Power, Politics, and Peace in Somalia

This transcript is from a CSIS podcast published on December 12, 2024. Listen to the podcast here.

Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: Welcome to Into Africa. My name is Mvemba Phezo Dizolele. I'm a senior fellow and the director of the Africa program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. This is a podcast where we talk everything Africa, politics, economics, security, and culture. Welcome.

Somalia holds immense strategic importance for regional stability and global security. However, the country continues to grapple with the persistent threat of Al-Shabaab, a militant group undermining peace efforts. Recent tensions with neighboring Ethiopia and Somaliland further complicate the landscape, raising questions about regional cohesion. At the same time, Somalia's economy faces critical hurdles, including food insecurity, infrastructure deficit, and reliance on remittances.

At the beginning of his term in 2022, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud joined us at CSIS to talk about Somalia's ongoing struggle against Al-Shabaab and ISIS. Despite 15 years of counterterrorism effort and billions of dollars spent, Al-Shabaab continued to operate with remarkable resilience, while ISIS, though smaller, posed an emerging threat.

President Mohamud spoke candidly about surviving multiple assassination attempts by Al-Shabaab and the urgent need to rethink Somalia’s security strategies. The president discussed the failures of the containment policy, which aimed to confine Al-Shabaab within Somalia's borders, but faltered due to the ideological nature of the group which knows no boundaries.

He emphasized the importance of countering Al-Shabaab's extremist propaganda with a campaign grounded in true Islamic teachings, exposing the group's criminal activities disguised as religious duty. On the economic front, the government worked to disrupt Al-Shabaab's financing by targeting exhaustion networks and establishing institutions like the Financial Reporting Center to trace money flows.

These efforts, alongside continued military action, reflected Somalia's commitment to addressing the root causes of instability. The situation is, of course, much more complicated. To provide greater context and evaluate Somalia's evolving security landscape, I'm joined today on Into Africa by Dr. Afyare Elmi, a political scientist whose research professor at the City University of Mogadishu and a non-resident senior fellow at the Middle East Council on Global Affairs.

Good morning, good afternoon, Afyare, and welcome to Into Africa.

Afyare Elmi: Good afternoon from my side. Thank you very much for inviting me to this discussion, and I'm looking forward to it.

Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: During a conversation with his Excellency President Mohamud, he explained that Somalia's divisions were not rooted in ethnicity but in clans. For viewers unfamiliar with this concept, could you briefly clarify what it means and how it shapes Somalia's society today within the context of what's happening in your country?

Afyare Elmi: Well, actually, normally Somalia is considered as one of the two homogeneous countries in Africa, and largely the country is populated by one ethnic group, Somali. That doesn't mean there are none others, but that's why the homogeneity school argues that there are no ethnicities that are fighting over resources.

Instead, it's clans within the Somali ethnic group that are fighting for power and resources. So, in that literature, normally, the way I put it is that the main root cause of the conflict is competition for power and resources, and clans are merely a mobilization tool where those that are leading or seeking militias or faction leaders or whatever use and exploit the clan identity. So basically, that's how I put it.

Mvemba Phezo Dizolele:

 Clans competing for resources and for power. This has been going on for decades now, at least, if we take it from the time of the fall of Siad Barre in the '90s and what followed. Somalia has been trying to reconstitute itself into a functioning country. How would you assess the situation in your country today following everything that we've read at the beginning of this conversation that President Mohamud had shared with us here at CSIS two years ago?

Afyare Elmi:

 Well, the way I see it is in the last 60 or so years, Somalia has had three more or less: the first republic, the second republic, and the third republic. The first republic was the civilian government from 1960 to 1969, and then the military rule that started in '69 to '91 is considered to be the second republic. From 2000 onwards, would been actually struggling to establish the third republic, which came through a negotiated settlement in Djibouti.

Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: The settlement in Djibouti, what exactly was that about?

Afyare Elmi: Well, the way to explain for the audience that may not be familiar with details, the third republic has four major components in the agreement. The first one is that Somalis that gathered in Arta, agreed to establish a parliamentary model, a democratic system, clan power-sharing, and regional autonomy.

And later on in Kenya, it has been revised and instead of regional autonomy, the Somalis in [inaudible] Kenya has actually changed it with federal system. So if you want to know basically the main components of the political settlement in Somalia at the moment of the third republic, it's the parliamentary system, it is democratic selection, election dispensation, whatever you call it every four, five years, and also a 4.5 a clan formula, which basically different clans share power and finally a federal arrangement.

