How Ukraine Rebuilt Its Military Acquisition System Around Commercial Technology

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Executive Summary

This report explores Ukraine’s shift in the development and deployment of military innovation, with a special focus on the role of the commercial sector and on changes in the acquisition process that have facilitated the rapid integration of these technologies into military operations. 

Key Findings

  1. Ukraine has radically pivoted its approach to military innovation, moving from a wholly state-owned research and development (R&D) model to one in which innovation is outsourced to the commercial sector. Historically dependent on closed, state-run defense research, Ukraine has turned to private companies and civilian engineers to meet military needs. This shift reflects the battlefield success of commercial technologies, proving their efficiency where traditional government-owned capacities have fallen short.
  2. The Ukrainian government acts as an enabler of rapid testing and deployment of commercial technologies in military and battlefield operations. Efforts taken by the stakeholders of the defense sector have included streamlining procurement processes, offering economic incentives to the private sector, and creating a regulatory environment conducive to innovation, which includes the absence of restrictions on defense-related AI development and deployment.
  3. Ukraine now bases its strategic priorities and requirements for military equipment and weaponry development on actual battlefield demands, rather than on speculative top-down visions. Ukraine has established new platforms for collaboration between defense stakeholders and private sector companies. These platforms include cross-ministerial coordination initiatives, hackathons, and challenges. These have helped to align equipment development directly with operational demands.
  4. After 2022, government-led military acquisition was significantly streamlined, and it now serves as the principal channel for delivering commercial technologies directly into the hands of fighters. By simplifying procedures of approval into service and contracting, thus reducing timelines from years to months—or even weeks, in the case of unmanned systems—Ukraine has minimized bureaucratic barriers and established supportive institutional infrastructures. The latter include dedicated testing ranges, specialized procurement agencies, and revised acquisition regulations.
  5. Acquisition of commercial technology has allowed for deployment of readily available, off-the-shelf products, thereby eliminating the long wait for custom-developed systems by the traditional military-industrial base. This approach mitigates both the risk that technologies will never acquire their intended capabilities and the burden of excessive costs related to long development cycles. Additionally, competition in the commercial sector allows fighters to have multiple options and to chose what best fits their needs.
  6. Decentralization of procurement processes has improved responsiveness to diverse operational needs. By enabling military units to procure equipment directly and to use funds either from the state budget or reallocated by local budgets, Ukraine has ensured greater flexibility in meeting requirements, which vary significantly across the front line. This decentralized model has enhanced adaptability to real-time battlefield challenges.

Introduction

When Russia launched its large-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the profound vulnerabilities of the Ukrainian defense industry became obvious. Long reliant on Soviet-era legacy technology and monopolistic state entities, the Ukrainian military-industrial complex struggled to respond effectively to the sudden and intense demands of modern warfare. Yet this crisis also served as a catalyst, prompting Ukrainian policymakers, defense officials, and private sector actors to undertake a sweeping transformation of the country’s defense acquisition and technology ecosystem.

A central aspect of this transformation has been a strategic shift toward integrating commercial technologies into military development, production, and deployment processes. Recognizing that the traditional centralized procurement and manufacturing practices were ill-suited to the rapidly changing realities of the battlefield, the government has implemented critical changes in military research, development, and procurement processes in order to leverage private-sector innovation and expertise.

Among the key objectives of the Ukrainian government in introducing these regulatory changes were the following:

  • Grow private sector partnerships. The government needed to expand its pool of defense contractors beyond state-owned enterprises by engaging with startups and other innovative firms.
  • Leverage commercial and dual-use technologies. Facing a numerically superior adversary, the Ukrainian military required advanced capabilities—such as software, robotics, and AI—to gain an advantage on the battlefield.
  • Move faster in adopting and fielding new technology. The Ukrainian government has implemented streamlined procurement cycles to expedite the delivery of mission-critical capabilities to frontline forces.
  • Reduce corruption in research, development, and procurement. Constrained by limited resources, the Ukrainian government has increasingly relied on private sector solutions, preferring off-the-shelf or fully developed prototypes over technologies developed through corruption-riddled state-owned enterprises. To further reduce malpractice and inefficiency, authorities have instituted more transparent, streamlined contracting processes and enhanced oversight mechanisms, surpassing those used before 2022.
  • Ensure immediate battlefield relevance. Ukrainian military leadership has prioritized capabilities and services that address urgent operational needs and requirements and deliver tangible benefits on the ground.

