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How Do the Latest Black Sea Attacks Affect Global Food Security?
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Attacks on agricultural infrastructure have been a defining feature of Russia’s war in Ukraine since 2022, causing record-level impacts on global food and fertilizer markets. However, recent attacks on shipping and export infrastructure in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov represent a heretofore unseen escalation in agriculture-related attacks by each country. Russia’s attacks on cargo ships and export infrastructure have largely suspended vessel traffic through Ukraine’s Black Sea ports, previously responsible for approximately 90 percent of Ukraine’s agricultural exports. Ukraine’s attacks on major Russian ports in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov have damaged grain export infrastructure and grain-carrying ships, leading Russia to suspend exports from its highest-capacity grain export terminals. These mutual attacks have made a significant proportion of the world’s wheat trade inaccessible to buyers and threaten global fertilizer trade—while reductions in traffic through the Strait of Hormuz and Panama Canal further complicate agriculture trade routes.
Q1: What is the nature of recent attacks?
A1: Since the start of its full-scale invasion in 2022, Russia has attacked Ukraine’s grain and oilseed production, transportation, processing, and export infrastructure; obstructed access to Ukraine’s Black Sea ports, including by attacking ships carrying Ukrainian grains, forcing Ukraine to secure alternative export routes like the Danube River, which subsequently became a target for Russian attacks; targeted and killed Ukrainian farmers, exporters, and agribusiness leaders; and stole and re-sold Ukrainian grains. Despite Russia’s deliberate efforts to undermine Ukraine’s agricultural economy, Ukraine has remained one of the world’s top agricultural exporters, though export volumes remain below prewar levels. Most of the damage to Black Sea agricultural infrastructure has been inflicted by Russia on Ukraine, and until recently, Russia’s production and export levels remained relatively unaffected by the war.
Recent attacks in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov have changed these dynamics. This summer, Russia has increased the intensity of attacks on grain-carrying ships in and near Ukraine’s ports, and targeted all of Ukraine’s means of grain transport, including by sea, river, and land. Concurrently, Ukraine has escalated attacks on Russia’s major Black Sea ports—notably Novorossiysk, responsible for 40 percent of Russian grain exports. Ukraine’s attacks there—part of a larger assault on Russia’s energy and military infrastructure—included Russia’s agricultural export infrastructure, including the first confirmed Ukrainian assaults on ships carrying Russian grain. As a result, traffic has significantly slowed through both Russia and Ukraine’s major grain-exporting ports simultaneously.
Since June, Russia has attacked at least 57 cargo vessels in the Black Sea, including some carrying Ukrainian grains, according to Ukrainian officials. Russia has also intensified its drone campaign targeting Ukrainian railways, regularly struck the Danube River ports of Izmail and Reni, and has damaged agricultural production facilities and farmland near the front lines. Because of Russia’s attacks on grain-carrying ships and Ukraine’s export infrastructure, vessel traffic through Black Sea ports has largely halted since July 22, causing grain exports to drop 75 percent in the first two weeks of August compared to 2025 levels.
For its part, Ukraine intensified attacks on cargo vessels leaving Russian ports in July and August. Ukrainian forces attacked 76 vessels between July 6 and July 11, according to Ukrainian officials. In mid-July, Russia suspended exports through the Don-Azov Channel. The Sea of Azov handled approximately one-quarter of Russia’s wheat exports. Russia’s Azov Sea wheat exports were further undercut by a Ukrainian attack to a major grain export terminal at Russia’s Taman port on July 29; Ukraine attacked a sunflower oil processing facility at Taman the following day. Ukraine’s August 12 strike on Novorossiysk marked a turning point, halting operations at all three of the port’s grain terminals. At time of writing, Russia’s only operational port on the Black Sea is the secondary port of Tuapse. Ukraine’s recent attacks have also demonstrated an expanded reach as drone assaults have now hit Russia’s Baltic Sea ports—including Ust-Luga, a major port for Russian fertilizer exports, in early September—and the Caspian Sea, where Ukraine has struck multiple Russian vessels this year and where Iran accused Ukraine of attacking an Iranian commercial vessel in late July.
Q2: What are the impacts of recent attacks on Ukraine’s and Russia’s agricultural exports?
A2: The surge in attacks on export capacity coincides with each country’s peak wheat export window. Winter wheat, the predominant type of wheat grown in Russia and Ukraine, is harvested in summer and exported in late summer and early fall. Ukraine’s attacks, particularly on Russia’s ports in the Sea of Azov and at Novorossiysk, have removed an estimated 70 percent of Russia’s grain export capacity. Russia’s recent attacks, which halted shipments from Odessa, took approximately 90 percent of Ukraine’s grain shipments offline.
