Policy of Truth: Reporting Requirements for Critical Minerals Investments

In paper after paper, webinar after webinar, forum after forum, experts from around the world, and especially in Washington, are opining on the meaning and implications of the current scramble for critical minerals. What would be the best framework for countering Chinese dominance of the sector, the most reliable methods to ensure return on investment, the fairest approaches to host community and government engagement, or the most appropriate ways overall for the United States and other governments to work in this new reality where such minerals are vital for the changing economy?

Some of this thinking is certainly worthy of review and consideration by policymakers. The difficult reality is that every mineral, every deposit, every context, every governing framework, every community engagement approach, every development-focused intervention, and every supply chain is different. There are many past lessons to be learned, but the elusive search for sets of standards and regulations that can ensure responsible engagement across contexts is destined to remain just that: elusive. Especially when mines can take at least a decade, or longer, to move from initial greenfield investment to operational site, along with questions about where trading, processing, and refining happens that can call into question what U.S. investment, let alone control, can even really mean.

In that context, what we need instead of new policy frameworks, papers, and proposed rules is to channel dance-pop legends Depeche Mode and institute a “Policy of Truth.”

This Policy of Truth that should be developed and deployed has a precedent in one of the countries and contexts that connects to a previous scramble, Myanmar, but remains relevant today given that it is home both to many of the global reserves of rare earths, along with other critical minerals, gems, and gold, as well as being governed by a repressive junta known for its violence, human rights violations, corruption, and engagement with U.S. competitors.

This Policy of Truth approach does not focus on meeting (or claiming to meet) specific standards or relying on third-party auditing; it simply focuses on the need for a Policy of Truth, basic due diligence related to the policy, and public reporting. That combination may result in a few-paragraph summary or a 60-page detailed report, with the decision left up to the filer. The scrutiny and potential enforcement are then in the hands of investors, downstream purchasers, communities, civil society, and potentially, government enforcement agencies.

As I have advocated previously, if the United States can only take one approach in a new battle for minerals dominance, this is the simplest and most direct way to facilitate an honest conversation about what is (and what should be) happening in the sector. Policies and investments rarely succeed without that as the starting point. This analysis will briefly review the background on the requirements as they relate to Myanmar, consider how these could be adapted for the current rush, and look ahead to future scenarios.

The Past: Burma Responsible Investment Reporting Requirements.

In 2012, the Obama administration introduced the Burma Responsible Investment Reporting Requirements (RIRRs). Over several years in the early 2010s, the then-ruling junta began to make changes that appeared to signal a shift toward democracy, rule of law, and a more open approach to foreign economic investment. This brought much enthusiasm from supporters of Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy, as well as broader civil society and other advocates for change in Myanmar, but also caution. Were these signs and words of intention to change going to lead to true and lasting reforms? Or were they a smokescreen?

As negotiations continued between the Obama administration and the junta regarding these issues, the removal of the extensive sanctions program in place on Myanmar became a key topic. There is no perfect time for sanctions removal, especially given the risks: If the U.S. government removes sanctions too soon, and then there is backsliding, reimposition is challenging, time-consuming, and often imperfect in execution; this was a part of what happened with respect to North Korea in the late 2000s, during a brief period of détente. On the other hand, if the U.S. government waits too long, hoped-for economic changes and foreign investment may not come soon enough, and hardliners can manipulate public opinion to undermine reforms and bring back authoritarianism and violence; this is a core piece of the history of Sudan between 2019 and 2021.

The RIRRs were a rare time when a middle ground was found that allowed for sanctions to be eased in a moderated form. The RIRRs were, in essence, a condition of the removal of the prohibition on “new investment” that had been a hallmark of the sanctions program since the early 2000s. In sum, according to the general license issued by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) to ease the investment sanctions, any U.S person who invested more than $500,000 in Myanmar needed to file a report with the U.S. Embassy in Yangon detailing their business investments within six months of making them. The report obliged the filer to set out the specifics of the investments made and detail the due diligence measures taken with respect to a particular set of issues: engagement with Myanmar’s government and military, as well as human rights, corruption, environmental concerns, security arrangements, property acquisitions, payment transparency, and more.

The decision on what to file substantively was left to the company. In some cases, extensive reports of dozens of pages were compiled, including by companies like General Electric that did not believe they needed to file, demonstrating both meaningful due diligence as well as awareness of areas where risks remained high and in need of further mitigation. In other cases, companies provided less than two pages with quite scant details, summary information, and an obvious sense that no real due diligence or risk mitigation had been undertaken. This was not a failure, but a feature: Rather than have companies pretend to meet a set of standards that they had not, they simply stated the truth, and then the market and external stakeholders could be the judge, which began to happen in 2013 and 2014.

The RIRRs disappeared too soon, as the Obama administration ended the sanctions program as a whole in 2016, meaning that the underlying general license establishing the RIRRs was no longer valid. This was not only too bad in hindsight, given what unfolded in Myanmar in the coming years, but it also meant the experiment ended prematurely. For example, the enforcement authority was never quite figured out between the Department of State and OFAC, and the reports were not varied enough in terms of sector to lead to meaningful conclusions about where regulatory or market interventions could be useful. But even with those shortcomings, the groundwork of the Policy of Truth was laid.