This study explores how the Ukrianian government is achieving these goals through changes to its regulatory framework. The analysis is drawn from the author’s years of experience as an adviser within the Ukrainian government, as well as from interviews with a broad range of stakeholders across Ukraine’s government and defense industry.

First, the paper offers an overview of the standard stages of military product development and life-cycle management (see Figure 1). It then contrasts how these stages operated under pre-invasion practices with how they now function under the post-invasion framework. This contrast demonstrates how Ukraine has overcome its legacy constraints to develop more agile, innovation-oriented procedures that effectively integrate commercial technology.

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Finally, the paper concludes by drawing upon the Ukrainian government’s actions to offer recommendations and lessons learned—findings that the U.S. Department of Defense should consider.

Before the 2022 Invasion

Background

Ukraine’s pre-2022 defense industry was overwhelmingly defined by its roots in the Soviet military-industrial complex. When Russia first invaded Ukrainian territory in 2014, Ukraine’s defense industry was exclusively state-owned and consolidated under Ukroboronprom, a conglomerate of Soviet-era enterprises that produced almost all of Ukraine’s conventional armaments. Although some minor improvements to the military research, development, and acquisition system were introduced during the 2014–2022 war in Donbas, the system retained its Soviet-era character, with a focus on sustaining production of mature systems rather than developing and introducing new ones. Any technological modernizations typically occurred in direct response to the requirements of foreign customers of Ukrainian military exports.

There were, however, pockets of military technology innovation. Between 2014 and 2022, private defense firms specializing in unmanned aerial systems began to emerge. Yet their overall production remained tiny, and the deployment of drones at the Donbas front line did not even remotely approach the scale that would follow the full 2022 invasion.

Product Life Cycle Analysis

1. Requirements

Requirements determine how the military decides what it needs to buy. Before 2022, Ukraine’s requirements-setting process was a top-down system: the General Staff set Military Equipment and Weaponry (MEW) requirements, which defined operational needs, including any necessary R&D. Requirements set by the General Staff were then formalized into budget requests and justifications by the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and incorporated into the State Defense Order (SDO), the central document that guided all defense procurement for Ukraine’s 16 agencies authorized to acquire MEW and related services. Initially renewed on an annual basis, the SDO adopted a three-year planning cycle in 2017, allowing for more effective allocation of resources and giving manufacturers more confidence in future demand.

In mid-2020, the Ministry of Strategic Industries (MSI) was established as a new government ministry with authority to supervise Ukroboronprom. MSI quickly became a key institution shaping the requirements for the military-industrial complex. At the same time, MSI was also tasked with refining regulatory frameworks, updating existing capabilities, prioritizing critical defense areas, and reducing corruption. Government sources told CSIS that although MSI’s efforts were reflected in state defense programs, their practical implementation sometimes diverged from official plans due to corruption and bureaucratic obstacles.

The timeline for needs and requirements development was three to six months, on average.

2. Concept and Prototyping

Once operational needs and requirements were established and a budget was approved, the military customer (one of the aforementioned 16 agencies) selected contractors for concept development and prototyping. The selection process varied depending on the system type and level of classification, ranging from open tenders to secret procedures; in cases with only one qualified contractor, sole-source direct agreements were used. Concept development and prototyping often took place within state-owned enterprises or dedicated design bureaus. Most of these bureaus have direct lineage to the Soviet era. One example is the Yuzhnoye State Design Office, which developed nearly 80 percent of the medium-range ballistic missiles deployed by the Soviet Union’s Strategic Missile Forces.

In practice, however, progress toward new concepts and prototypes was limited prior to 2022. According to statistics cited in a 2021 statement by Oleksiy Reznikov, then Ukraine’s minister of defense, only 13 percent of General Staff requests for newly developed or upgraded equipment were satisfied between 2014 and 2020. Instead, the Ukrainian military was typically directed to meet its needs with foreign imports or by drawing from existing inventories of legacy technology (which generally did not satisfy requirements). Reznikov further stated that roughly 20 percent of R&D projects in 2020 had been underway for 20 or more years with little or nothing to show for the time and money involved. Ukrainian government sources told CSIS that these programs were frequently little more than vehicles for corruption.

