What Can the United States Do to Counter Growing Chinese and Russian Influence in Antarctica?

Photo: William "Bill" Muntean III
China and Russia announced in March 2025 separate but coordinated plans to strengthen and expand their presence in Antarctica. That same month, the United States announced cuts to funding to operate its flagship South Pole station. While the United States retains the most important geopolitical spot in the region (the South Pole) due to having the largest presence and greatest logistical capacity, U.S. funding decisions could quickly reverse that to the detriment of U.S. national interests.
China and Russia: On-Ice Collaboration
In their March statements, Russia and China separately announced plans to modernize and build new stations near each other in Marie Byrd Land, Antarctica. China announced it would build and operate a new station with capacity for 25 people at Cox Point, to be completed in 2027. A mere 11 miles away, at Cape Burkes, is the existing Russian station, Russkaya. The Russian announcement said it would not only reopen and modernize the Russkaya station (which has been closed since 1990) and build a new station, but would also build a runway for long-haul aircraft.
The timing of the announcements and the locations of the stations makes it highly probable that China and Russia have entered an active new phase of close collaboration in the Antarctica region to complement their collaboration in the governance of Antarctica.
Per the Antarctic Treaty and its related agreements, China and Russia are allowed to build stations where they chose in the region, as there is no sovereign territory in Antarctica and no international bureaucracy that must approve potential actions in the region. Countries must, however, comply with certain rules that promote transparency and environmental standards before, during, and after construction of stations. China has already submitted its draft Comprehensive Environmental Evaluation for its proposed sixth station; Russia, which regularly provides updates to treaty parties on its operations in the region, will likely report on its own plans for the Russkaya reopening and modernization and the new station and airfield at the annual meeting of Antarctic Treaty parties. Additionally, countries are encouraged to cooperate in the region so as to minimize the human impact on Antarctica’s environment and to support human endeavors, particularly in case of emergencies.
This coordinated joint endeavor in Marie Byrd Land likely developed out of close collaboration between China and Russia on the opposite side of the continent, in the Larsemann Hills region. The Russian Progress II and Chinese Zhongshan stations are close to each other, along with the Indian Bharati and Australian Law stations. Similar to the plans for Marie Byrd Land, Russia operates an airfield in the Larsemann Hills area. China and Russia recently announced the successful completion of a joint deep glacier drilling in the area. All four countries collaborate to manage the shared Larsemann Hills area through an Antarctic Specially Managed Area. This is to say that China and Russia are doing nothing illegal by cooperating in Antarctica, but even legal activities could challenge U.S. national interests.
The Importance of Stations
Due to its inhospitable climate, Antarctica has never had any indigenous population and is incapable of supporting human life without outside supplies. However, since 1904, countries have consistently borne the costs of supporting a small number of people living year-round in this frozen region. Governments do so not out of altruism or misuse of funds but to advance national interests, which range from claiming sovereignty, promoting peace, searching for economic opportunities, and advancing scientific research.
Man-made stations are oases of life in Antarctica that facilitate science and other peaceful activities in the region. These stations can range from nothing grander than a single double-wide trailer (albeit with lots of insulation) to a collection of architectural and engineering marvels to meet the needs of hundreds of people. Countries report information on the stations to the Council of Managers of National Antarctic Programs and the Antarctic Treaty secretariat to comply with treaty transparency requirements and facilitate collaboration in the region, including for emergency situations. There are around 80 year-round and seasonal stations in Antarctica, mainly along the coast where resupplying these stations is most efficient. All stations, including the equipment located there, are subject to unannounced inspections per the terms of Article VII of the Antarctic Treaty. The United States has conducted the most unannounced inspections of any country, but has not done one since February 2020, when it inspected three stations, one airfield, and one specially protected area in the Ross Sea region.
Argentina has the most year-round and seasonal stations, with 13 outposts ranging from 12 to 147 people, followed by Chile with 11 stations ranging in size from 4 to 150 beds. Other programs with a sizable footprint in Antarctica include Australia (five stations from 8 to 91 beds), France (four stations from 16 to 100 people), Italy (three stations from 20 to 130 people), Korea (three stations from 78 to 130 people), and the United Kingdom (nine stations from 4 to 168 people).
China has been active in Antarctica for over 40 years and has four year-round stations: Great Wall station in the Peninsula with capacity for 60 people, Zhongshan station in Larsemann Hills with capacity for 80 people, Kunlun (Dome A) station with capacity for 26 people, and the newest station, Qinling, which opened in 2024 with room for 120 people.
Although Russia is one of three countries that claims one of its citizens first sighted Antarctica in 1820, it has been active in the region for “only” the past 70 years, starting with its participation in the 1957-58 International Geophysical Year that invigorated scientific research in Antarctica. Russia reports 11 stations ranging in size from 15 to 100 people, but five of those stations are temporarily closed (including Russkaya), and most of the rest are in dire need of modernization. The exception is Vostok station, which President Putin announced in 2024 had completed its multi-year refurbishment project. Russia maintains the basis of a claim of sovereignty, as does the United States, meaning they retain the right to claim some or all of Antarctica should the treaty disappear, but have never specified their potential claim.
