What Happens After Hungary’s Election? Four Scenarios to Watch

Hungary’s high-stakes election is beginning to look like an uphill battle for incumbent Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. At least that is what the polling shows: Orbán’s party, Fidesz, has been trailing opponent Péter Magyar and his Tisza Party by an average of 10 points for weeks. However, media bias, foreign interference, and the unfair nature of recent elections create an uneven playing field for Tisza. An election observation mission led by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is on the ground but is itself under scrutiny, reportedly leading some civil society organizations to refrain from sharing information. EU representatives, while concerned, are holding back criticism of the skewed environment for fear of Orbán instrumentalizing those attacks.

Orbán has created a situation in which it is hard for him to lose, but also one in which he had better not lose—lest he face the consequences of years of power consolidation. Because of the dynamics of Hungary’s illiberal turn and of the campaign, it is important to consider the scenarios that could follow the April 12 election, the expected response from key actors, and the impact on Hungary and Europe. These scenarios neither aim to fearmonger nor pretend to predict the future. Instead, they aim to spur creative thinking about potential responses to protect a democratic outcome in an increasingly undemocratic electoral environment.

Scenario 1: The Easy Road

Likelihood: Medium

Result: Tisza wins, Orbán concedes. This is the easy road, but it has two paths. In the first, Tisza gains a constitutional majority in the National Assembly and is able to implement deep reforms to get Hungary back on a democratic footing. In the second, it gathers a majority of seats in the Assembly but falls short of a two-thirds majority to amend the constitution. Regardless, it will take a few weeks for a new parliament to be seated and for a Tisza government to be formed. Péter Magyar will be the prime minister.

Response: In either case, expect a warm response from most EU leaders—except perhaps Slovakia’s Robert Fico—and from Brussels, which will likely begin restoring some frozen funds for Hungary to show support for the new government’s reform efforts (as they did for Poland), as well as reconsidering the €90 billion ($103 billion) loan to Ukraine. The U.S. response in this scenario would likely be muted and somewhat displeased, but if Orbán does not dispute the results, the administration has no incentive to do so either. Russia would stay silent or perhaps lament Orbán’s loss—but may signal willingness to work with Magyar for performative reasons. 

Impact: First and foremost, this result gives Hungary a chance to inch back toward some form of consolidated democracy, with decisions taken for the good of the broad public rather than for narrow interests. Magyar has promised to prosecute corruption and undo Fidesz’s democratic backsliding.

The impact of both paths under this scenario is transformational for the European Union: It offers a rebuke to the ongoing consolidation of the far-right by removing one of its standard-bearers from the political scene. It removes Russia’s most vocal supporter from the ranks of European leaders (and, allegedly, its Trojan Horse). In this way, Moscow would lose its strongest ally in the European Union and its lever to stall major moves from Brussels, especially on Ukraine. It unlocks EU-level foreign policy decisions on Ukraine and sanctions against Russia—provided Fico (or another pro-Russian leader) does not block them. Finally, it breaks up the reemerging Hungary–Slovakia–Czech Republic alignment on foreign policy, budget, and rule of law issues. 

The U.S.-Hungary relationship would likely cool down for a while, given the warm personal relationship between President Donald Trump and Orbán, and the latter and U.S. conservatives more broadly. It would be in Magyar’s interest not to alienate the U.S. administration, and he would likely find a receptive partner in Secretary of State Marco Rubio. He would also support a more productive role for Hungary in NATO—something the administration wants to see across Europe—but the leadership transition will leave Washington bereft of its biggest supporter in Hungary.

The road bifurcates when it comes to the impact on Hungary’s political and economic future. Though symbolically significant, a simple majority would not allow Tisza to implement deep and long-lasting reforms that undo Fidesz’s capture of the state—or even economic policies that would address voters’ demands for a better standard of living. Many institutions (e.g., public media and judiciary) are dominated by Orbán loyalists who would thwart those reform efforts, and Magyar would have to decide how far he is willing to go without a strong legal footing or constitutional overhaul. (His past closeness to Fidesz leaves open the question of how aggressively he would purge current elites.) This would be similar to what unfolded in Poland after Law and Justice’s ouster in 2023. It means a potential sputtering of the reform agenda driven by executive rather than legislative moves, which would allow Fidesz to discredit Tisza in the eyes of Hungarian voters until they can mount a comeback in the next elections.