As a result, the timeline for the concept and prototyping stage lasted, on average, between 3 and 20 years. 

3. Adoption into Service

Adoption into service is the formal process of adding a weapon system to the official inventory of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Once a system is adopted into service, it becomes an official part of the military’s arsenal and can be procured at scale. The procedure of adoption into service consists of two major stages, which unfolded as follows before the 2022 invasion:

3.1 Testing and Evaluation

After the designs and concepts were transformed into tangible prototypes or pilot batches, they underwent factory testing to assess functionality and performance. State trials were then conducted, culminating the development process. A high-level commission consisting of the military representatives reviewed the samples, evaluating them against initial requirements for R&D and determining whether they were ready to proceed to the next stage.

3.2 Codifying, Approval for Operation

In 2016, Ukraine launched a project to conform its military to NATO standards. According to NATO practices, each new weapon system must undergo testing to receive its NATO codification, placing it within a standardized system of military supply. Codification is a process of assigning official nomenclature numbers and designating production items as recognized “supply items.” This universal process ensures consistent identification and cataloging across NATO countries, facilitating interoperability and logistical coordination.

Pre-2022, the next step was to get approval for operation—an authorization granted for MEW use and deployment according to intended purpose and compliance with operational requirements of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

On average, the process of adoption into service typically took one to two years.

4. Contracting

Once a system had been formally adopted into service, the MOD submitted budget requests for its acquisition, primarily through the SDO. After budget approval, different procurement procedures were used depending on the level of classification of the product or service being acquired. Unclassified items followed public procurement rules, mainly through electronic auctions that automatically evaluated bids on criteria such as price, life-cycle costs, and delivery terms. This approach aimed to ensure transparency, efficiency, and alignment with EU standards.

Classified acquisitions, by contrast, bypassed competitive processes. Suppliers were selected from a special registry maintained by the Ministry of Economy and the Security Service of Ukraine, with all details remaining confidential. Pricing in these cases commonly followed a cost-plus method, with profit margin capped to not exceed 5 percent of the cost of components and 30 percent of the cost of services. Additionally, the MOD could impose stricter limits, reducing these margins to 1 percent and 20 percent, respectively. This approach, combined with the absence of inflation adjustments, constrained suppliers’ profit margins and limited their incentives and resources to invest in technological innovation or improvements in product quality.

Overall, approximately 95 percent of SDO procurements were classified, characterized by closed processes and a lack of meaningful competition. Suppliers not personally connected to military customers generally had no opportunity to propose their products or services and often learned of procurement decisions only in post-factum public communications. Government sources told CSIS that the secrecy surrounding classified procurements—though often justified in the context of active war—nevertheless left the process vulnerable to significant corruption.

The contracting process could span from six months to one year.

5. Contract Execution

In pre-2022 Ukraine, defense procurement contract execution (i.e., the manufacturing and delivery of contracted services) was overseen by the MOD or other state customers to ensure compliance and responsible use of government funds. State representatives stationed at contractors’ facilities oversaw product quality and controlled costs and pricing calculations by submitting detailed reports throughout the contract period. Although this system was intended to guarantee accountability and quality assurance, it did not always function effectively due to systemic corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency. Interviews conducted by CSIS indicated that contract execution frequently faced delays, with the duration varying according to the complexity of the ordered systems.

On average, the process spanned two to five years.

6. Maintenance and Operational Support

In Ukraine, weapon system maintenance followed a Soviet-era model in which the Armed Forces oversaw equipment sustainment. As for the equipment damaged on the frontline, the Armed Forces were sending items to facilities for repairs or ordering repair services directly at unit locations near the front lines.

Summary of the Pre-2022 Period

The period preceding Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion was characterized by a defense sector firmly entrenched in the Soviet-era industrial base and platforms, almost entirely isolated from the innovations of the commercial sector. Inadequate government investment in R&D, slow bureaucratic procedures, and opaque funding mechanisms prevented many initiatives from progressing to tangible prototypes or delivered systems. Corruption within the procurement process frequently hindered meaningful technological advancement and modernization.