So that is what it entails. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud came to power in 2022 with a provisional constitution that had that four components in it. And by the way, for a brief background, from 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, and 2022, these were the five periods where we have had some hiccups. The political settlement stayed the same.

The political settlement with the four components that I'm trying to explain have not changed. So, President Mohamud came to power in 2022. The provisional constitution was based on those four major political settlements or major components of the political settlement. So that is when he took power.

In terms of the groups, in 2000, it was only civil societies. In 2004, faction leaders joined. In 2008, Islamists, moderates particularly, joined. And in 2012, some of the regions basically became part of it. So, President Mohamud again took power in 2022 when almost all of the groups were part and parcel of the third republic, with the exception of Somaliland and Al-Shabaab, which we all know the reason is that they were not part of. Apparently, Somaliland wants to secede, and Al-Shabaab wants to overtake the whole system. So, these were the realities when the president took power.

Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: This Djibouti consensus that you're referring to, when did it take place?

Afyare Elmi: In 2000.

Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: So, from 2000 to today, 24 years, how do you assess that process? It sounds like, on one level, it's holding. I don't know if that's the right word because you've had this transition back and forth. President Mohamud himself has been elected twice. He came to power, then Farmajo, and now he's back. Uh, you said everybody, with the exception of Somaliland and Al-Shabaab, all the major key components who a part and parcel to this. So, will you say that this settlement is holding?

Afyare Elmi Well, it has been holding since 2012. Apparently when you look at the objectives or the aspirations of the Somali people, the progress was very slow, by after 20 some years, the expectation was that at least the state would be able to control its boundaries and some sort of oversight would be given to the people, whether it's through election or something else. But so far that has not been the case in terms of what we would like to achieve as a nation. But apparently, it has been growing in a very incremental way.

Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: In the right direction, that is?

Afyare Elmi: Yes. In the right direction.

Mvemba Phezo Dizolele:

 So, since we've hosted President Sheikh Hassan Mohamud here after he assumed office for the second time, how do you assess the progress that has happened since as he tried to implement the vision that he had outlined? What are the key challenges that the country continues to face that hinder his administration's efforts?

Afyare Elmi: Actually, I think that is an area that I have been writing about and concerned with the way the government approached it. I think there were four initiatives or activities that the current government has embarked on. The first was a winner-takes-all approach. The government, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, and his political party won the election, but it got assistance of so many other groups for the political victory.

However, later when they were forming the government, they took this often jargon within the peacebuilding called it winner-takes-all, they did not share power with those they have defeated and those that have also been part of the coalition that helped them win the election. So that's one part.

Second was President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and his government actually attempted to change the components of the political settlement that I have explained. For instance, it has prescribed the presidential system over the parliamentary system that Somalis used to have. So, for instance, the government is new constitution, they actually installed a presidential system.

Second, even though the parties that deal with that component has not been enacted by the parliament, they also have changed the federal character in essence by more of centralizing the powers within the central government.

I'll give you just an example. The government has assigned, when you look at the distribution of power and responsibilities, it has assigned 44 exclusive powers that are very important to the federal government. And then it shared 20 powers and responsibilities with the federal member states and assigned a number of important functions to the local government as well.

The only party that they have given to federal member states on 29 powers that are not so important. So basically, even though they did not touch that term federal, in essence, they have played with it to the extent that something similar to a centralized government is emerging. So that's the secondary component.

The third component is democratic dispensation is every four years. Apparently, the government has passed three laws, one for political parties, one for electoral system, and one for the commission. And all of them when you look at it, it gives an advantage to the incumbent government and restricts the political space from others.

For instance, they have actually legislated three political parties who only compete for the presidential elections. And actually, that is not desirable for a polarized society like Somalia. So, in this case, I would say that for a non-specialist audience, the government has tampered with the political settlement in a arbitrary process and that has had serious negative implications for the cohesion of the people who were already part of that political settlement.

The president came to power in 2022 while the political settlement was intact and as many groups as possible were part of it, with the exception of Somaliland and Al-Shabaab. Particularly those were the two main groups that were outside the political settlement. Apparently, the president has promised to defeat Al-Shabaab.

In the interview that you referred in the introduction of this broadcast, also the president was asking about the Somaliland question, and he was talking about the possibility of reaching some sort of agreement later on when there is a change or circumstances change.