Should Tisza get a two-thirds majority, the options for constitutional and real institutional reforms are wider. This would allow Magyar to implement his agenda more fully and demonstrate to voters that elections have consequences—and rewards.

A month ago, the likelihood of this scenario would have been low. Tisza’s polling consistency and Orbán’s inability to make attacks stick to Magyar have improved the odds.

Scenario 2: The Status Quo

Likelihood: Low

Result: Fidesz wins, Magyar concedes. Fidesz edges out a thin majority because of its structural dominance through years of gerrymandering and an election manipulation campaign that leverages higher energy prices and the war in Ukraine. This assumes no egregious moves or cheating on Orbán’s part, which would trigger a stronger international response and pushback from Magyar’s camp.

Response: Magyar and anti-Orbán forces will be disheartened but forced to recognize Orbán’s domination of the political space. EU leaders will begrudgingly acknowledge the results, as they have in past elections that were declared unfair but free. A few leaders decry an unfair environment but do not go as far as calling Orbán an autocrat, which would acknowledge that an EU member is actively undermining the values of the treaties (and should be ejected). The United States will send warm congratulations to its close ally in Budapest and celebrate another term of his illiberal regime. Russia will follow suit, having provided help for this victory.

Impact: Orbán is further emboldened—he strengthens his grip on the state apparatus, the media, and Hungary’s economic sphere. He maintains his policy stances on Ukraine (that relationship will continue to devolve), Russia, energy supply (i.e., Russian oil and gas), immigration, and social issues like further impinging LGBTQ+ rights. Orbán could look for ways to discredit Tisza and Magyar for the long term (preventing future electoral successes), for example, through sham investigations or ties to “foreign actors” like Ukraine.

The European Union will continue to be stuck on critical policy issues like supporting Ukraine or negotiating the next multiyear budget (e.g., introducing new rule-of-law safeguards)—unless they find a workaround not yet explored. Some EU officials have hinted at contingency plans that would withhold more funding from Hungary should Orbán win again, or push for voting-rule changes (assuming there is unanimity on this). Yet if recent history is a guide, Brussels is more likely to look for ways to appease him than to back him into a corner. Orbán may also look to tactically deescalate conflict with the European Union over Ukraine in exchange for the release of frozen EU funds. His victory will bolster far-right forces across Europe ahead of a critical electoral year in 2027—including France’s presidential election.

The United States will maintain its unequivocal support for Orbán as a representative of the type of conservative governments the administration has said it would support across Europe. This is despite Hungary’s closeness to Russia at a time when the latter pummels Ukraine and reportedly supplies Iran with intelligence on targeting in Washington’s war against Tehran. 

Russia maintains a foothold inside the European Union, access to critical intelligence, and a pressure point to prevent significant changes in policy from Brussels (including sanctions). Its influence likely grows to keep Hungary within its sphere despite a weakened Orbán.

Scenario 3: The Gray Zone

Likelihood: Medium 

Result: Too close to call by the end of election day or early the next day. Diaspora votes, critical in any scenario, take a long time to count. Ethnic Hungarians in neighboring countries, whose votes are weighed more heavily than emigrant Hungarians, are critical in pushing Fidesz closer to the line. In-country precincts show a close result that requires full counting to declare a winner. 

Response: Magyar calls for calm and for all votes to be counted, prepares for court battles if necessary—despite a Fidesz-controlled judiciary—and activates civil society organizations involved in election monitoring. 

Orbán and his allies flood the zone: They warn of irregularities at some precincts (particularly where Tisza is doing better), manipulate the media ecosystem to give the impression Fidesz is likely to win or that Ukraine and Brussels are attempting to influence the results, and generally create a basis to dispute the results if they lean toward Tisza upon final count. Orbán could evoke special powers under the state of emergency that has been in place since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, either to control the vote counting (or release of the results) or to create conditions to annul it and hold new elections.

The European Union calls for the count to finish in fair conditions, and member states do the same. Brussels prepares for a potential infringement procedure (rule-of-law breach, violations of the Media Freedom Act, among others) if Orbán goes too far, some of which can pass through the Council of the European Union with qualified majority voting. The OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights releases its preliminary report about the election, detailing any unfair or unfree conduct.