Although the Russian aggression in 2014 elicited some grassroots initiatives from the private sector and volunteer communities, these efforts were stymied by entrenched systemic barriers. Overall, the shortcomings of the pre-invasion military-industrial and technological spheres significantly limited Ukraine’s capacity to modernize its defense capabilities in response to dire security challenges.

After the Invasion of 2022

Background

The 2022 full-scale invasion fundamentally transformed the landscape of Ukraine’s defense sector. This metamorphosis was characterized by a radical departure from long-standing practices and frameworks. While state-owned enterprises continued to go through multiple rounds of reforms, with production managed by the Ministry of Strategic Industries, the urgency of the war introduced powerful incentives for change in private defense sector.

In response to existential threats, the government removed two big bottlenecks in MEW development and deployment processes:

  1. The long and inefficient development process by the state-owned conglomerate was increasingly outsourced to the private sector, civil society organizations, and other non-traditional actors.
  2. Complicated adoption into service and acquisition processes were streamlined though regulatory changes that removed unnecessary bureaucratic hurdles.

Figure 2 demonstrates how the timeline for research, development, and deployment of military equipment and weaponry has changed at every stage of the product life cycle.

Remote Visualization

This section will examine these transformative developments, illustrating how the pressing wartime needs have accelerated innovation, collaboration, and institutional adaptation within Ukraine’s defense ecosystem.

Product Life Cycle Analysis

1. Requirements

After the 2022 full-scale invasion, Ukraine’s General Staff has remained the primary authority defining MEW requirements. However, in the current context, these requirements increasingly reflect needs reported directly from the front line, even though the exact mechanisms of their collection and translation into acquisitions remain classified.

Another distinguishing feature of this new stage has been the emergence of quasi-governmental initiatives such as Brave1—led by the Ministry of Digital Transformation—which coordinates various stakeholders in identifying and communicating technological demands from the military. Through its activities, challenges, and hackathons, Brave1 enables companies and startups to understand the armed forces’ most urgent needs and propose solutions accordingly.

A particularly noteworthy development has been the direct interaction between military forces and industry engineers. This has allowed firsthand communication of operational requirements from the battlefield and has enabled rapid iteration of new products. This communication bypasses traditionally long requirement cycles within the General Staff and formal requests through the MOD. As a result, engineers can quickly update and refine their products in response to evolving battlefield conditions and adversary capabilities, sometimes even while being forward deployed.

The state-owned Ukroboronprom has also adapted the way it receives requirements, occasionally receiving high-level directives—such as those from the Office of the President—for high-priority programs like long-range missiles or strike drones.

Overall, the timeline for developing and communicating requirements has significantly shortened—often to mere weeks or a few months—in order to match the adversary’s equally fast pace.

2. Concept and Prototyping

The concept and prototyping stage has accelerated markedly as a matter of national survival, with most innovation now arising from the private sector, based on commercial technology.

According to Ukrainian military personnel interviewed by CSIS, private companies typically possess a broader range of ideas, technologies, talent, and resources, allowing them to introduce novel concepts and technology applications. In many cases, personnel told CSIS that such innovations were beyond the expectations and imaginations of military actors, who are often unaware of cutting-edge technologies that have the potential to be transformative. For instance, AI-enabled navigation and targeting software has raised the success rate of low-cost drone strikes from approximately 20 percent to as high as 70 percent by mitigating factors like insufficient operator skill, stress, and jamming by electronic warfare.

There are noteworthy examples in which even state-owned enterprises, traditionally much slower in concept development, have significantly improved their pace. The Ukrainian Palyanitsa cruise missile, for example, progressed from concept to prototype in just a year and a half, likely with the help of pre-existing expertise in engine construction, rocketry, and drone design.

Government sources told CSIS that private-led innovations in software have advanced even more rapidly, with entirely new capabilities emerging within weeks and integrating seamlessly into existing platforms, enhancing navigation, targeting, reconnaissance, and data fusion capabilities.

Interviews conducted by CSIS with representatives of the private sector indicate that, on average, concept and prototype development now requires only a few weeks to six months.