The Present: Venezuela and Other Sanctions Relief Cases

So when faced with the question of how to handle critical minerals investments in contexts of uncertain governance situations—including with partners whose long-term reliability is questionable at best—the clearest and most direct approach should be to reinvigorate the RIRRs. Perhaps there is a world in which the higher ground of a more robust or deeper framework would be possible, but the current climate is not that world, and this middle ground is both achievable and desirable.

In many cases of current interest with respect to minerals investments—Venezuela, Ukraine, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)—versions of the RIRRs could again be implemented through sanctions general licensing. Should Myanmar return to a more democratic path, it, too, could have a new round of RIRRs implemented through the new sanctions program brought back into place after the 2021 coup. Venezuela sanctions have, of course, been easing over the last several months since the arrest of former President Nicolás Maduro, but importantly, these RIRRs could be implemented through general licenses even in contexts in which the sanctions themselves are not being eased. Even in cases where our policy overall on sanctions remains unchanged, such as the DRC, a general license establishing the RIRRs would be permissible.

As before, the reporting requirements would be simple and follow a specific starting template:

• Details of the investment (e.g., which minerals or location)
• Details of the investors and operators (beneficial owners and key operating partners on the ground)
• Chain of custody or other approaches taken with respect to offtake
• Expected operating returns and summary of payments to the host government
• Labor and human rights due diligence frameworks implemented
• Security arrangements, including contracts with the host country’s security forces
• Confirmation of sanctions and anti–money laundering compliance programs
• Social license to operate approaches taken, if any
• Free, prior, informed consent engagements, if any
• If necessary, some information could be provided to the U.S. government directly via classified submission, but the subjects covered in that submission would be required to be noted in the public report

Rather than remain staid and identical, in each case, the Department of State would issue a business risk advisory that would outline the specific risks relevant to a specific country (or region), which would then add supplemental elements to the report for filers active there. Enforcement would rest principally with OFAC (e.g., for failure to file, which is a violation of the license), but with guidance provided by the Department of State and other agencies with information regarding the investments on the ground.

The U.S. government has recently included a version of this idea and incorporated it into the private reporting provided to OFAC and State in the context of Venezuelan minerals. In March 2026, OFAC issued GL 51 and 51A related to Venezuelan minerals, including gold, allowing for U.S. entities to engage in all transactions related to these minerals under certain conditions, including that a report be provided to OFAC and the State Department within 10 days of the first transaction and every 30 days thereafter covering these elements:

• The parties involved
• Documentation demonstrating supply chain due diligence plans to determine the chain of custody of the minerals
• Quantities, descriptions, and purchase prices of the minerals
• The dates the transactions occurred
• Any taxes, fees, or other payments provided to the government of Venezuela

In addition to a narrower focus, these reports also lack the public component. There would be several key benefits to this broader approach:

• The RIRRs, including the underlying general license and informational advisories, would be adaptable and adjustable over time, responsive to ongoing circumstances.
• The reports will likely be clear, simple, and easily accessible and digestible to downstream purchasers and the public in the United States and in host countries, allowing for more meaningful engagement than reports pursuant to certification systems have done.
• The reports will provide important baselines for more country-specific and mineral-specific interventions, given that the differences across minerals can be hard for a single framework to cover effectively.
• The reports can become key baselines for investors, financial institutions, insurance companies, and other companies essential to the operation of critical minerals investments.

The Future: A Broader Reporting Framework Beyond Existing Sanctions

The deeper question is how to apply the RIRRs in other contexts where sanctions are not immediately available, such as Indonesia, Zambia, and Brazil. Without a legal authority in place through sanctions or otherwise, reports could be encouraged voluntarily, as discussed below, but the ideal approach would be a legal framework applicable to all minerals investments.

A few options could be pursued to develop the underlying authority, or an alternative:

• Introduce a “Critical Minerals Sanctions” program, which not only allows targeting of those foreign actors undermining critical minerals investments through corruption or other illicit means, but also authorizes and requires the submission of RIRRs.
• Pass legislation authorizing a federal agency—and agencies such as the Departments of the Interior, State, Energy, or even the Commodity Futures Trading Commission could all be candidates—to collect, maintain, and eventually enforce the reports.
• If no government-led approach can be developed outside sanctions frameworks, outside stakeholders can consider the development of a multi-stakeholder initiative that can oversee, collect, and disseminate the reports.

Reviving the RIRRs will not solve the myriad issues underlying the current critical minerals scramble; in the end, no single framework can. The broad and complex set of policies that must eventually underlie critical minerals investments and community development can be developed, but first, there must be a baseline and comparable set of data and an overarching Policy of Truth.

Brad Brooks-Rubin is a senior associate (non-resident) with the Human Rights Initiative and Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.