Bridging the Gap: LEO Satellite Internet and Human Rights

Just a few days into Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukraine’s minister of digital transformation (now Minister of Defense) took to Twitter to ask Elon Musk for Starlink in Ukraine. Approximately 12 hours later, Musk confirmed that the world’s most prominent low Earth orbit (LEO) satellite internet was now active in the country. Russia’s intentional targeting of Ukrainian infrastructure over the past four years has caused inconsistent internet coverage and blackouts that have led to greater connectivity issues, creating crucial gaps in both the maintenance of a state and the conduct of a war in the modern era.

Predictable, high-speed internet, once seen as a nice-to-have, is increasingly imperative for nearly all aspects of life, including state functions, conduct of business, operations of civil society, and defense of human rights. LEO satellite internet can help to fill crucial connectivity gaps.

Q1: What is LEO satellite internet and what are its potential benefits?

A1: Geostationary orbit (GEO) satellite internet has been a mainstay of connectivity for approximately three decades. However, this method, with satellites orbiting at more than 22,000 miles from the Earth’s surface, is extremely expensive to launch, is prone to interference, and can be slow when compared to broadband internet. LEO satellites orbit at 1,200 miles or less above sea level, limiting interference, making them less expensive to launch, and allowing for faster connectivity. While Amazon’s LEO system (called Amazon Leo) has been tested at up to 1 gigabit per second, common GEO systems reach maximum speeds of 10–15 percent of that.

The predictability and speed of LEO satellite internet give it a key advantage for the continued functionality of government and the predictability of communications between individuals and groups without other access options. Such gaps can exist due to a lack of infrastructure in rural or remote areas, attacks by state or nonstate actors against internet infrastructure, or, in the case of internet shutdowns—a substantial and growing weapon of authoritarians—deliberate efforts to limit a population’s connectivity. In short, LEO satellites remove the potential for infrastructure gaps by making their location dynamic and difficult to target, and they can operate largely free of government interference.

Q2: What are the risks of LEO satellite internet?

A2: While the risks of unchecked reliance on any technology are myriad and difficult to predict, they largely fall into two categories. The first is common for private-sector led critical infrastructure and the sometimes-mercurial nature of private industry and individuals, and the second is the danger of giving authoritarian actors a single target to suppress.

• Single Shutoff/Private Sector–Led Critical Infrastructure: Private sector–led critical infrastructure can create reliance on companies or individuals with unique incentive structures. In the case of certain technologies, this can give companies significant influence on vital aspects of governance or foreign policy operations. This is no less true with LEO satellite internet access than it would be with other utilities such as electricity or water. The dynamic and multilayered nature of individual and corporate relationships with governments adds an additional layer of consideration to this reality.
  The speed with which Musk’s SpaceX was able to make Starlink available in Ukraine demonstrates a private sector advantage, but the longer-term relationship tells a more complex story, especially when contrasted with the experience of other states. Several months after initially providing Starlink access in Ukraine, SpaceX reached out to the Pentagon requesting financing. This took place after the Ukrainian resistance had already become reliant on the technology. According to a Ukrainian presidential adviser, the technology had “helped [Ukraine] survive the most critical moments of war,” and a senior U.S. military official judged the technology as “exceptionally effective on the battlefield.”
  
  Beyond funding is the potentially capricious nature of individuals when combined with their ability to serve as a single shutoff point for vital technology. More than a year after Russia’s full-scale invasion, Musk intervened personally to limit Starlink access to the Ukrainian military in advance of a particular operation in Crimea. 
  
  This was further evidenced in Starlink’s response to two tyrannical governments in January 2026. While the company opted to comply with an order from the government of Uganda to cease operations in advance of an internet shutdown in the days surrounding the country’s election, Starlink remained one of the very few functional sources of internet protests in Iran happening at the same time. This was despite Starlink’s legal prohibition in Iran and the ongoing nature of “one of the most extensive internet shutdowns ever recorded.” While the Iranian internet shutdown did make Starlink less reliable and less functional, this was a product of changing tactics from the Iranian regime, not an active decision by SpaceX and its leadership. In short, Starlink chose to comply with one authoritarian government attempting to shut down the internet while ignoring the orders of another, leaving civil society without internet in one setting but keeping those in the other connected.
  