3. Adoption into Service

Following the full-scale invasion, the Armed Forces of Ukraine required immediate access to all available combat capabilities, both military and commercial. Therefore, the government introduced regulatory changes that significantly shortened the process of approval for new weapon systems.

Instead of completing the entire adoption into service procedure, new or experimental systems now only need to obtain operational approval, essentially fulfilling just the final step of the standard procedure. This approval authorizes limited use of new systems in real battlefield conditions, enabling the military to deploy new weapons without committing to full-scale adoption. Nonetheless, the validity of this approval for operation is limited to war time, and government officials expect that all systems will again be required to undergo the full adoption process once hostilities cease.

3.1 Testing and Evaluation

Testing procedures were also significantly simplified to accelerate the evaluation of prototypes against manufacturers’ technical and operational documentation. When manufacturers are unable to conduct these tests independently, the MOD may provide testing ranges, technical support, and scientific expertise. One initiative facilitating this process is the Zaliznyy Polygon electronic system, launched by the Ministry of Strategic Industries and MOD, which enables manufacturers to submit testing applications and get quick access to state-owned testing ranges and military expertise. It also allows testing applicants to track the paperwork process online.

For critical weapons categories such as unmanned systems and electronic warfare equipment, an even simpler procedure is now in place. Manufacturers send requests through the MOD to the Central Directorate of Unmanned Systems of the General Staff, which conducts the necessary tests and directly issues approvals.

3.2 Codifying, Approval for Operation

The codifying and approval process for new MEW has also notably changed. In 2024, the approval for operation timeline was reduced from 20 days to 10 days by eliminating unnecessary steps.

Under the revised system, manufacturers need to submit only five documents containing descriptions of the equipment’s purpose, technical specifications, testing results, and design parameters. If these requirements are met, an MOD commission reviews the submission and issues an approval act, granting NATO codification and authorizing operational use by the armed forces.

Despite the official timeline targets, approvals can still take up to three months in practice. However, for unmanned systems and electronic warfare solutions, the entire process is often completed within two weeks.

4. Contracting

The defense contracting process begins with manufacturers submitting commercial proposals to the Defense Procurement Agency, an entity under the MOD responsible for lethal systems acquisition. Contract terms and pricing are determined during subsequent negotiations, where both parties must reach consensus on commercial and operational details. Once an agreement is achieved, a state contract is signed, followed by financial arrangements and an opening of treasury accounts through which the manufacturer receives advance payments.

In the case of unmanned systems and electronic warfare equipment, the procurement process involves distinct requirements to ensure transparency and efficiency. Manufacturers must submit detailed cost calculations and secure expert evaluations from the Research Institute of Forensic Examinations to determine a system’s estimated value. Advance payments can reach up to 70 percent of total costs for 12 months, while profit margins are capped at 25 percent of production costs. Recent regulatory adjustments enable domestic drone procurement through the Prozorro public procurement platform, following a closed procedure that conceals sensitive contractor information. After the state customer issues a framework announcement specifying technical requirements, suppliers submit applications with cost assessments, expert evaluations, and proof of successful testing. An auction then determines a winner, who must provide the required documentation within four days to finalize a state contract.

Additionally, military units can now procure certain items without relying on annual procurement plans, instead using a list of required items approved by the unit commander. This decentralization allows units to rapidly acquire technologies that address immediate needs in specific segments of the front line. Although most weaponry and equipment is procured through negotiation rather than open auctions—a fact that raises transparency concerns—this approach accelerates delivery.

In December 2024, the government allowed the transfer of funds directly from the state budget to military units for drone procurement and allocated $650 million for this purpose over the next 11 months. Local authorities may also fund these acquisitions, quickly reallocating their budgets in response to requests coming from military units.

Overall, the contracting timeline ranges from one to six months, depending on the procurement procedure selected and the speed of the negotiation process. This more decentralized and flexible system aims to accelerate procurement, adapt to evolving frontline requirements, and increase the responsiveness of defense acquisition in a rapidly changing security environment.

