How Open-Source, Real-Time Data Can Defeat China at the Edge of Its Influence

The game of global influence has changed. China has undertaken a concerted effort over the last two decades to establish a web of interlocking influence structures, including economic power, media influence, health diplomacy, and digital investments. These efforts have intentionally focused down to the local level, where relatively small investments can win over allies hungry for resources.

A talented cadre of thought leaders spent the last year working on creative solutions to adapt U.S. strategy to this new era through a CSIS-hosted discussion series entitled “25 Gamechangers for 2025.” The series was originally intended to include 25 leading thinkers working together to solve this wicked problem, but the number of participants grew to 58, encompassing experts in national security, special operations, technology, public influence campaigns, and counternarcotics. The group sought to think differently about pushing back on China at the local level, in particular, playing to U.S. strengths and seeking the cracks in Chinese messaging.

Discussions among these Gamechangers led to key insights on countering China and reasserting U.S. leadership globally. These ideas centered on harnessing technology, fully engaging in the information warfare space, and planning for a possible contingency where competition expands to economic warfare. The three sections below explore each concept.

The U.S. Government Should Better Harness Technology

China’s advantages include central planning and financing of large-scale projects and copious human resources to throw at a problem. Centralization plus people means Chinese influence efforts have scope and depth. To counter this, the United States should lean into its own strengths of innovation and a belief that humans know themselves and their needs better than any outside force. The United States can use technology to empower policymakers in Washington and people residing far from national capitals, at the edge of China’s influence, to chart their own course, rather than put up with China’s restrictions and exploitation. Participants had the following ideas around technology:

• Tech can provide real-time monitoring of complex networks. Soon, tools may be able to identify vulnerable nodes as they emerge and alert policymakers that urgent action will yield outsized results. For example, in the fight against fentanyl, illuminating transit and distribution networks will provide insights into vulnerable nodes and processes. Networks can be disrupted if the information about them is up-to-date and actionable.
• Tech can smooth the gaps between U.S. policymakers. U.S. policy is slow in part because interagency coordination is stilted and inefficient. Better real-time data sharing across a common operating picture would improve rapid reaction, limit needless meetings, and ensure parties walk into a meeting with the same, up-to-date information.
• Modern technology is leading to a revolution in open-source intelligence (OSINT). New, powerful insights can come from untapped, unclassified data sources, and that data is far easier to share with countries that touch the supply chain, like China. The United States should lean into OSINT to provide evidence to drive Chinese action on bilateral issues like fentanyl.

Competing with China in the Information Space

The Gamechangers also emphasized that the United States needed to strengthen its messaging and counter-messaging. Many ideas centered on improving U.S. tactical knowledge to outcompete China at the local level and emphasized focus, innovation, and playing to the U.S. strength of amplifying authentic voices:

• The United States should always be sure to clarify the objectives of the engagement. Then, it should seek out rapid feedback on what messages and counter-messages are most effective for communicating with the population about the main objective. Adjust rapidly and iterate. Critical to this effort is granular and real-time data on population opinions.
• Resist temptation to be everywhere all at once. Rather, empower local, organic voices as a force multiplier and maximally effective resonance. The number of like-minded parties will help reach parity with opposing voices. For example, the United States should invest in local newspapers featuring fresh, rising journalists.
• Amplify true stories of real Chinese policy failures and false promises. In particular, remember that Chinese public diplomacy efforts have two audiences, and the primary one is Beijing. This leads to missteps in messaging. Further, Chinese Communist Party representatives often falter in unscripted moments, revealing true intentions. These moments can provide fodder for messaging campaigns.

Prepare for Contingencies: Plan for Extreme Economic Warfare

As participants developed policy options for pushing back against China, researchers asked them to also brainstorm “break glass” proposals—ideas so extreme they should only be deployed in a dire situation, like an imminent conflict with China. They came up with the following extraordinary measures in the economic realm:

• Invest heavily in a specific sector (e.g., batteries) to outcompete China. Use their own subsidy tactics against them to prove that the United States could engage in these practices as well.
• Fund investors to buy out key nodes of supply chains, like critical minerals mines. Develop long-term economic and defense options for protecting those assets in case of conflict.
• Signal to countries worldwide that they must pick a side economically—either fully decouple from China or align with the United States. Implement export controls, sanctions, and secondary tariffs, and signal to other countries the need to decouple from China.
• Use hybrid warfare tactics to sabotage Chinese supply chains, including hacking Chinese ports, embedding ransomware in companies to cause shipment delays, or conducting offensive supply-chain disruption tactics, like inserting defective elements to create disruption.

Of course, no participant wanted the United States’ relationship with China to deteriorate to the extent that policymakers should consider such extreme options. But failing to plan for extreme situations does not prevent them from happening.

This group of extraordinary leaders aimed to help the United States compete without shifting into conflict. Competing effectively will demonstrate to Beijing that Washington is not in decline—far from it. Rather, the United States provides a far more attractive ally, compelling vision for a peaceful future, and long-term economic success for its partners than China could. The U.S. government has the tools to harness technology and compete in the information space, and, if necessary, to outcompete China economically. Perhaps more importantly, it has innovative leaders who are thinking ahead about how to defeat China at the edge.

CSIS thanks Vannevar Labs for their generous support of this effort.

Emily Harding is director of the Intelligence, National Security, and Technology Program and vice president of the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.