So basically that's where we were in 2022 and when he came to power, the regime, or the government as a whole has adopted winner takes all and introduced its own new constitution would changed three of the four basic components of the political settlement and apparently attempted to restrict the political space by introducing the number of political parties and nominating their own election commissioners and actually introducing a very confusing electoral system that has all the major electoral systems in the group, open list, closed list, first pass the post, all of them are part and parcel of the new system that they introduce.

So, there is apparently a clear intent of gerrymandering the outcome for such design of institutions of the government.

Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: We also hosted the Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of the Interior Jama Salah a year ago so. At the time I think he was working on this being a constitutionalists. This process you're describing Afyare, it was done extra-constitutionally or how do they do it and how did they manage to pull it off if they're pulling it off?

Afyare Elmi: The way they did it is first of all, there is something called a constitution review, which the process is stipulated in the provisional constitution. And then what we have now is basically something that touch on the core of the settlement.

 Like, for instance, introducing a presidential system, this is a very high churn. Somalis are already complaining about too much power in the hands of the president who has been elected by parliament. Imagine then if we jump into presidential system.

In political science, by the way, there is nothing wrong with presidential system. What I'm basically arguing is that the Somali context does not get well. So that's one thing. In terms of the process, the process was basically a sham process, whether it's corruption or processes that have been overstepped.

When you look deep into the way that the government was imposing this settlement that they wanted, it was quite clear that it'll not keep the country together. And by the way, by implication of that, and as a result of that, two federal member states stepped out, Puntland left and Jubbaland left, and the national opposition also left the whole process.

So, then it became clear that this is just a government project, and it wanted just to continue pushing forward.

Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: This means, Afyare, that the very hard work that went into the Djibouti settlement in 2000 is maybe undone. You described the two federal member states that left. What is the reaction from the other member states?

Afyare Elmi: Well, there are three more member states that are with the government as of now; at least their leaders are supporting the process, but the transactional politics actually is that even the leaders of those federal member states are overstaying their mandate, with perhaps one of them is still within mandate, but the other two are overstaying their mandate.

Some can actually successfully argue that this should not have been the case, but they have exchanged this loyalty of the regime so that they can also stay a longer time and do not go to elections. So that's how it's explained as well. But yes, what I am arguing and what I have been saying publicly in both Somali language and whatever language that I can speak, is that this is not the right thing to do in a polarized post-conflict society. And it might have actually an effect that the country cannot easily recover from.

Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: Within that context then, as the administration is fighting Al-Shabaab, you spoke in a recent interview, and you said that former Al-Shabaab members would transition into government roles, have acted as local mediators in addressing some of the group's activities. However, you also pointed out that these mediators may struggle to effectively address Al-Shabaab's transclanic nature. Given what you just described in terms of the disruption of the political settlement, how is this transitioning, if you will, of members of Al-Shabaab into the government and the role as mediators going to work out then?

Afyare Elmi: I think this is, again, let me just give you a short background. In any conflict, whether it's against the extremists or another faction, given civil conflict or civil war, and is either through a negotiated settlement or through a military victory. When you were talking to the president actually he said clearly that the intent behind the fight against Al-Shabaab at that time was just to force them to come to the table. Eventually he said, we'll talk to them. That's basically what he said.

And later on in Norway he repeated that. So, what I am saying here is that given the 17, 18 years that the conflict has been going on, military victory is not in sight. We cannot see any group, whether it's Al-Shabaab or whether it's the government, winning the war militarily and defeating the other groups completely. I cannot see that.

So, then the common logic here is that the next best thing is to negotiate and work out a settlement. For that to come, you need a mediator, apparently a credible third party that can get the confidence of all parties.

And that's why I proposed external parties like Turkey or Qatar or Saudi Arabia or Norway or Finland, whatever. Those two are the countries that I mentioned. And I was basically saying that this has to go to that third party, that's external, simply because there is no third party, whether it's traditional elders or an eminent personality, that is able to lead this process from the internal political setting or from the Somali side of it.

So that is what I said. I still believe that, and I believe it's not going to be easy, but I think that's where we will be heading anyway.

Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: On that point, Afyare, the two mentions that I can think of. One, we know that the United States carried out airstrikes on December 24th last year, so a month ago today, against Al-Shabaab. You also have not included the United States in the group of these potential external actors who can be brokers. How do you differentiate the United States with the other groups? What is it, how the United States is engaging and what do you think the other groups will be bringing to the table?

Afyare Elmi: I think it's very simple. United States is party of the war. It has been supporting the government. It has been actually conducting airstrikes against the Al-Shabaab. So more or less, it cannot act as a mediator. And I don't think Al-Shabaab also would be willing to do that. Maybe they would be willing to talk to them directly, but I don't expect such a thing.