Due to many factors related to Antarctica’s climate, locating, building, and operating stations are all remarkably challenging. Most countries require several years to identify an appropriate location and to design a station to meet the needs and opportunities of that site. Frequently, several more years are needed to build the station since all materials required for the build must be brought to the site, which can require and specialized logistical capacity, such as ice breakers. Operating the resulting station requires annual resupply of people and all essential goods. After all, there are no grocery stores, gas stations, hotels, or anything else in the region. These stations are generally built with an expected lifespan of 25 years, but refurbishments can double the length of utility.
United States’ Privileged Location in Antarctica
Real estate experts emphasize “location, location, location,” and the United States has the most politically desirable location in Antarctica at the South Pole.
The United States runs the largest station, McMurdo station in the Ross Sea, which has capacity for 1,204 people. McMurdo elicits comparisons to a mining town due to its unattractive collection of dilapidated and deteriorating buildings, but it is the lynchpin not only for activities in the Ross Sea but for supplying the geopolitically significant U.S. Amundsen-Scott South Pole station. The 186-person South Pole station is the location for groundbreaking scientific research such as the IceCube Neutrino Detector. It is also geopolitically important, not only as the most symbolic destination, but as the terminus for sovereignty claims by seven countries. With the South Pole station, the United States has a footprint in each of the seven claimed territories; therefore, by its mere presence and ongoing operations, the South Pole station demonstrates the continuation of the one-hundred-year-old policy to reject territorial claims in Antarctica and its support for the Antarctic Treaty. The United States operates a third year-round station, the 45-person Palmer station in the Peninsula region.
In addition to other goals, stations serve as a means to reinforce a country’s position on sovereignty in Antarctica. As you can see in Figure 2, Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom are the seven countries that have made specific territorial claims of sovereignty from the Antarctic coast to the South Pole. Defusing tension during the 1950s between Argentina, Chile, and the United Kingdom, which have overlapping claims in the Peninsula region, was one of the motivations for negotiating the treaty. Those seven claimant countries have placed their stations solely in territory they have claimed. Russia and China wish to have a continent-wide influence on and knowledge of the region. Since they do not have a station at the South Pole, both countries either have or are placing a station in each of the seven sectors claimed by a country, as well as the eighth unclaimed region. The plans to update an old station and build new stations in Marie Byrd Land are consistent with this policy of placing stations in each of the claimed or unclaimed sectors.
All of these territorial claims are frozen by Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty, meaning those seven countries can espouse their territorial claims but cannot act upon them. It also means that all other countries are free to reject any and all claims over Antarctica, which is the route all other countries have taken. This means that stations placed by countries such as China, Italy, and South Korea in Antarctica reinforce the Antarctic Treaty’s rejection of sovereignty in the region.
As a result, the entire continent and its surrounding waters are free from the restrictions imposed by sovereignty, so officials can move throughout the region without regard to who claims the area. It also means that no country owns anything in Antarctica, including any minerals that it might find there. All signatories to the treaty regularly reiterate their support for its provisions, including Article IV, and no country, signatory or not, has ever advocated changing Antarctica’s governing structure.
The United States has at its South Pole station the single-most important location in Antarctica to maintain the peace in this 10 percent of the world. However, keeping the peace is not assured if the United States does not continue to take an active and influential role in maintaining the conditions that discourage international discord or strife in Antarctica. In 2024, the United States announced various reductions in its logistics and scientific activities in the region. In 2025, there has been significant attention to building polar security cutters, some of which could be used to continue the peaceful presence of the United States in the region, but the justification for these icebreakers has focused on the increasingly crowded Arctic rather than the still-tranquil Antarctic. Additionally, the Trump administration announced in March that it intends to use line-item veto authority it does not possess to cut funding, including $60 million that is critical for U.S. Antarctica operations, including at the South Pole station. While a bipartisan group of U.S. Senators oppose this plan, it is unclear if this attempted funding cut is a one-off or a harbinger of future reductions.
To address this evolving situation, the United States should pursue two overlapping activities.
First, the United States and like-minded countries should conduct unannounced inspections of stations in Antarctica. Regularly using this tool significantly reduces the risk that policymakers would be ignorant of the capabilities of countries in Antarctica. Maintaining stations and logistics networks are key to realizing these inspections.
In addition, the United States should properly fund the stations and logistics that support its operations in Antarctica. The stations achieve multiple goals, including maintaining peace through presence in this challenging climate. “Logistics” means funding not only polar security cutters, but also C-130J cargo airplanes made in Marietta, Georgia, that would be used by the 109th Air National Guard to supply remote polar locations. The costs of these platforms are significantly less than the cost of any other means to advance U.S. interests in the region.
The U.S-created Antarctic Treaty system has buffered 10 percent of the world from global political turmoil for almost 70 years. It does so by freezing conflicting territorial claims and minimizing incentives to sort out those claims by reducing the region’s economic and military potential. Maintaining this unique and successful system is in the interest of the United States for geopolitical and fiscal reasons.
William Muntean is a Senior Associate (non-resident) of the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.