think that foreign interference was not to blame for multiple leader absences. In response, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Guo Jiakun stated “We have never had any interest in, nor will we ever interfere in any way with the internal affairs of other countries.”

Kiribati President Taaneti Maamau claimed he could not attend because he could not secure a flight while the Kiribati parliament was in session. He sent Kiribati’s director of foreign service and former ambassador to China to replace him as head of the delegation. Kiribati’s delegation head also did not attend the leaders’ retreat and was initially not announced at the conference’s closing ceremony.

Fiji’s Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka did not attend because of domestic issues, and Samoa’s Prime Minister Laaulialemalietoa Leuatea Schmidt skipped due to health problems. Vanuatu’s Prime Minister Jotham Napat did not travel to Koror, as he was attending the Leaders Party of Vanuatu congress, and New Caledonia President Milakulo Tukumuli was leading a delegation to Paris. While some of these absences may have been unfortunate coincidence, the end result was a leaders meeting with a notable lack of leaders.

Q5: How did tensions around China and Taiwan play out at this year’s PIFLM?

A5: China has long taken issue with Taiwan’s position as a PIF development partner, and especially its invitation in that role to the annual PIFLM. For years, Beijing has sought to limit Taiwan’s engagement with the Pacific through economic and diplomatic pressure, much of which has been aimed at Taiwan’s diplomatic allies, including Palau as this year’s PIF chair. On August 19, China’s Consular Service issued a travel warning noting to “exercise caution when traveling to Palau” and that there has been “a number of theft and robbery cases targeting tourists, resulting in significant losses for the victims.” These motions align with Chinese punitive actions against Palau in previous years, including restricting state-backed tour groups to Palau and repeatedly issuing travel warnings. Such actions have noticeably damaged Palau’s tourism industry, with the number of Chinese tourists falling from 91,095 in 2015 to 21,286 in 2025, effectively punishing the country for its close relations to Taiwan. Taiwan’s embassy in Palau issued a response on its Facebook page stating “Taiwan deeply regrets and strongly condemns China’s attempts to politicize and weaponize tourism, using people-to-people exchanges as a means of pressure and coercion to force other countries to alter their political positions.” The U.S. embassy in Koror also responded on Facebook with a post noting that the United States “opposes any attempts by China to weaponize tourism to coerce Palau” and calls on Beijing to “cease all its coercive activities against Palau.”

China also pursued other means of voicing displeasure over Taiwan’s impending involvement in the PIFLM. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement on August 11 directed toward PIF Secretary General Baron Waqa stating, “China urges the Pacific Islands Forum secretary to strictly adhere to the one-China principle, properly handle Taiwan-related issues and avoid affecting the healthy and stable development of ties between China and the Forum.” 

These types of statements continued during the summit. Following the participation of Taiwan’s Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung and supporting delegation in meetings and side events held on the margins of the summit, China’s Pacific envoy, Qian Bo, asserted that “Taiwan is not a dialogue partner with the forum so we have serious concerns” and that “There will always be consequences . . . this should not have happened. We think it’s very inappropriate.” Chia-lung responded: “Whenever China goes to a party, it makes itself as if it’s the host and China ruins the whole atmosphere of the party.”

Conclusion

As this year’s PIFLM comes to a close, what is clear is that the vast Pacific, home to some of the world’s most prolific fisheries, well-transited waterways, and most vibrant small democracies, will increasingly act as an arena for great power competition. China’s attempts to pressure Pacific nations is not likely to abate in the coming years, and yet with New Zealand as the host of next year’s PIFLM, Beijing’s actions are unlikely to prevent Taiwan’s participation again as a development partner. Yet attempts to manipulate the forum’s posture on Taiwan will likely continue, as will efforts to mute regional responses to aggressive actions such as the ballistic missile test this past July. 

This increasing outside attention has the potential to bring more resources to the Pacific, but it also threatens to overshadow what Pacific nations have defined as their actual national security priorities, including climate change, economic security, and transnational crime, among others. As partners continue to vie for influence with these critical Pacific nations, it will be imperative to demonstrate the ability to be effective, transparent partners. Ultimately, the partners best positioned to earn lasting influence will be those willing to listen and invest in the priorities Pacific nations have set for themselves, rather than those defined by great power competition.

John Augé is the program manager for the Australia Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Kathryn Paik is a deputy director and senior fellow with the Australia Chair at CSIS.