On March 22, the USS Spruance, an Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer, left Naval Base San Diego heading south towards the U.S.-Mexico border. A week prior, the USS Gravely also deployed to the Gulf of Mexico, together bringing an unprecedented concentration of naval assets to bear for border security missions. While the deployments underscore the seriousness with which the Trump administration has promised to treat border security and counter-organized crime, the tasking of two warships has raised questions over their mission and their fit for the task.
Q1: What do these destroyer deployments accomplish?
A1: First and foremost, the deployments send a powerful signal that the United States is taking border security, and the Western Hemisphere more broadly, seriously. In a statement from U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) upon deployment of the Spruance, the ships will “restore territorial integrity at the U.S. southern border” and will support operations related to “combating maritime related terrorism, weapons proliferation, transnational crime, piracy, environmental destruction, and illegal seaborne immigration.” The tasking of some of the United States’ most exquisite naval capabilities to support Southwest border operations accordingly provides yet another indicator that a strategic pivot to the Western Hemisphere in general, and the U.S.-Mexico border in particular, is well underway. Southwest border activities were one of 17 priorities laid out by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, where savings from cuts to other Department of Defense Programs would be reallocated. Meanwhile, Mexico-based transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) topped the list of security threats facing the United States in the recent unclassified national intelligence Annual Threat Assessment.
Beyond signaling resolve, the Spruance and Gravely bring important capabilities to bear along the border and in NORTHCOM’s area of responsibility more broadly. Both destroyers are accompanied by a U.S. Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachment (LEDET), teams specialized in maritime boarding and policing operations. LEDETs have a storied history in counternarcotics and smuggling operations and should be an asset for any interdiction activities the warships conduct. Alongside the Trump administration’s refocused attention on Southwest homeland security, the Coast Guard appears set to play an expanded role in U.S. force posture within the region. The Arleigh Burke Flight IIA to which both ships belong boasts powerful sensors and electronics that can be assets for detecting small boats and semisubmersibles used for illicit activities. The destroyers can also serve as a hub for coordination between other sea, air, and land assets to act as a force multiplier.
Q2: What other assets has the United States sent to the border?
A2: The Spruance and Gravely are the latest in a buildup of military and intelligence assets taking place along the land border, as well as the waters and airspace between the United States and Mexico. On his first day in office, President Trump signed an executive order declaring a state of emergency at the Southwest border and deployed 1,600 additional troops there. These complemented an existing force of 2,500 National Guard members already at the border, while some 640 more troops drawn from the 10th Mountain Division and the joint forces are expected, which would bring the total U.S. military presence along the land border to roughly 4,740 troops. Most of these forces are serving logistical roles supporting construction and repairs, as well as complementing border patrol monitoring and detection activities. As a previous CSIS analysis noted, these levels conform to historical precedent for U.S. military presence at the border, but statements from the administration suggest there is an appetite to go higher.
Beyond troop deployments, another notable development has been the use of Navy P-8 Poseidon and Air Force RC-135 Rivet Joint surveillance aircraft to collect intelligence along the border. Flight tracking data showed several of these sorties passing over known hot spots of cartel activity, including two sorties by a Rivet Joint in international waters over the Gulf of California near Culiacán, the city at the heart of the ongoing Sinaloa cartel civil war. Then, in February 2025, reports broke that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency had been flying MQ-9 Reaper drones on reconnaissance missions against drug cartels. Unlike the Poseidon and Rivet Joint missions, the drones reportedly entered Mexican airspace during their missions. Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum subsequently stated that the missions were taking place at the request of and in coordination with the Mexican government. Taken together, these moves suggest the U.S. military is intensifying efforts to familiarize itself with the security and operational environment along the Southwest border.
Q3: Do these destroyers pose a threat to Mexico?
A3: Currently, the only country to raise objections to the deployment has been Cuba, and there is no indication of plans to use the destroyers to conduct kinetic military operations within Mexico. However, rhetoric from the Trump administration has raised fears that the United States could consider military action against Mexican TCOs. In his State of the Union address, President Trump stated that “the cartels are waging war in America, and it’s time for America to wage war on the cartels,” echoing pronouncements he made while on the campaign trail. Theoretically, the armaments carried by the two destroyers, most notably Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles, could be used to target known cartel safehouses, leadership, or drug production labs. However, given the limited-to-nonexistent air defense capabilities of the cartels, the use of such advanced precision-guided munitions makes little tactical sense, to say nothing of the political and economic chaos a strike against the United States’ neighbor and closest trading partner would unleash.
