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President Donald Trump has given Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky an ultimatum: “You either make a deal, or we are out.” He canceled the planned signing ceremony of the bilateral minerals deal, claiming that Zelensky had “disrespected” the United States and is “not ready for peace if America is involved.” This capped a week in which Trump called Zelensky “a dictator without elections” and refused to identify Russia as the aggressor. The administration is reportedly considering the cessation of equipment shipments. Ukraine faces the possibility of fighting without U.S. military aid.
Ukraine needs a steady flow of weapons, munitions, and supplies to continue its resistance, and Zelensky has worried in the past that Ukraine would “have a low chance to survive without the support of the United States.” Is he right? The bad news is that U.S. funding for military aid to Ukraine is now depleted. The good news is that a steady stream of American equipment will continue to flow to Ukraine from previously announced commitments—if Trump allows it. More will come from the Europeans, who have committed around $40 billion of military aid that has not yet been delivered. This will buy time for a negotiated settlement. However, though this may be enough to hold ground, it is not enough to repel Russia and gain the victory that Ukraine desires.
Q1: What is the status of funding for U.S. military aid to Ukraine?
A1: All military aid funds have been committed, but the equipment is in different stages along the delivery pipeline.
Congress has appropriated $86 billion for Ukraine military aid in five supplemental appropriations and the Department of Defense (DOD) base budget. Congress passed the last aid package in April 2024, and the Trump administration is unlikely to request more, given last week’s events.
The United States has sent equipment to Ukraine through three primary mechanisms: the Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA), the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI), and Foreign Military Financing. Figure 1 shows these three funding sources.
Although DOD has committed all the PDA and USAI funds, not all funds have been dispensed. Figure 2 shows the history of announcements of military aid to Ukraine, through both drawdowns and USAI. The Biden administration made several large announcements before it left office to move military aid along before the Trump administration took office. Before that, there were large announcements in the spring of 2023 as Ukraine prepared for its counteroffensive and in April 2024 when Congress passed the last aid package.
Before diving into the status of military aid funds, it is worthwhile to review the steps in the funding pipeline:
Figure 3 shows funds that have been committed but not obligated, funds that are obligated but not disbursed, funds that have been disbursed, and funds that expired before they were used. These funds include USAI, Foreign Military Financing, and the replacement of items sent to Ukraine under PDA.
There remains around $4 billion of authority for equipment drawdown, but DOD has run out of money to replace the equipment and has been unwilling to release equipment when there is no guarantee of its replacement.
Q2: If all the military funds have been committed, does that mean U.S. military aid to Ukraine has ended?
A2: No. As the discussion above indicates, aid takes a long time to deliver, and much is still in the pipeline. Equipment will continue to flow for years.
Some systems have shipped quickly: Four High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) were announced in early June 2022 and arrived later that month. Others, like Patriot missile systems, took longer, with a December 2022 commitment to draw down but the first units delivering in April 2023. CSIS analysis indicates that average drawdowns take about eight months from announcement to complete delivery.
USAI, which provides funds for Ukraine to procure equipment directly from U.S. manufacturers, has a much longer delivery timeline. The U.S. government takes about four months to secure a contract (based on analysis of DOD announcements), around 24 months for the manufacturer to produce the first item (based on historical experience), and another 20 months to complete delivery (assumed to be longer than the typical 12 months because of production bottlenecks).
Figure 4 combines the announcements in Figure 2 with the expected delivery timelines to show deliveries by month. Equipment will continue to flow to Ukraine despite the exhaustion of funding and the Trump administration’s opposition to new packages. Early USAI contracts have begun deliveries. Even when the final equipment provided under PDA is delivered (around August 2025), USAI contracts will provide a steady flow of weapons through 2025 and beyond.
Q3: What equipment is going to Ukraine?
A3: The United States provides Ukraine with the full spectrum of equipment that a military needs. PDA packages run the gamut from heavy weapons (e.g., tanks) to munitions (e.g., artillery shells and air defense missiles) to supplies (e.g., medical equipment and cold-weather gear). Recent packages appear to provide the monthly production of equipment that is in short supply in the United States, like artillery shells, air defense systems, and anti-tank weapons such as the Javelin.
USAI packages focus on weapons and heavy equipment. Of note, around a dozen HIMARS to boost Ukrainian firepower and a dozen National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS) for air defense were contracted in 2022 and will soon appear on the battlefield.
Although the discussion of military aid generally focuses on major weapons, the key is quantity, not particular systems. In addition to weapons, militaries in combat need munitions of all sorts, from small arms to mortars to artillery, and a lot of ordinary supplies like trucks, night-vision goggles, and spare parts. The key, therefore, is the size of the flow and not whether that flow includes particular systems.
