Russia, the world’s top wheat exporter, saw its wheat exports surge to record levels in 2023–2024, due largely to favorable growing conditions. Though lower than 2023–2024, Russia’s exports of wheat are still predicted to be 12.5 percent higher in 2024–2025 than 2020–2021, prior to launching its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine pushed global food prices to the highest levels on record, according to the Food Price Index of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization. Elevated food prices, alongside increases in fuel and fertilizer prices, contributed to a surge in the number of people experiencing food insecurity. Following the 2022 price spike, global food prices steadily declined, though they remain high compared to pre-pandemic levels. The UN estimates that in 2022, over 763 million people were undernourished, the highest number of undernourished people in 15 years. The number of food-insecure people has declined marginally but remains elevated compared to 2007 levels.
Q2: How could the proposed ceasefire plans affect Ukraine’s and Russia’s agriculture sectors?
A2: Evolving ceasefire proposals would have significant implications for Ukraine’s agriculture sector, which contributed 10 percent to Ukraine’s GDP, employed 14 percent of its labor force, and accounted for 41 percent of Ukraine’s export revenue before Russia’s full-scale invasion. Ceasefire proposals that have been made public could result in further reductions in Ukraine’s agricultural production and exports, to Ukraine’s detriment and Russia’s benefit.
On March 26, the United States agreed with Ukraine and with Russia to “ensure safe navigation, eliminate the use of force, and prevent the use of commercial vessels for military purposes” in the Black Sea, and to develop measures to implement and monitor the partial ceasefire. Russia and Ukraine have not yet agreed whether and how this deal would come into force. Around the time the agreements were published, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated, “We are for the resumption of the Black Sea initiative in some form,” referring to the BSGI, terminated by Russia in July 2023. Though the BSGI guaranteed safe transit through Ukraine’s Black Sea ports, Ukraine ultimately increased its agricultural exports following the cessation of the BSGI, due in part to the elimination of time-intensive ship inspections that characterized the BSGI. Throughout the course of the BSGI, the number of ship inspections and ships entering and departing Ukrainian ports dropped appreciably. A renewed BSGI could potentially reintroduce onerous inspections, thereby slowing the export of Ukraine’s agricultural products.
While likely detrimental to Ukraine, a renewed BSGI could further benefit Russia if a deal were to facilitate the export of Russian ammonia through the Black Sea. Exports of Russian ammonia through Ukraine were blocked upon Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and a pipeline transporting Russian ammonia through Ukraine was destroyed, presumably by Ukraine, in June 2023, immediately before Russia’s termination of the BSGI. Under a new BSGI, Russia stands to benefit from unimpeded export of Russian ammonia through Ukraine to world markets. Any agreement that would guarantee the security of Russian vessels transiting through Sebastopol would further benefit Russia, which has reportedly used the port to export stolen Ukrainian grain.
Following the United States’ announcement of the agreements in late March, Russia issued a statement specifying that implementation would be contingent on certain conditions, including that sanctions against Rosselkhozbank (the state-owned Russian Agricultural Bank) and other Russian financial institutions be eased to allow use of the SWIFT financial messaging system to facilitate international trade in agricultural products. Despite Russia’s claims to the contrary, Western sanctions did not target Russia’s agricultural exports. Furthermore, this level of easement of the sanctions regime against Russia is not achievable by the United States without cooperation from the European Union. Shortly following the Kremlin’s statement release, U.S. President Donald Trump suggested that Russia could be “dragging their feet” on negotiations, as some analysts posited that Russia issued steep demands to test the United States’ willingness to compromise.
The text of a U.S.-proposed ceasefire agreement, made public on April 25, would likewise disadvantage Ukraine’s agriculture sector, with the United States proposing that Russia retain control of the majority of Ukrainian territory seized since 2022. Approximately 22 percent of Ukraine’s farmland was under Russian control in 2022, according to NASA Harvest, which estimated in 2023 that over 16.5 percent of the wheat produced in Ukraine, accounting for over 4 million metric tons, was produced in areas controlled by Russia. Freezing today’s lines of control would effectively transfer a significant proportion of Ukraine’s farmland, and the grains produced on it, to Russia. A ceasefire agreement drafted by Ukraine and the European Union, also made public on April 25, proposes that negotiations over territory start from today’s line of control, and be discussed and resolved only after a “full and unconditional ceasefire.”