One key capability this surge of assets to the U.S.-Mexico border could offer both countries in the fight against organized crime is intelligence. While adept at evading law enforcement, Mexican TCOs observe generally poor operational security, communicating via unencrypted channels and making frequent use of social media, which open-source intelligence analysts have been able to use to successfully geolocate cartel activity with a surprising degree of accuracy. Focusing U.S. intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities on criminal activity along the border could be used to develop a detailed picture of criminal networks operating there, ripe for exploitation by both U.S. and Mexican security forces. Indeed, Mexico’s secretary of defense, General Ricardo Trevilla, has already credited the drone overflights with aiding in the capture of two cartel leaders.
Q4: How does this deployment impact U.S. readiness in other theaters?
A4: While few commanders would advocate having fewer capabilities at their disposal, the unusual deployment does raise questions about how they will integrate with NORTHCOM’s broader Southwest border mission set. Admiral Daryl Caudle, head of U.S. Fleet Forces and NORTHCOM’s naval forces, characterized the mission as “putting our toe in the water a bit to understand it, to make sure that we know how to employ this force.” Meanwhile, one reporter noted that the use of destroyers for counternarcotics and migration enforcement was “really kind of overkill.”
Although the deployment of two destroyers is a significant step up in NORTHCOM capabilities for Southwest border operations, it should not meaningfully diminish U.S. naval assets for other missions. However, as the United States continues to grapple with shipbuilding challenges and their impact on naval readiness, the sudden emergence of a crisis outside the hemisphere could merit the redeployment of one or both of the vessels to support. In recent weeks, the United States has also stepped up its military presence in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, conducting several airstrikes on the Houthis in Yemen. At least six B-2 stealth bombers have also been deployed to Diego Garcia air base in the Indian Ocean, while the USS Carl Vinson carrier strike group (CSG) is currently en route to support the USS Harry Truman CSG already stationed in the Red Sea.
In the event of a sustained air campaign in the Middle East theater, the sensing, air defense, and precision strike capabilities of the Spruance and Gravely would likely be better served supporting fleet assets there instead of remaining off the coast of Mexico.
Q5: What are the long-term implications of these actions?
A5: Time will tell whether the participation of destroyers in border security missions becomes a mainstay of the Trump administration’s defense posture or merely an experiment. However, they are one clear indication that the administration’s renewed pledge to focus on the United States’ shared neighborhood in the Western Hemisphere is more than mere bluster.
The missions may also open new opportunities for the United States in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) more broadly. While the Spruance and Gravely are deployed to NORTHCOM’s area of responsibility, the lessons learned from this mission could be applicable for the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) as well. SOUTHCOM confronts many of the same challenges in the maritime domain from narcotrafficking, smuggling, and illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing. A better understanding of how a range of naval and air capabilities can be used to address the security challenges faced in LAC would provide important benefits for the United States as well as regional security.
There may also be room for closer collaboration with European navies. While the United States grapples with fentanyl, Europe has emerged as the primary destination for cocaine trafficking, with the revenues from this trade fueling instability and displacement throughout LAC. A fortified U.S. naval presence in the Western Hemisphere would present opportunities to increase cooperation with agencies like the European Union’s Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre to better identify trafficking routes and seize illicit cargoes. Another important mission for SOUTHCOM to work with European and LAC partners in the naval domain is to deter Venezuela from further military provocations toward Guyana. In early March, the USS Normandy, a Ticonderoga-class cruiser, and USS Thomas Hudner, another Arleigh Burke–class destroyer, conducted naval exercises together with the United Kingdom and Netherlands navies in the Caribbean Sea. The Normandy also participated in more recent exercises with the Guyana Defense Force, coinciding with Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s visit to Georgetown.
While more capital ships may not be the answer, the Department of Defense can and should use the current moment to explore how various air and sea platforms can improve intelligence collection and information sharing with one another and like-minded allies.
Henry Ziemer is an associate fellow with the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
