Is Food Security National Security?

U.S. government investments in global food security have traditionally received strong bipartisan support from policymakers, either explicitly or implicitly, on moral, economic, and national security grounds. In its first 100 days, the Trump administration has paused or terminated most U.S. foreign assistance, weakened or dismantled U.S. aid agencies, and stated that any future foreign assistance must make America demonstrably stronger, safer, and more prosperous. In times of uncertainty, advocates for U.S. leadership on global food security have leaned on its importance to national security to secure lawmakers’ commitments to protect U.S. funding and programs. Too often, however, these advocates have failed to delineate the connection between food insecurity abroad and U.S. national security at home. Failing to define the links between global food insecurity and U.S. national security can lead to confusion and dismissal of this concept, and risk termination of longstanding programs.

Whose Food Security? Whose National Security?

Domestic food security is generally accepted as a matter of national security for sovereign countries worldwide. For NATO countries, resilience of food and water systems is one of the baseline requirements for civilian preparedness enumerated at the 2016 Warsaw Summit and enshrined in NATO’s Article 3. Food insecurity in the United States helped propel the passage of the 1946 National School Lunch Act, when military leaders reported undernourishment as a top reason for rejection of World War II recruits. Market shocks brought by the Covid-19 pandemic and Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine led to a first-ever National Security Memorandum on Strengthening the Security and Resilience of United States Food and Agriculture in 2022, noting the rise in potential threats to the sector. The food security of the United States—understood both as the productivity of U.S. agriculture systems and the nutrition of American citizens—is broadly accepted as a matter of U.S. national security.

But proponents of U.S. global food security assistance assert that food security in other countries is a matter of U.S. national security. The first Trump administration’s 2017 National Security Strategy declared support for “food security and health programs that save lives and address the root cause of hunger and disease,” and the Biden administration’s 2022 National Security Strategy referred to food and food security an impressive 30 times, though neither strategy defined the links between food insecurity abroad and U.S. national security interests.

Bad Actors

One threat posed by food insecurity to U.S. interests abroad comes in the form of “bad actors.” Leaders and regimes hostile to the United States can take advantage of food insecurity among local populations to extend their influence and strengthen their hold on power. In Venezuela, President Nicolás Maduro has used food as a tool for social control, with President Maduro widely accused of distributing food to buy votes in presidential elections. In Syria, ISIS has used food to encourage dependency by local populations on ISIS governance structures, distributing food to attendees at religious outreach events, taking control of industrial bakeries to distribute bread to local populations, and offering reduced-price beef to the “poor and needy.”

In such instances, food insecurity creates an opening for dictators and terrorist organizations to provide food in exchange for fealty from a local population. This phenomenon is often observed on the regional and national levels, but the globalization of agriculture markets has opened up opportunities for bad actors—most vividly, Russia—to use food to influence food-insecure populations worldwide. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine pushed global food prices to all-time highs, diminishing food security and nutrition for millions around the world. Since launching its full-scale invasion in 2022, Russia has regularly attacked all aspects of Ukraine’s agriculture system, reducing Ukraine’s output and creating market openings for Russia’s own exports.

In 2022, the Russian government declared food to be its “silent weapon.” From 2022 to 2023, Russia’s exports of wheat to sub-Saharan Africa increased by 39 percent; its wheat exports to Africa increased another 19 percent in 2024. Russia has also delivered free grains and fertilizer to friendly countries, including Burkina Faso, Eritrea, Mali, Zimbabwe, Somalia, the Central African Republic, and, most recently, Ethiopia. At the same time, Ukraine’s exports of wheat to Sub-Saharan Africa fell from about 11 percent of its total exports in 2021 to less than 1 percent in 2024. Russia’s attacks on Ukraine’s agriculture sector have contributed to food insecurity in import-dependent countries, while Russia uses its own food exports and handouts to extend its influence. Leaders of countries dependent on Russian food are less likely to oppose Russia on the global stage, including in the United Nations, effectively expanding the coalition of countries supporting—or refraining from denouncing—Russia’s aggression.