As a result, exports of wheat from Russia and Ukraine have fallen dramatically. In recent years, Russia has exported an average of 5 million tons of wheat in August; estimates of Russia’s wheat exports in August 2026 range from 3.0 million metric tons to 1.5 million metric tons, representing as much as a 70 percent decrease in Russian wheat exports for the month. Analysts forecast Russia’s July–September wheat export volumes at 5.6 million tons overall, a roughly 50 percent decrease from the 11.3 million tons Russia exported during this period last year. Ukraine’s August grain exports are expected to be approximately one-third the level of what Ukraine exported in August 2025.
Q3: How are Ukraine and Russia adapting to the recent attacks in the short term, and how could the attacks affect Ukraine’s and Russia’s agriculture sectors in the long term?
A3: In the near term, Russia and Ukraine are seeking alternative export routes for their grains, but alternative routes are expensive and unable to handle the volumes afforded by the Black Sea and Sea of Azov ports. At time of writing, Russia is reportedly rerouting grain shipments to ports on the Baltic Sea, including Russian ports and ports of Baltic states. Grain shipments through Russia’s Baltic Sea terminals, plus potential shipments through Estonia and Latvia, could approach 10 million metric tons—about a fifth of the more than 46 million metric tons of grain Russia exported through its Azov and Black Sea ports in the 2025–2026 season. To ease the impacts of high trading costs, Russia has also paused export duties on wheat, barley, and corn through the end of the year.
Ukraine, in turn, is seeking alternative transport by rail, road, and the Danube River. According to Ukraine’s agriculture minister, alternative routes, once fully operational, could export only half the volume handled by Ukraine’s disrupted Black Sea ports. The Danube River had become central to Ukraine’s maritime grain exports following the termination of the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI) in 2023, facilitating export of Ukraine’s grains from Ukraine’s Danube River ports to Romania’s territorial waters and Black Sea ports. Today, extreme heat and low rainfall have dropped Danube River levels to historic lows, reducing cargo vessel capacity, increasing freight costs, and causing long queues of ships awaiting transit, with preference given to higher-priced cargo (e.g., fuel) over grain. Russia’s mid-August attacks on Izmail, Ukraine’s largest port on the Danube River, have further obstructed Ukraine’s exports via the Danube. Today, export by rail is the primary alternative to maritime exports, according to Ukraine’s agriculture minister. In response to disruptions to Ukraine’s grain export capacity and impacts of drought on EU agricultural production, the European Union is urging member states to “assess rapidly” means to mitigate the adverse effects of these compounding pressures on global grain markets.
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In the near term, export-route obstructions are driving up prices for grain buyers and reducing revenues for Russian and Ukraine grain sellers. Recent disruptions could cause up to $3 billion in losses for Ukraine’s agriculture sector alone. Should trade impediments continue, lost revenues could affect future harvests. Accumulating inventories and a shortage of storage capacity would lead to a back up of grains on farms, reducing space to store future harvests, while farmers, receiving less revenue from current crops, would have less capital to invest in future planting and sowing campaigns.
Q4: How could recent attacks affect global agriculture markets and global food security?
A4: Russia, the world’s top wheat exporter, and Ukraine, the world’s fifth-largest wheat exporter, together account for approximately 27 percent of global wheat exports, according to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). The recent attacks have caused benchmark wheat futures on the Chicago Board of Trade to reach their highest levels since 2023.
These disruptions are coinciding with a decline in global wheat production due to drought and other weather events, largely related to El Niño, across the Northern and Southern Hemispheres. According to the USDA, combined production of the world’s top seven wheat exporters will decline 11 percent for the 2026/2027 marketing year compared to the previous year, and wheat exports will be down 7 percent in 2026/2027 compared to the previous year. This represents significant declines in production from some top producers, including the United States. In the United States, wheat production is expected to fall by 26 percent, representing the lowest wheat production levels since 1970–1971, and wheat exports are expected to decline by almost 15 percent. A combination of drought and high fertilizer prices are similarly reducing production in Canada and across EU countries. In the Southern hemisphere, drought and high fertilizer costs are expected to reduce exports from Australia, while Argentina’s wheat exports are expected to decline in marketing year 2026/2027, despite potentially positive impacts of El Niño on Argentina’s wheat production.
Together, decreased exports from Russia, Ukraine, and other top wheat exporters are driving up global wheat prices. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN Food Price Index estimated that world wheat prices were 15 percent higher in August 2026 than August 2025, though cereal prices together remain significantly lower than the peak reached in 2022. Sustained high wheat prices—and potential impacts on maize and oilseed exports—could push cereal prices higher. As in 2022, elevated global food prices would hit net-food-importing countries hardest, driving up prices of staple foods and reducing consumption of both staple foods and more nutritious (and more costly) foods at the same time.
Q5: What are the prospects for a cessation of attacks on agriculture infrastructure in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov?