Q3: What’s at stake for the world?
A3: Agricultural exports from Russia and Ukraine are critical to global agriculture markets, food prices, and food security—and they confer significant political influence for both countries.
Following its record wheat harvest in 2023–2024, Russia controlled 26 percent of the global wheat market, the highest wheat-market share in Russian history. According to CSIS analysis, as of 2023, Russian wheat exports had increased to every region of Africa, while Russia had also delivered free grains and fertilizers to at least six African countries. In 2024, according to Russia’s agriculture ministry, Russia increased the value of its agricultural exports to Africa by 19 percent overall. And as recently as January 2025, Russia donated more than 1,600 metric tons of grain to Ethiopia. In May 2024, Russian state media reported that President Putin announced a shift “away from energy products, with agriculture considered a significant driver of future foreign trade,” in an effort to expand Russia’s GDP through 2030. According to Russian Fertilizer Producers Association CEO Andrei Guryev, fertilizer production increased by 6–7 percent in 2024 to 63 million metric tons, with Russia’s fertilizer exports reaching a record 40 million metric tons in 2024. By 2030, Russia aims to increase agricultural exports by 50 percent and increase fertilizer production by one-third.
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, President Putin declared his intention to “fully replace Ukrainian grain” with Russian grain on global markets, and former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev declared food to be Russia’s “silent weapon” in its war in Ukraine. Any ceasefire deal that would grant Ukrainian farmland and agricultural products to Russia would assist Russia’s effort to expand its global influence, and its GDP, with food exports. Russia’s latest effort to extend its influence on global agricultural markets is an attempt to establish an agricultural exchange among BRICS countries—accounting for nearly half of global grain production—which would form “independent price indicators” to facilitate “more unbiased assessment of the agricultural products’ value on the world market.”
A peace deal least detrimental to Ukraine’s agriculture sector would minimize the transfer of Ukrainian territory to Russia while guaranteeing a ceasefire not only on land—including on agricultural land, where fighting to-date has left significant damage—but also by sea and air, which would prohibit attacks to Ukraine’s port infrastructure and grain-carrying ships. By fall 2023, Ukraine had successfully undermined Russia’s capabilities to wage naval attacks, until Russia commenced a new round of attacks on Ukraine’s grain infrastructure in September 2024, including its first attack on a grain-carrying vessel since the war started. Such strikes damage infrastructure necessary to store grain, destroy grain itself, and drive up the cost of insurance for ships carrying Ukrainian grain, all of which contribute to reductions in Ukraine’s agricultural exports.
In the face of attacks across its agricultural system since February 2022, Ukraine has still managed to remain among the world’s top exporters of agricultural products. For the 2024–2025 marketing year, USDA estimates Ukraine as the third-largest global exporter of corn, fifth-largest exporter of wheat and barley, and the top global exporter of sunflower seed oil and meal. Given the importance of agriculture to Ukraine’s economy and the importance of Ukrainian agricultural exports to global agriculture markets and global food security, negotiators should carefully consider the implications of a peace deal on Ukraine’s agriculture sector. Even after a peace deal is reached, significant investments will be needed to rebuild Ukraine’s agriculture sector. The latest RDNA estimates the total cost of recovery and reconstruction of Ukraine’s agriculture sector at $55.5 billion through 2035, of which only $872.8 million, or less than two percent, has been met to date. The U.S.-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund, established in May 2025, provides a potential source of funding for Ukraine’s agricultural recovery. As a lasting pillar of Ukraine’s economy, Ukraine’s agriculture sector could deliver the “economic growth [and] job creation” that the fund sets out to achieve.
Caitlin Welsh is the director of the Global Food and Water Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Emma Dodd is a research associate with the Global Food and Water Security Program at CSIS. Joseph Glauber is a senior adviser (non-resident) with the Global Food and Water Security Program at CSIS.