Unplanned Migration

Another threat food insecurity can pose is in the form of unplanned migration worldwide, including into the United States. In 2021, former Vice President Kamala Harris cited hunger among other “acute” drivers of migration from Guatemala to the United States. In 2024, the Group of Seven (G7) launched an initiative on food security in part to stem irregular migration from African countries into Europe.

But the relationship between food insecurity and migration is complex. For example, while food insecurity and a general inability to afford basic necessities can contribute to the desire to emigrate, they can also impede would-be migrants from starting their journey, according to a survey by the UN World Food Programme and other partners in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Furthermore, food insecurity rarely occurs in a vacuum, and is more often one of a plethora of challenges afflicting households in regions facing both food insecurity and high levels of out-migration.

In these instances, food insecurity can more accurately be considered one factor influencing decisions to migrate but rarely, if ever, the sole driver of migration. Food insecurity often exists alongside increasing incidence of violence, impacts of climate change, diminished livelihoods, deteriorating social services, and low government capability to address these challenges. These factors in aggregate have contributed to surges in immigration from Central America to the United States, from Africa to Europe, and in other regions around the world.

Social and Political Unrest

Food insecurity can also contribute to social and political unrest, destabilizing regions strategically important to the United States. World food prices reached an all-time high—later surpassed only with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—in December 2010, the same month commonly recognized as the onset of the Arab Spring. Prices remained high and volatile for the next year, coinciding with civilian protests across North Africa and the Middle East. Protests ultimately influenced governance across the region, with some governments instituting popular reforms, others overthrown and replaced, and still others falling into civil wars that continue to destabilize the region today.

Food insecurity resulting from the Russia-Ukraine war likewise helped fuel protests around the world: A 2022 study described over 12,500 protests in countries worldwide between late 2021 and late 2022, many over increases in the prices of food and fuel triggered by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Like the Arab Spring, some of these protests led to regime changes. High food prices helped drive protests that led to the overthrow of Sri Lanka’s ruling party in mid-2022.

Food insecurity, precipitated by the sudden increase in food prices, has contributed to social and political unrest throughout history, from the French Revolution to the Tiananmen Square uprising to the Arab Spring. High food prices can put staple foods, like bread, out of reach, risking hunger among a population, and making more nutritious foods difficult to access, risking long-term health impacts. Consumers interact with food prices more regularly than the prices of other necessities, making high food prices an immediate signal of inflation that can quickly impact household wellbeing.

For these reasons, food insecurity precipitated by high food prices can be a near-term instigator of protests—but like migration, the relationship between food insecurity and social and political unrest is complex. Rarely is food insecurity the only factor driving unrest; almost always, food insecurity exists alongside—and is exacerbated by—other challenges, including poor governance and high prices of other staples, like fuel. Food can be a near-term trigger of protests that can lead to social and political unrest, sometimes with long-term political impacts, but is rarely the sole driver of discontent.

Food Security May Be National Security

Many supporters of U.S. leadership in global food security assert that food security is national security, and hunger and malnutrition abroad threaten U.S. interests at home. But proponents of fortifying the defense industrial base, halting pandemics, shoring up critical mineral reserves, and winning the artificial intelligence race claim that these issues, too, are national security priorities. In this atmosphere, policymakers could benefit from more specific language explaining the nature of these threats.

Food insecurity in other countries almost always influences negative outcomes for those countries. But food insecurity abroad affects U.S. national security when U.S. interests are at stake. Food insecurity in some African countries creates openings for Russian influence—through increased food exports and deliveries of food and fertilizer—while the United States tries to rally countries in opposition to Russia for its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Food insecurity also creates opportunities for China to support agriculture systems in developing countries worldwide through its One Belt, One Road initiative, signaling goodwill while indebting countries to China. To cope with food insecurity and related ills in Central America, many decide to move—often to the United States, contributing to spikes in unplanned migration and the crisis at the U.S. Southern Border. And food insecurity in North Africa and the Middle East was among many factors in the Arab Spring uprising that reshaped governance in the region. By themselves, hunger and malnutrition abroad may not directly threaten U.S. national security, but by their contribution to phenomena that concern the United States—the proliferation of terrorist organizations, expanding influence of Russia and China, surges in unplanned migration, and overthrow of friendly regimes—food insecurity abroad can indirectly affect U.S. national security interests.