5. Contract Execution

In cases involving private manufacturers, it is not common practice for military representatives to oversee production to ensure compliance with quality standards. Interim quality checks may occur during production, and contract terms can be adjusted if surplus production or increased unit costs arise. Logistics arrangements, including transportation costs, are determined by contracts. Training provisions are typically included in contract prices, ensuring that end users receive instruction. Upon delivery, manufacturers provide formal quality guarantees.

Although contract execution has accelerated, timelines vary considerably. Interviews conducted by CSIS suggest an average of three months to one year. This variation is due to factors such as supply chain reliability, system complexity, and component availability. While acquiring large quantities of foreign-made components remains challenging, Ukraine’s efforts to localize production have helped mitigate some delays.

6. Maintenance and Operational Support

In the current environment, all equipment is deployed immediately to the front lines, eliminating the need for maintenance. Repairs are made as required, but timelines are difficult to estimate. To enhance operational resilience, manufacturers invest in training fighters not only in equipment use but also in basic repair and maintenance, allowing more effective and sustained performance on the front lines.

Summary of the Post-2022 Invasion Period

The Ukrainian government has achieved its immediate wartime objectives by fundamentally restructuring long-standing procurement and research practices. By outsourcing development from the state-owned conglomerate to private firms and civil society organizations, the military leadership has unlocked broader pools of expertise, talent, and technological innovation.

Simultaneously, the government has streamlined testing and adoption into service processes—particularly for unmanned systems and electronic warfare—to reduce administrative barriers and shorten timelines from months or years to mere weeks. New flexible contracting procedures and expanded use of advance payments have further accelerated the delivery of urgently needed military capabilities.

Figure 3 displays the overall timeline for the full product life cycle before and after the 2022 invasion.

Remote Visualization

From integrating software updates for drones to fast-tracking new missile designs, the Ukrainian defense apparatus has prioritized frontline demands through direct feedback from fighers, quasi-governmental innovation platforms, and targeted financial mechanisms. Although various challenges—such as supply chain reliability and component availability—persist, these shifts demonstrate the government’s ability to adapt under extreme pressure. By forging stronger public-private partnerships and fine-tuning regulatory frameworks, Ukraine has not only fulfilled its urgent battlefield needs but also laid the groundwork for a more resilient defense sector in the long term.

Conclusion

Confronted with an existential threat, Ukraine’s military leadership has turned to commercial technologies to create an asymmetric response to Russia’s superior military strength. The private sector has readily provided cost-effective, easily produced, and rapidly upgradable off-the-shelf systems. Consequently, Ukraine has naturally shifted away from reliance on a single state-owned “prime” contractor toward a greater integration of commercial dual-use innovations.

These experiences offer valuable lessons for the U.S. military. Four relevant recommendations are provided below:

  1. The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) must significantly increase its procurement from commercial firms and startups to test and deploy off-the-shelf capabilities or readily available prototypes. The success of Ukraine’s defense industry upgrade has been predicated upon an expansion from one state-owned supplier to about 500 defense companies, most of which are new businesses established after 2022. Notably, Ukraine allocated 1 percent and 6.7 percent of its acquisition budget in FY2024 and FY2025, respectively, to drone procurement, creating a stable demand that has incentivized private investment. 

    In the United States, by contrast, all venture-backed companies received less than one percent of the $411 billion in DOD contracts in 2023, compared to just 0.5 percent of $373 billion in 2010, illustrating a missed opportunity to harness commercial innovation. 

    To nurture a similarly vibrant ecosystem, DOD should reallocate a dedicated portion of its acquisition budget toward commercial technology solutions and emerging firms. Clear multi-year commitments would provide the demand stability that investors and entrepreneurs require, ultimately fueling breakthroughs in areas like AI, robotics, and autonomous systems. 
     
  2. DOD should decentralize acquisition authorities and provide combatant commands with direct control over a greater share of the budget to rapidly field new technologies. The current U.S. military procurement system is largely service-centric, often neglecting theater-specific realities and granting combatant commands minimal influence over capability development and acquisition; combatant commands control roughly 0.7 percent of the defense budget, while the three services—Army, Air Force, and Navy—control over 80 percent. These constraints severely limit the ability of combatant commands to tackle immediate needs and quickly adopt emerging technologies. 