You know what happen during the Taliban as well? I live in Qatar. I was teaching the university there. So, unless the whole thing is going to change in that direction, I don't expect the US to have a role in the negotiations. But it's allies, these are all its allies that have not been part of the fighting that can actually present themselves as credible mediators.

And they have done it already. I don't know whether anything has started. The president said nothing has started. So, we'll see how these things developed. But by the way, there is a new administration in the US, so perhaps we'll have a question on that.

Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: Yes. Absolutely. I actually want to, since we are on this.

Afyare Elmi: Yeah. It seems like the administration in Somalia may think that things will go on as usual, but what is your assessment? Do you think the US will remain, the US will pull out? How the incoming government relations with Somalia may change?

I think before I go to the US and the incoming administration, I would strongly emphasize the importance of some sort of internal cohesion among Somalis led by the government for this period of uncertainty. And I would strongly encourage President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and his team to change direction and embrace [inaudible] government and more or less at least bring on board all of the federal member states that are outside the system as well as the national opposition.

I think without that, the government will risk the small... I mean, or, I mean, let's say the achievements or the progress that has been made for the best while. So that's what I would say on the Somalia front. On this current administration, the Trump administration in Africa, particularly one of Africa, it's coming to a region that is disoriented now as a whole within Ethiopia, in Sudan, in South Sudan, and in Somalia.

If you look at it, we're having a lot of problems in the region in the Horn of Africa. On top of that, Somalia has been facing a lot of problems as well. So, the main issues I hope will happen with the new administration is that it will come to the region in a sober manner where they look and pay attention to the complexity of the situation here in the region and both in Somalia.

Apparently in Somalia, expects the continuation of the support and also expects the overall so-called I mean territorial integrity and so whatever it is. So that is the general talking point that I see from the government. But I guess a lot will depend on the team that comes to Africa and the overall direction of the Department of State and Rubio and others and how they look in the region and Somalia.

I still believe, as you said, Somalia is a very important country. It comes by its location, by the many problems that it is facing. So hopefully some sort of prudent handling is needed from the Washington end.

Mvemba Phezo Dizolele:

 So there gotta be some tough talks on both sides; not only may the United States pull out troops, uh, during this new administration, time will tell. We'll see. But the US also may withdraw, may actually use this UN assessed contribution for AUSSOM and even cut security assistance to forces that are not American forces, but the other forces that engage with Somalia. Do you see those possibilities?

Afyare Elmi: Actually, I see it. I mean, one of the indications is is that it abstains from the last vote. So, it's quite clear the direction that we are heading. And I think this is not only limited to this specific project about the entire US relations; we don't know how they will unfold.

So that I can see, and there are many other possibilities as well. Either way, if you go by the rhetoric of former undersecretaries during Trump era who have been outside during the Biden era, some of them were open about what they wanted to do or what the US should do when it comes to Somalia, security support or Somaliland-Somali relations. So, all of these things.

So basically, we don't know what will happen when they come to power or how they will act? I honestly don't know.

Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: The one thorny issue... Afyare, sorry to just jump in.

Afyare Elmi: Mm-hmm

Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: And we want to call it the elephant in the room or not. It's Somaliland. You know, you talk about some of the people had been in the Trump administration, one, and left doing that interim. They were very vocal in their support for the recognition of Somaliland's independence...

Afyare Elmi: Mm-hmm.

Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: Now that some of them may be going to the government, the new Trump administration, that may become a reality as well, where the United States recognizes Somaliland.

Afyare Elmi: Well, that is by the way, even important think tanks like Heritage and Hoover Institute, and as you said, the former undersecretaries and other officials are open about it. And they do it, apparently; they can do it, but it's not be like, I mean, easy. As you know, a new state to join the state system normally takes a long time.

Some studies that talk about de facto states number about 68 of them, of which 10 are prominent. So apparently there are many, many de facto states that are trying to become a juridical states and join the UN, but that depends on the P5 politics in the security council and you know that all of them have to agree, or at least none of them should oppose in the event that one comes in. So, a lot will depend on how this issue of Somaliland is approached. If it's approached like Kosovo, I think it'll enhance Somaliland's position, but that may not immediately translate into juridical status for Somaliland at the UN level.