A5: On August 13, Ukraine proposed to Russia, through a third party, that they both halt attacks on civilian targets in the Black Sea. Russia dismissed the offer the following day. According to Ukrainian President Zelenskyy, Russia wants to extend a ceasefire on ships carrying agricultural products to cover Russia’s energy infrastructure, without offering to cease Russia’s own attacks on Ukraine’s energy system. Russia’s counteroffer has been a nonstarter for Ukraine.
In 2022, the establishment of the BSGI, intended to facilitate the export of Ukrainian and Russian grains and fertilizers from the Black Sea, ultimately stemmed the spike in global grain and fertilizer prices. Today, neither Ukraine nor Russia is likely to return to a similar regime. The BSGI initially allowed Ukraine to resume grain exports, but the ship inspections required under the BSGI ultimately made it so that Russia could squeeze Ukraine’s grain exports for political purposes. Following the termination of the BSGI and absent Russia’s inspections, Ukraine’s agricultural exports increased. For Russia, the deal was “one-sided,” not facilitating exports of Russian food and fertilizers to the extent originally agreed.
According to Turkish officials, Turkey has drafted a plan for the safe passage of grain-carrying ships and is in contact with Russia and Ukraine about it. Absent a ceasefire, grain industry analysts fear that recent hostilities in the Black Sea could last as long as the Russia-Ukraine war itself, with continued, and expanding, impacts on global agriculture markets.
Q6: How is the Iran war worsening dynamics in the Black Sea and the global impacts of the crisis?
A6: The U.S.-Israeli war with Iran and continued closure of the Strait of Hormuz are influencing military tactics in the Black Sea and exacerbating the impacts of recent attacks on global agriculture markets. The ongoing struggle for control of the Strait of Hormuz, and Iran’s continued threats to the safe passage of ships, has significantly slowed traffic through the Gulf waterway. This strategy was proven effective by the Houthi’s threats to commercial shipping through the Red Sea in late 2023 and Russia’s blockade of vessel traffic through Ukraine’s Black Sea ports following the 2022 full-scale invasion. According to one UK-based research institute, Iran’s ongoing threats to safe passage in the Strait of Hormuz may be normalizing the targeting of civilian vessels, potentially informing Russia’s decision to accelerate attacks on civilian vessels that have led to the halt of maritime exports from Ukraine.
Destruction of energy infrastructure and delays in shipping have slowed the production and export of fertilizers from the Persian Gulf region, increasing global prices of fertilizers and fertilizer inputs. By April 2026, North American fertilizer prices had increased 30 percent compared to prewar, and have since eased. The spike in fertilizer prices at the onset of war in spring of 2026 led to some farmers planting fewer acres of fertilizer-intensive crops, including wheat. High fertilizer costs are one factor contributing to expectations of lower wheat export levels from some of the world’s top producers, potentially compounding the impacts of ongoing Black Sea disruptions on global wheat markets.
Likewise, the concurrence of the Strait of Hormuz closure and Black Sea attacks could compound impacts on global fertilizer markets. Since 2022, Russia has relocated much of its fertilizer exports from its Black Sea ports to the Baltic Sea, but by March 2026, Ukraine demonstrated its ability to reach Russia’s Baltic Sea ports, potentially threatening fertilizer exports from the region. Though 84 percent of Russia’s mineral fertilizer exports are through the Baltic Sea, Russia’s Black Sea ports of Novorossiysk and Taman remained important, and export of fertilizers from these ports has effectively halted since the recent escalation.
Since 2022, Ukraine’s naval defenses have been critical to its ability to export grains. Starting in June 2023, Ukraine initiated attacks on Russia’s Black Sea Fleet on the Crimean Peninsula. Successive strikes through that fall forced Russia to relocate its BSF to Novorossiysk, inhibiting Ukraine’s ability to target Ukraine’s maritime activity in the Western Black Sea and enabling Ukraine to secure grain export routes via its Odessa ports and through the Danube. Since Ukraine launched the Ukrainian Corridor in September 2023, following Russia’s termination of the BSGI that July, Ukraine has exported approximately 100 million metric tons of grain through the route as of January 2026, allowing Ukraine to remain one of the world’s top agricultural exporters.
Today, Ukraine’s naval defense capabilities remain critical to Ukraine’s maritime grain exports. Moving forward, diplomatic efforts to negotiate a ceasefire on civilian vessels and agricultural infrastructure in the Black Sea, coupled with efforts to bolster Ukraine’s maritime self-defense, will prove essential to resuming agricultural trade from the vital waterway.
Caitlin Welsh is the director of the Global Food and Water Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Emma Curtis is a research associate with the Global Food and Water Security Program at CSIS. Joseph Glauber is a senior adviser (non-resident) with the Global Food and Water Security Program at CSIS.
The authors would like to thank Joely Virzi for her research support.
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