    To overcome these challenges, DOD should shift both acquisition authority and resources closer to fighters. Empowering combatant commands to shape requirements, allocate funding, and experiment with new technologies would accelerate the delivery of tailored solutions in domains such as command and control, data integration, and network resiliency. In Ukraine, real-time collaboration between fighters and industry has led to new battlefield capabilities, and acquisition authority has been given to military units with direct transfers from the state budget for procurement of unmanned systems. Emulating this responsiveness will ensure that U.S. combatant commands can fulfill their mandated missions and adapt at the speed required by modern threats. 
     
  3. DOD should reduce market-entry barriers by scaling and tailoring streamlined acquisition procedures for specific systems and programs of record. DOD should expand and refine existing streamlined acquisition mechanisms and develop new, targeted processes to meet urgent operational needs. Ukraine’s experience—particularly in priority areas such as unmanned systems and electronic warfare—demonstrates the effectiveness of expedited acquisition methods. In the United States, Commercial Solutions Openings (CSOs) have evolved from an experimental pilot program authorized by the FY 2017 National Defense Authorization Act into a codified means of procuring innovative commercial technologies. The use of CSOs has grown from 127 instances in FY 2022 to 161 in FY 2023, with six procuring military agencies already adopting this approach. 

    One remarkable example is the Innovation Adoption Kit, developed and introduced by the Navy’s Program Executive Office (PEO) Digital. It is a model for rapidly identifying, piloting, and fielding innovative technologies. The “kit” consists of 15 smaller procedures with purposes ranging from streamlining acquisition to speeding up collaboration with emerging vendors. This system, complemented by “investment horizons” that funnel disruptive ideas from Horizon 3 (early evaluation) through Horizon 2 (piloting) to Horizon 1 (fleet-wide deployment), illustrates how accelerated procurement can be achieved while maintaining a clear process for transitioning successful pilot projects to operational use. In tandem with divesting Horizon 0 legacy systems, PEO Digital’s approach serves as a best practice example of how other services might similarly remove barriers and adopt new technologies aligned with fighter needs. 

    New specialized acquisition pathways should be developed in tandem with specific programs of record, such as Replicator. These frameworks should clearly articulate requirements, budgets, and expedited procurement procedures under one program, enabling DOD to respond rapidly to evolving threats and technological opportunities. 
     
  4. High-level military authorities should serve as facilitators—removing barriers, securing funding, and ensuring interoperability—while enabling lower-level commands to identify and adopt urgently needed technologies. Ukraine’s experience illustrates how interagency (or interservice) collaboration, combined with strategic prioritization of technology deployment and resource allocation, can streamline innovation by removing bureaucratic barriers. 

    In the U.S. context, this means allowing combatant commands and end users to play a more prominent role in shaping requirements, testing, and and the rapid fielding of new technology. The services and senior decisionmaking offices (SDOs), meanwhile, should focus on three critical tasks: 
     

    • Securing congressional support for budgets
    • Revising regulations to accelerate acquisition
    • Enforcing technical interoperability for new systems, as well as upgrading and integrating old ones


    Enabling units such as the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) and the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office (CDAO) already serve as vital “glue” between end users and industry. DIU’s Commercial Solutions Openings (CSOs) streamline the acquisition of commercial technologies, while CDAO’s initiatives—such as the Tradewinds Solutions Marketplace—provide DOD components with vetted solutions for data, analytics, and AI/ML needs. CDAO’s role in developing Combined Joint All Domain Command and Control (CJADC2) capabilities through its Global Information Dominance Experiments (GIDE) also demonstrates how central coordination can improve joint kill chain execution and secure data sharing across services and domains. 

    However, units like DIU and CDAO should not be expected to handle every demand from every combatant command; instead, they should focus on connecting fighters to commercial tech solutions and help them to aquire and deploy the technology they need by removing regulatory bottlenecks and securing funding. The general oversight should also ensure the elimination of duplicative efforts—like separate service-specific command and control programs that overlap with CJADC2—and the reallocation of human and financial resources to single common projects.  

Kateryna Bondar is a fellow with the Wadhwani Center for AI and Advanced Technologies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

This report is made possible by general support to CSIS. No direct sponsorship contributed to this report.