Indirect though these effects may be, it bears repeating that U.S. global food security efforts have strong economic and moral rationales, too. Investments in food security and nutrition can contribute to greater educational and economic outcomes for individuals, with impacts on their nations’ economies. And investments in agriculture systems can have broad-based impacts on economic growth and expand markets for U.S. exports. Moreover, Americans—Democrats and Republicans alike—have long considered alleviating global hunger and malnutrition a moral imperative, often underpinned by their private religious convictions. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jim Risch (R-ID) wrote for CSIS in 2021, “Our founding fathers spoke about Americans’ habits of the heart—the idea that we always help our neighbors. . . . We can do our part to lead an effective response to growing food insecurity. I know we will.”

Perhaps the strongest justification for U.S. leadership in global food security is the same justification for U.S. leadership in all manner of global development concerns: A strong U.S. presence worldwide is in the United States’ interest. U.S. leaders have long understood this reality. President John F. Kennedy launched the Peace Corps in 1961, at the height of the Cold War. The Peace Corps has three goals, two focused on strengthening connections between Americans and foreign populations. In the Cold War, our adversaries were doing the same thing: Later that decade, Cuba sent doctors, nurses, and other experts to African countries including Algeria, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, Somalia, and Tanzania. Today, China’s investments in agriculture abroad are soaring, and Russia using its own food exports to secure its foothold in import-dependent countries. The greatest antidote to our adversaries’ influence, in the past and today, is a strong U.S. presence abroad.

Making the Future Case

At the time of writing, the future of U.S. foreign assistance is uncertain. Many vocal supporters of foreign aid, including Republicans and Democrats, echo a similar sentiment: U.S. foreign aid should be improved, not killed. And room for improvement is indeed considerable.

For example, Under President Biden, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) identified gaps in reporting mechanisms for the U.S. government’s Feed the Future (FTF) initiative, flagging that absent performance goals, federal agencies were limited in their ability to determine impact. The GAO also recommended improvements in coordination across U.S. agencies involved in the FTF initiative, noting a lack of communication among organizations. The report offered specific steps to rectify these shortcomings.

Furthermore, most of U.S. food security assistance programs were designed decades ago and have not adapted to evolving challenges. For example, most U.S.-funded food security interventions are targeted at agricultural producers in rural areas, while most food-insecure people live in cities. In 2024, the UN Committee on World Food Security reported that a full 76 percent of the world’s population suffering from moderate and severe food insecurity live in peri-urban and urban areas. Food security programming could be updated to target—and measure the impact of U.S. assistance on—food-insecure people in towns and cities alongside rural areas.

Finally, the connection between U.S. investments in global food security, U.S. national security, and economic prosperity could be strengthened. The Global Food Security Act requires the U.S. government to articulate requirements for selection of target countries. Congress could require policymakers to include U.S. national security and economic prosperity among these criteria in future iterations of the Global Food Security Act and Global Food Security Strategy. For example, U.S. policymakers could determine the countries in which China and Russia are having the greatest impact through their own investments in agriculture and food, and direct U.S. resources to these same places to counter Chinese and Russian influence. Likewise, policymakers could be required to describe the benefits of U.S. investments in food security, such as the ways U.S. assistance is expected to grow economies and cultivate export markets for American goods.

In the end, the national security rationale for investments in global food security may be weaker than some proponents assert. But investments in global food security are important for more than national security—they can improve U.S. economic outcomes, and for more than sixty years, policymakers have believed that reducing hunger and malnutrition abroad is the right thing for the United States to do. Most of all, a strong U.S. presence abroad is in the United States’ interest. It is because of the manifold importance of U.S. investments in global food security that policymakers should not scrap investments altogether, but instead take a clear-eyed look at U.S.-funded programs, to make better use of U.S. taxpayer dollars and ensure greater benefits for food security and nutrition worldwide.

Caitlin Welsh is the director of the Global Food and Water Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).