Will U.S. Military Aid to Ukraine Bring Victory?
Ukraine has faded from the news, but the war hasn’t stopped and continues to inflict thousands of casualties even as it burns through billions of dollars of military aid. The good news is that U.S. aid to Ukraine is sustainable. The $61 billion aid package approved by Congress in April will last at least through January and possibly into the summer. The bad news is that limits on U.S. inventories and production have constrained what can be sent every month. Deliveries may be enough to stabilize the front but will not be enough for victory.
Q1: How does the United States provide military aid to Ukraine?
A1: Before discussing aid packages, it’s worth reviewing the two main mechanisms for delivering military aid to Ukraine: the presidential drawdown authority (PDA) and the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI). PDA (Section 506(a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961) has existed since the early 1960s but has historically been limited to $100 million a year. It allows the president to send existing equipment to foreign partners. Because the equipment already exists, it arrives quickly. Congress has vastly expanded that authority to tens of billions of dollars to support Ukraine.
The statutory authority does not require that the equipment be replaced, and, indeed, transfers were not replaced in the past. However, the scale of deliveries to Ukraine has required replacement lest the readiness of U.S. forces be seriously degraded. Thus, drawdown authority is paired with funding to replace transferred equipment.
The other mechanism is the USAI (Section 1250 of the 2016 National Defense Authorization Act). This flexible account can fund training; purchase equipment from third countries, such as T-72 tanks from NATO countries in Eastern Europe; and procure equipment directly from U.S. manufacturers.
The advantages of procuring new equipment through USAI are that the equipment has a full-service life ahead, is the most current version, and does not come at the expense of U.S. military readiness. The great drawback is that the equipment does not arrive for years because of the long lead time for contracting and production.
Q2: What is the status of U.S. aid to Ukraine?
A2: The Ukraine supplemental appropriation passed by Congress in April provided $7.8 billion in new drawdown authority and $13.8 billion for the USAI, in addition to $1.7 billion to buy equipment through another program, Foreign Military Financing. It further provided $13.4 billion to replace equipment sent to Ukraine in the future and to make up for past deficits. Based on historical commitment rates, this funding will last at least until January. At that point, the administration will need to ask for more money, likely leading to a political battle that goes beyond the discussion here.
It’s important to note that the $61 billion covers a wide variety of activities that support the war effort and mitigate its impact: backfill for PDA transfers (dark blue), enhancements to the defense industrial base (light blue), USAI (black), intelligence support for the war (red), increased costs of U.S. forces in Europe (yellow), economic support for the Ukrainian government (green), humanitarian aid (purple), and the activities of other U.S. government agencies (brown).
Q3: What is the historical track of administration aid announcements?
A3: The Department of Defense (DOD) uses the congressionally enacted aid funding and authorizations to assemble packages of specific items to be sent to Ukraine and announces the amount and items publicly. The graph below shows these announcements over time. PDA packages appear regularly, about every three weeks, whereas USAI packages tend to be larger and announced less frequently, every six weeks or so.
The large USAI announcements in July 2024 ($3.7 billion total) get the USAI/PDA balance since April closer to the long-term 50/50 ratio.
The recent PDA announcements have developed a pattern, averaging about $250 million monthly and built around a core that includes Stingers, HIMARS rockets, 105 mm and 155 mm artillery rounds, mortar rounds, anti-armor systems (Javelins, AT-4s, and TOWs), small arms ammunition, demolition munitions, spare parts, and ancillary equipment. Packages often include one other air defense munition: HAWK, Patriot, or NASAMS. Other items appear in individual packages—for example, M113s, trucks, riverine boats, and body armor—but the core remains nearly consistent.
This indicates that DOD is not digging deeper into inventories already depleted by years of deliveries. The United States could reduce inventories further and take more risk if other conflicts break out (for example, on the Korean Peninsula). It could take equipment from late-deploying reserve units. However, DOD has been unwilling to take those steps. Instead, DOD sends the monthly production of these items to Ukraine.
That answers a frequently asked question: Is U.S. military support for Ukraine sustainable? With this approach, it is. The United States is not weakening its own capabilities and can maintain the pace indefinitely. However, this sustainable approach also means that there can be no surge of deliveries that might allow Ukraine to overwhelm Russia. Deliveries will increase slowly as U.S. production expands—155 mm artillery shell production has risen from 14,000 per month before the war to 40,000 per month today and is headed for 100,000 per month by the end of 2025—but this will happen over months and years.
Q4: How does the recent level of announcements compare with previous experience?
A4: During the first 23 months of war, the drawdown amounts averaged $1.14 billion per month. In the four months since Congress passed the latest aid package, drawdown packages have averaged $569 million per month, about half of what the packages had averaged previously. The good news is that aid funding will stretch into the summer of 2025 if kept at this level. The bad news is that this level is far below what is needed to support another counteroffensive.
Q5: How much equipment has the United States delivered to Ukraine?
A5: Announcements of aid are not the same as deliveries, and DOD does not provide public information about deliveries for reasons of operational security. The chart below shows an estimate based on the dates of announcements and information on delivery timelines gleaned from public sources and budget documents. The calculations assume that drawdown equipment starts arriving immediately and fully arrives over eight months. The spread occurs because some items must be repaired and packaged before shipping. Further, Ukrainian personnel sometimes need training on maintenance and operations. Items acquired through the USAI are assumed to take four months to contract, 24 months to produce the first item, and 12 months to complete delivery.
The chart shows that deliveries peaked in the late winter and spring of 2023 as Ukraine prepared for its counteroffensive. Deliveries declined precipitously in the fall of 2023 as funding ran low. The $61 billion package in April halted the decline, but it will take several months before deliveries are significantly above where they would have been without the new funding (as shown by the dotted line). The level of deliveries will peak at about two-thirds of the previous peak unless Congress provides more funding in 2025.
One piece of good news is that early contracts funded through USAI are now beginning to deliver equipment. Those deliveries will accelerate and continue for about three years even if Congress provides no additional money. U.S. military aid will not, therefore, disappear if Congress fails to provide any more funding, but the levels will be less than what has been sent in the past and will not provide the full range of material needed (for example, spare parts and other consumables).
It is important to note that Ukraine does not rely on the United States alone. NATO and other global supporters provide military aid that is approximately equal to what the United States provides. In the spring, the hope was that these countries would “step up” to provide more aid as U.S. levels tapered off, but that did not happen. Aid from these other sources is subject to the same politics as in the United States. At best, it will continue at its current level.
The turnaround in U.S. aid is slowly having an effect on the battlefield. Although Russian forces keep attacking broadly along the front, the locations are fewer, and Ukrainian units are able to conduct some counterattacks of their own. As more aid arrives, Russian attacks will diminish, and Ukrainian attacks will increase, but all of this will be local—gain a few kilometers here, lose a few kilometers there. Strategically, the war will be a bloody stalemate, and that constitutes a partial Russian victory. Ukraine needs to articulate how it plans to win. If that requires a massive increase in U.S. aid, it is better to have that discussion now rather than after six more months of killing and destruction.
Mark Cancian (Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, ret.) is a senior adviser with the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.