The focus on equipment should not obscure the “soft” support—training and intelligence data, for example—that the United States provides. Although such support cannot be counted in the same way that equipment can, it has been critical in building Ukraine’s military capabilities. Training encompasses not just the operation of donated Western equipment but also support for individuals and units. Intelligence information has enabled Ukraine to understand the strategic picture better (i.e., what Russia is doing and intends to do) and the tactical level (i.e., where Ukraine should fire its long-range munitions). Elimination of these would have hurt Ukraine’s military effort in ways that are hard to predict. The Europeans are providing some of this themselves and might replace some lost U.S. support, but the United States has capabilities that the Europeans do not and a scale of capabilities that is hard to replace.
Q4: Could the Trump administration stop the shipment of military aid?
A4: Yes, at least in part. Drawdown equipment is still being shipped. The Trump administration could direct that shipments cease despite announcements by the previous administration. More difficult would be stopping shipments of newly produced weapons from contracts Ukraine signed with the defense industry, though with funds provided by the United States. Legally, those belong to Ukraine. However, the Trump administration may be able to divert deliveries to U.S. forces using Title I of the Defense Production Act or other emergency authorities, citing national requirements. Although that claim would be a stretch, the Trump administration has not hesitated to use emergency authorities for its political goals.
Q5: If U.S. military aid ends, what other military aid will Ukraine receive?
A5: The United States is not the only equipment supplier to Ukraine. As calculated by Germany’s Kiel Institute, European military aid for Ukraine has been comparable to that of the United States, at roughly $1.8 billion per month. European aid was especially critical in late 2023 and early 2024 when the United States ran out of funds while Congress debated the next aid package. The European Union also approved using frozen Russian sovereign assets to support Ukraine’s military needs. The bad news is that the Europeans are already supplying as much as they can, given the deteriorated state of their defense industry. Further, if the United States ceases aid, many European countries will also likely scale back.
Ukraine also sources some equipment from its own defense industrial base. Investments in the last three years are now producing some key equipment in volume. Drone production—from small first-person-view (FPV) drones to long-range kamikaze drones—is a standout example, having increased over 100-fold since the invasion began. Ukraine has also started production of the home-developed Bohdana self-propelled howitzer and artillery ammunition. Although a significant step toward self-reliance, the scale of production cannot supply more than a fraction of what the Ukrainian forces need. Ukraine is still struggling with an unbalanced defense industry designed to be part of the broader Soviet Union defense network and not to produce complete systems on its own.
Q6: What will happen on the battlefield?
A6: The future depends heavily on the amount of equipment delivered.
Currently, the war is stalemated, but Russia has the initiative. Ukraine’s defenses on the eastern front are bending but not breaking, and it retains an enclave in Russia’s Kursk region. Russia has made small but continuous gains in Ukraine’s east since the Ukrainian counteroffensive halted in November 2023, though these gains have come at a high cost. In 2024, Russia gained territory roughly the size of Rhode Island while suffering over 420,000 casualties. At its current rate, Russian combat losses since the 2022 invasion are on track to exceed 1 million troops by midyear—a challenging statistic for Putin, who has resisted calling for a second mobilization.
On the positive side, the United States is projected to deliver substantially more equipment in 2025 than in 2024, barring a Trump administration interruption, with monthly deliveries rising from $500 million to $920 million. These deliveries, combined with increasing European production and expanding domestic production, will strengthen Ukraine’s firepower across the board and replace the high reported attrition.
Yet, pessimism abounds, reflecting Russia’s more numerous population (145 million people vs. 38 million) and larger economy ($2,021 billion GDP vs $179 billion GDP). Vice President JD Vance expressed the administration’s gloomy outlook, saying that “Russians have a massive numerical advantage in manpower and weapons in Ukraine, and that advantage will persist regardless of further Western aid packages.” Max Boot assessed the effects of a U.S. aid cutoff and concluded, “It would definitely result in far greater loss of life and could easily result in Ukraine losing the war.”
Despite Western sanctions and dwindling stockpiles, Russia has kept its military supplied by ramping up domestic production and securing weapons through external partners like North Korea. Russia’s production of artillery shells, which are a crucial source of firepower for both sides, continues to outpace the combined total of American, European, and Ukrainian production.
The bottom line: Prospects for Ukraine are bleak. In the best case, U.S. and European aid continues, which is enough for Ukraine to stabilize the front lines, blunt Russian attacks, and buy time for a negotiated settlement, perhaps with Russia more willing to make a deal as its casualties pass the 1 million mark.
In the worst case, the United States cuts off shipments of equipment. What Ukraine receives from the Europeans, other global sources, and its own industry will keep its forces in the field but with declining capabilities. Russian attacks will gain more and more territory; at some point, Ukrainian lines will break. Ukraine will have to accept an unfavorable, even draconian peace.
It is tragic that the Ukrainians are at this point after three years of heroic resistance and sacrifice.
Mark F. Cancian (Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, ret.) is a senior adviser with the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. Chris H. Park is a research associate for the Arleigh A. Burke Chair at CSIS.