The United States likely congratulates Orbán preemptively in the hopes of sustaining Orbán’s advantage in this information gray zone. Russia does the same and looks for ways to engage in various gray zone tactics to maintain confusion.

Impact: Tensions rise as the count continues and both camps prepare to mobilize protests, particularly Magyar and anti-Orbán voters. The courts are under pressure to render opinions on the final count, should Magyar bring those cases to them, but likely to find in favor of Fidesz.

For the first time, an EU member state finds itself with a heavily contested election where the judiciary may be unable to render a fair judgment or face contradictory court rulings. EU officials find themselves in the uncomfortable position of having to call for a fair resolution while having very little power to bring it about. The limits of the European Union’s ability to impose democratic standards within itself are exposed, and its legitimacy and authority decline. 

Scenario 4: The Powder Keg

Likelihood: Low to medium

Result: Tisza announces they won, but Orbán declares victory. Election results are disputed, and the vote is marred by massive irregularities. 

Response: Magyar calls for major protests to respect the will of the people and pursues legal avenues as far as he can—but European courts lack clear jurisdiction regarding a member state’s conduct of elections. 

Orbán claims foreign interference (most likely from Kyiv and Brussels) and cheating, calls for a recount or a flat-out cancellation of the results—along the lines of Romania’s 2024 presidential election—and new elections. He calls on the courts to annul the election, and they may oblige. He mobilizes counter-protesters, creating the risk for serious altercations. In the worst version of this scenario, he declares Magyar was ineligible due to some recently unearthed charges and launches a severe crackdown on anti-government protesters, leading to injuries or deaths. A Maidan-style uprising unfolds in the streets of Budapest.

The European Union issues immediate condemnations and launches infringement procedures based on Article 2 violations. Most member states join in on the recriminations, though a question remains as to what Slovakia would say. Robert Fico may not want to be associated with images of protesters being assaulted by police, but would prefer to stay out of any real blame game. The European Union could also threaten to hold back funding from countries that protect Orbán and block Article 7. Some member states would then also threaten to treat Orbán’s protectors as pariahs. 

The United States supports Orbán’s claim and calls to count all votes and to investigate any irregularities, supporting a potential recount. It calls for calm from anti-government protesters and offers assistance to maintain stability.

Russia intensifies its disinformation campaign inside Hungary to support Orbán’s claim and potentially assists with a full takeover if protests get worse, as it did in Donbas.

Impact: This worst-case scenario brings massive instability to Hungary for weeks if not months. This is the final abandonment of any democratic pretense from Orbán and his allies, demonstrating his desperation to hold on to power. 

Brussels faces the unprecedented reality of a member state devolving into civil unrest because of an election and one leader’s refusal to honor the result. It does so without good options for retaliation, as the most potent tools require political decisions and unanimity among member states (such as Article 7 procedures). It is not impossible that Slovakia or the Czech Republic would find this scenario to be a red line and finally vote to proceed with voting rights suspension for Hungary. Barring this, the European Union risks getting exposed as toothless when core values are under attack. Member states would be exposed to the same hypocrisy if they do not take a strong stance.

The Crossroads Election

Across these scenarios, one image emerges: Hungary’s election is so critical because Orbán has been allowed to hollow out the country’s democracy for 16 years while his European counterparts offered mild responses—when they offered any at all. Outside actors like Russia have fueled this dynamic and gained a destabilizing foothold inside the European Union. The election outcome, if it follows the worst trajectory, also risks undermining the legitimacy of the European Union as an institutional framework.

Regardless of the results, Brussels and Washington (including Congress) can prepare by supporting the observation missions and civil society observers, making clear statements in support of a fair election that is free of interference, and calling for all sides to respect the results of the vote count. 

Outlining potential outcomes is important for thinking about the role of each actor and potential responses, particularly in the worst-case scenario. For example, in a powder-keg scenario, member states could informally suspend information-sharing with Hungary at NATO or in EU meetings, summon Hungarian ambassadors, and recall their own ambassadors from Budapest. They can start with a clear rhetorical rejection of any gray zone tactic to cast doubt on the election or steal it altogether. And they can look toward the future to make sure this does not happen again. 

Donatienne Ruy is a fellow in the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.