The US has to negotiate with Russia and China and others and eventually convince them. But if it comes through the African Union, that's a different story. And it hasn't been done so far and I don't know what will happen with the new changes in the African Union. A lot will depend on as well on who becomes the leader in the African Union. So, there is lots of ifs and hypothetical components of this argument, and I think we should carefully watch first.

Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: Absolutely. We'll be watching. I mean, the administration is just settling in. On the economic front, Afyare, the president, of course, was very bullish on what he will do. I'm talking about President Mohamud here, what he'll do about Somalia's situation. Where is the economy of Somalia today? Have there been notable areas of improvement and/or setbacks?

Afyare Elmi: Yes. There has been notable improvements. As you know, there has been debt relief completion. Apparently, the government has tried to increase its domestic revenue. It's still small, but it has increased in double-digit if you look at it. But the amount is like less than $500 million still.

So that is, again, I think progress and they should be praised for that, I would say. I think one area that needs the government overall is to improve its efforts against the corruption. There's a lot actually. And this is pandemic anyway in any aspect of the state lives, whether it's in local or other aspects as well. But overall, I would say there have been some improvements on the economic front.

And by the way, I'm talking about just the state side, because when there are not, that many countries that are asking you to repay this or that, I think that's helpful as well. I'm not talking about the overall poverty level, I'm not talking about the humanitarian situation. That's actually staggering. And this is actually another level, but I'm talking about the management of the fi- finance, particularly at the ministry level and how they have been doing with a lot of the areas with some caveat.

Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: So, you noticed— there have been some improvements that you see. We'll end with one more question for you today is, you know, in the past when we've spoken, you said that Somalis just want foreigners out of their country. They want to have the space to talk, to rebuild. Yet when the president came to CSIS in that conversation that I had with him, he was keen on building strong relations with the neighbors, with the United States, and now we are wondering the role of Egypt with all the pressures that are taking place between Ethiopia, Somaliland, and Somalia. Can you speak to that as we wrap up?

Afyare Elmi: Actually, what I would say is like, I mean, Somalia is not its own universe. It has to deal with its neighbors. It has to deal with global actors. So, I think maybe that's misunderstanding. On about of how I conceive relations that Somalia should have with the neighbors. I guess what you are referring to is what should the neighbors, or what kind of role should neighbors play in terms of sending peacekeeping forces in Somalia?

And I think there are pieces that I have written a long time ago where I have argued that neighbors should not be part of the peacekeeping forces. And in fact, there was a resolution in 2007 that also said neighbors or so-called frontline status, should not be part of the peacekeepers, for apparently that they will benefit from intermingling and this whole overall buffer zone strategy that they have been using in Somalia.

And in fact, that argument can still be made that, okay, Ethiopia, for instance, has been using the buffer zone strategy since '91 in Somalia. What has been achieved with that? Has Somalia benefited from that? And I think that is quite clear that it has not.

So, from what I see, Somalia should still engage and talk to its supporters. With what I am against as well is the haphazard and messy way of the government in which it's conducting foreign policy now, of signing multiple, nobody knows what they are. Agreements with rival countries, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Turkey, Emirates, Qatar.

There are so many agreements that has been going on and nobody knows what they are. So, I think that is what I am referring to. That the government should handle these things in a more careful manner. And I think perhaps that's a fair assessment and I hope that government is not lost the rivalries between Egypt and Ethiopia and Eritrea. I think that should be managed in a better way.

I think perhaps one very important thing is the humanitarian aspect of the situation in Somalia. There are still millions and millions of Somalis that have been dependent on the support of the international community. I can tell you that in the past 22, 23, it was the United States that has done the heavy lifting in saving thousands of Somalis from starvation.

Now the purse is not as big as it was. I think it's $400 million for 2025. That may not be sufficient so I guess at least the international community might pay attention to that. With climate change actually adding to the already complicated situation.

Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: Afyare, thank you for raising the issue of the humanitarian situation in Somalia and the role that the US has played and what the needs still are as we enter this new year. I would like to thank you, Dr. Afyare Elmi, political scientist, research professor at City University of Mogadishu, a non-resident fellow at the Middle East Council on Global Affairs, for joining us today on Into Africa. We look forward to seeing how things evolve in your country, Somalia. Thank you.

Afyare Elmi: Thank you so much, Mvemba. Thank you so much. Will see you again when I'm in this area.

Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: Absolutely. Thank you. Thank you for listening. We want to have more conversations about Africa. Tell your friends, subscribe to our podcast at Apple Podcasts. You can also read our analysis and report at CSIS.org/Africa. So long.

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