  Critical infrastructure is, by its very definition, critical. When an actor beholden to incentives and constituencies outside of the public good controls critical infrastructure, gaps are created. In the case of LEO satellite internet, Starlink’s actions in Ukraine and elsewhere have been a remarkable boon for human rights defenders and the continuity of a besieged government, but they have also demonstrated the dangers of such incentive gaps.

   

• Overreliance and Countermeasures: LEO satellite internet is already seeing the impacts of authoritarian innovation and cross learning. As mentioned above, while Starlink served as one of the few unblocked means of internet connectivity during the 2026 Iran protests, the Iranian government saw some success in limiting Starlink’s efficacy. The “most likely culprit” of this limitation is a Russian-developed weapon known as Kalinka, which creates a “zone effect” that both limits the functionality of LEO satellites and makes it difficult to replace them in orbit.
  
  Kalinka is not the only technology being used to combat LEO satellite internet. Both Russia and China have invested heavily in counterspace capabilities. Beijing has worked to develop lasers that can burn or blind satellite censors, causing malfunctions. Moscow has developed other weapons in addition to Kalinka that aim to jam signals from LEO satellite internet. Both the Iran protests and recent history of authoritarian collaboration create a high likelihood that any technologies that are effective in silencing dissent and facilitating repression will be available for use by other authoritarian actors.
  
  This approach to the technology of strategic competition is not new, but it is particularly troubling when there is substantial or full reliance on an individual technology. Given Russia’s approach to destroying Ukrainian infrastructure, there are precious few other options for Ukraine’s military beyond LEO satellite internet. When a government such as Iran or Uganda blocks the internet in response to protests or in advance of a rigged election, civil society and activists have nowhere else to turn.

Q3: What can be done to address the risks posed by LEO satellite internet?

A3: Moving forward, focus should be on reversing the concerns raised above. Efforts should be made to improve the predictability of LEO satellite internet systems, both by treating access to internet as a public good and a human right—akin to a digital access to information—and by eliminating single shutoffs that can create havoc and undo human rights gains. Innovation should also be prioritized to continue to evade the growing use of internet shutdowns by authoritarian actors, who will inevitably continue to work diligently to limit communication, access to information, and avenues for advocacy.

To start, this effort requires an inclusive and international rights-based framework for access to the internet. UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres has already called for “universal access to the Internet by 2030 as a basic human right.” This merely applies preexisting international human rights law documents, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, both of which guarantee free expression, including the right to receive and impart information regardless of media or “frontiers.” Such a rights-based approach would give individuals experiencing an internet shutdown a pathway for justice through international courts and create a cost for violators, labeling problematic states and authoritarian actors as violators of human rights, not merely espousing normative concern.

Second, as the Direct2Cell campaign makes clear, “a rights-protective . . . framework is necessary, but it is not sufficient.” Positive commitments from operators, governments, and funders are vital to fulfill the positive requirements of individual access to the internet in conflict zones and humanitarian disasters.

Third, in line with a rights-based approach and positive commitments, efforts should be taken to bypass single-switch shutoffs for critical infrastructure, including LEO satellite internet. The World Liberty Congress, a collection of human rights defenders from across the globe, has prioritized this in its Tech for Freedom initiative, going as far as to create a manifesto against centralization and a decentralized social media site to prevent accounts being shut down for authoritarian purposes. The two largest LEO satellite internet companies are based in the United States, with smaller companies based in the EU and Canada. Just as weapons companies are subject to limitations and requirements given the importance of their wares in the conduct of foreign policy, so too can these companies, as they are subject to the legal restrictions of home countries. Their reliance on federal procurement dollars for continued operations creates added incentive for compliance.

Finally, the United States and other countries standing up for free expression should continue to incentivize innovation to improve the reliability, consistency, and invulnerability of LEO satellite internet systems. The authoritarian world will not stand still. Internet access is as valuable to human rights defenders and civil society as supply chains are to militaries. New ways to ensure continuous connectivity will be crucial to upholding this human right.

Andrew Friedman is director and senior fellow in the Human Rights Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.